AMPARO CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. ROSA HERNANDEZ NALDA, JOSE HERNANDEZ NALDA, CARLOS HERNANDEZ NALDA, MARIA LUISA HERNANDEZ NALDA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND EUGENIO TORRES DE LOS HEROS…

Amparo Cruz seeks the
review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing her
petition in this case and dissolving the writ of pre­liminary injunction
therein issued.

It appears that, on June
13, 1956, a contract was entered into by and between said Amparo Cruz –
hereinafter referred to as peti­tioner – on the one hand, as lessee, and
members of the Nalda family^[1] – hereinafter referred to as respondents –
as well as Angela M. Butte – hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Butte – on the
other hand, as co-lessors, whereby the latter leased to the former three (3)
par­cels of land, located in the City of Manila and more particularly de­scribed
in the contract, including the buildings existing thereon.

One (1) of said parcels
of land, known as Lot No. 4, Block No. 2142 of the Cadastral Survey of Manila,
has an area of 544.90 square meters. 
Four-fifths (4/5) thereof – seemingly pro indiviso –
belongs to said respondents.  The estate
of the late Carlos Gil owns the remain­ing one-fifth (1/5), which had been
leased to Mrs. Butte.  The other two
(2) parcels of land adjoin said Lot No.
4, and are known as lots No. 3 and 16 of the same block, containing, more or
less, 386.80 square meters and 0.60 square decimeters, respectively.  Both are the exclusive property of Mrs.
Butte, who, before the year 1956, had
with the consent of respondents
and the representatives of the estate of Carlos Gil, constructed on the three
(3) lots a building, known as “Society Theater,” and other
improvements, which thereby became common property of the owners of the lots, in the following
propor­tions, more or less:

The aforementioned
contract of lease with petitioner herein was for a term of five (5) years, beginning from July 1, 1956 – extendible for
a like period and under the same terms and conditions, “at the option of
both parties” – at a monthly rental of P8, 500.00.  Short­ly before
the expiration of said term, petitioner advised the afore­mentioned co-lessors
of her wish to renew the lease for another five (5) years, under the same terms
and conditions above referred to.  Mrs.
Butte agreed thereto, but not respondents, who demanded a higher rate of rental,
for their share in the leased premises, and a reduction of the term of the
lease to three (3) years, in addition to the assumption by petitioner of the
cost of maintenance, repairs or alterations, formerly borne by the
co-lessors.  Petitioner replied invoking
her right to a renewal under the terms and conditions ori­ginally stipulated,
but, respondents countered that the contract could be renewed at the option
only of both parties,
and that they (respondents) would not agree to a renewal if petitioner did not
ac­cept their terms.

Upon the expiration of the period fixed in the contract,
respondents demanded the return of their respective portions of the leased
premises, plus P6,223.71 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
thereof, and the reimbursement of P5,067.00,
representing the cost of repairs allegedly made by them.

This demand not having been heeded, on August 4, 1961,
respondents filed, with the Municipal Court of Manila, a complaint, for
unlawful detainer, against herein petitioner. 
Having renewed the contract of lease with the latter, at the original
monthly rental, Mrs. Butte was not joined as party.  On April 17, 1962, judgment was given for the
respondents, but, on petitioner’s motion for re­consideration, another decision
was rendered, on August 6, 1962, dismissing the complaint.  On appeal taken by respondents, the Court of
First Instance of Manila – hereinafter referred to as the trial court –
sentenced petitioner to vacate the premises in ques­tion, to pay to respondents
P6,223.71 a month, as their share of the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of said premises, from July 2, 1961, until petitioner shall have
vacated the same, plus P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs.  Both parties appealed from this decision of
the trial court.

Before the appeal had been perfected, respondents moved, how­ever,
for the execution of this decision. 
Despite petitioner’s objection thereto, the trial court issued an order
granting the motion and authorizing the issuance of a writ of execution, unless
petitioner filed a supersedeas bond. 
Thereupon, petitioner commenced, in the Court of Appeals, the present
action for certiorari, against respondents herein and His Honor, the Judge who
presided the trial court.  On
petitioner’s motion, said appellee to court
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of the order complained of and the execution
of the trial court’s deci­sion. 
Subsequently, however, the appellate court dismissed the peti­tion for
certiorari and dissolved the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction,
upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject-mat­ter of the
case.  Hence, the present petition for
review by certiorari.

The Court of Appeals declared itself without jurisdiction to en­tertain
this case, upon the theory that the decision of the trial court, in the illegal
detainer case, was appealable, not to said appellate court, but to the Supreme
Court, and that, accordingly, the present action for certiorari is not “in aid of its” (Court of Appeal’s)
“appellate jurisdiction.” This conclusion was predicated upon the
premise that only questions of law could be raised in the appeal from the
decision of the trial court, no testimonial evidence having been introduced
before the same, and the parties having submitted the case for decision upon
purely do­cumentary evidence presented by them, the authenticity of which is
not in issue; that the main action hinges on the question whether or not peti­tioner
is entitled, pursuant to the provisions of the original lease con­tract, to a
renewal thereof, under the same terms and conditions there­in stipulated, which
is a question of law; and that petitioner had ques­tioned, first, in the
municipal court, and, later, in the trial court, the jurisdiction thereof to entertain
respondents claims for repairs and at­torney’s fees.

Upon the other hand,
petitioner maintains that the appeal from the trial court’s decision would
require a determination of the question whether she had acted in bad faith – as
found by the trial court – insisting upon a renewal of the lease, despite the
explicit language of the contract
requiring therefor the consent of “both” parties, which
question of bad faith, she claims, is one of fact; and that issues of fact are similarly
involved in the determination of the
reasonableness of the awards for the use and occupation of the leased premises and
for attorney’s fees.

Although petitioner
maintained that the municipal court and, later, the court of first instance had
no “jurisdiction” to adjudicate said attorney’s fees and damages, it
would appear that the objection was, in fact, based upon respondents’ alleged
lack of cause of action therefor.

Then, again, despite the fact that the case had been submitted
upon documentary evidence, the determination of the question whether or not
petitioner had acted in bad faith is one of fact, or, at least, a mixed
question of fact and law.  In any event,
the reasonableness of the amounts awarded as compensation for the use and
occupation of the property in litigation and as attorney’s fees is a question of fact.

Accordingly, and, since the
jurisdiction of no court is really involved in the appeal from the decision of the trial court, aside from
them act that petitioner had explicitly
appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals, it is clear to us that the presents certiorari proceeding is in aid of the jurisdiction of said Court of Appeal, and, hence,
with­in its original jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside and the record remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings, with the costs of this instance against the aforementioned
respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J., on official leave.

Angeles, J., no part.

^[1]
Rosa, Jose, Carlos, Maria Luisa, (assisted by her husband, Eugenio Torres de
los Heros), Eduardo, Rita (assisted by her husband, Rafael Marciano Gil) and
Carmen, all surnamed Hernandez Nalda, Aurora Martos Nalda (assisted by her husband
Francisco Perez Salado).  Francisco and
Maria Josefa (assisted by her husband Antonio Galy Muncada), both surnamed
Bernal Martos, Jose Luis Calderon Hernandez, Carmen Nalda Ortega, Amanda Ortega
(assisted by her husband, Francisco Sanchez Medina), Antonio Hernandez Nalda,
Benigno Today y Toledo and Eduardo Paz y Hidalgo.