JANUARIO L. JISON, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLANT, VS. WARNER, BARNES & CO., LTD., CLAIMANT AND APPELLEE.

In Special Proceeding No. 1184 of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental, the court issued an order on April 6, 1949, fixing the
period of six months from April 16, 1949, within which claims against the
intestate estate of the deceased Eduardo L. Jison could be filed. On May 12,
1949, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., filed a claim against the intestate estate
for the sum of P2,105.52, plus 8 per cent interest compounded monthly from May
1, 1949, and 20 per cent of the total debt as attorney’s fees. A copy of said
claim was served on May 11, 1949, on attorney for the administrator. On May 5,
1950, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., filed a mo’fcion for the approval of its
claim, calling attention to the fact that the administrator had not filed any
answer thereto. On May 8, 1950, the administrator filed an opposition, setting
up the defense of moratorium. After the filing of a reply by the attorneys for
Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., the court on May 20, 1950, issued an order
approving the claim and directing the administrator to pay, within thirty days
from notice, the claim in question. From this order the present appeal was taken
by the judicial administrator.

Under section 5, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court, all claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether
the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expenses of the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in
any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants.
The effect of the debt moratorium is merely to make a debt, even if already
matured, not yet demandable; but section 5 of Rule 87 covers a claim which is
not due, and requires its presentation within the prescribed period, if it is
not to be barred. The purpose “is to settle the affairs of the estate with
dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto
without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims,
which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed.”
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 400.)

The general objective of the Moratorium Law, which is
rehabilitation of debtors, must give way to the more urgent necessity of
settling the estate of a decedent and distributing its residue among his heirs
as soon as possible, thereby minimizing, if not avoiding altogether, expenses of
administration. Sections 15 and 16, Rule 89, of the Rules of Court expressly
enjoin the court to fix the period within which the executor or administrator
should finish the settlement of the estate, such period not to exceed one year
in the first instance, or more than two years where special circumstances shall
so require, or more than two years and a half when the executor or administrator
dies and a new one is appointed. Thus, “the speedy settlement of the estate of
deceased persons for the benefits of creditors and those entitled to the residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration
have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.” (Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 3rd ed., Vol. II, p. 435, citing Magbanua vs. Akol,^[1] 40 Off.
Gaz. 3871, and Borja vs. Borja,^[2] L-1259, April 27, 1949.)

Moreover, as the Moratorium Law had not been set up timely,
because the administrator failed to file an answer within five days from the
service of copy of the claim in question, in accordance with section 10, Rule
87, of the Rules of Court, said defense has been waived. In this connection, the
trial court did not err in approving the claim without reception of evidence,
since the same was not denied by the administrator in due time.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, and it is so ordered
with costs against the appellant.

Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, and Labrador, JJ.,
concur.

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[1] 72  Phil., 567.

[2] 83 Phil., 405.