NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. TERESA R. DE FRANCISCO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 2006) dismissing condemnation proceedings instituted
by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).

It appears from the record that on June 11, 1955, Republic Act No. 1266
became operative. This law provided as follows:

“Section 1. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA) is hereby authorized to expropriate within six months from the approval
of this Act, the Hacienda del Rosario situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City,
and pay the price of the land and cost of such expropriation out of its funds.
The said hacienda, shall be subdivided into lots not bigger than one hectare
each and resold to bona-fide occupants thereof at such price as may be
determined by the Board of Directors of the NARRA which shall include the price
of the land and the cost of such expropriation, administration, subdivision,
resale and interests. The purchase price of the resale to bona-fide tenants and
lessees shall be payable in installments within the period of not more than ten
years. Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.”

In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminent domain
proceedings in the Court below against the heirs of the original owner of the
Hacienda (the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario, who died in 1947) and their
subsequent vendees. The lands involved totalled 669 hectares, more or less; but
during the pendency of the proceedings, the heirs Dolores R. de Concepcion,
Teresa R. de Francisco and Paz R. de Tubangui agreed to the expropriation of
their respective holding; while defendant spouses Carmen R. de Ciocon and Jaime
Cioqon also agreed to the expropriation of their corresponding share, except a
portion of 85.0414 hectares, which said spouses were occupying and wished to
reserve for their seven (7) children and sixteen (16) grandchildren. As a
result, all the defendants mentioned voluntarily ceded to the NARRA about
391.7583 hectares.

The case then continued against the remaining defendants who (except the
Ciocons) were purchasers and sub-acquirers of various portions of the original
hacienda, and held different areas ranging from one-half to thirteen (13)
hectares, all acquired between 1949 and 1954; before the passage of Republic Act
No. 1266.

Invoking the decisions of this Court in Republic vs. Baylosis, 96
Phil., 461; 51 Off. Gaz., 722 and Rural Progress Administration vs.
Guido, 84 Phil., 847, the Court a quo declared that the condemnation proceedings
did not lie against the remaining defendants, and held that:

“Long before Republic Act No. 1266 was approved on June 11, 1955, the lots of
the defendants were already segregated from and were no longer identified with,
the Hacienda del Rosario. As a matter of fact, since April 7, 1938, or on
October 11, 1951, Hacienda del Rosario ceased to ¦exist. If it exists at all, it
does so in name only; for the estate which was formerly known by said name was
already broken up and partitioned among the five vendees and heirs of the
original owner, the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario. Hence, Republic Act 1266
cannot apply to the lots of the remaining defendants as it authorizes
condemnation proceedings only against the Hacienda del Rosario.

Moreover, by reason of their small areas, the said lots cannot be the subject
of expropriation for purposes of resale, because each lot is not the big landed
estate contemplated in Section 4 of Article XIII, Constitution, as construed by
the Supreme Court in numerous cases. The case of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Baylosis, (96 Phil., 461; 51 Off. Gaz., 722) is decisive of the
case at bar. Not even the decision in the case of Rural Progress Administration
vs. Reyes (G.R. No. L-4703, Oct. 8, 1953), which the Baylosis case
supersedes, can be applied to the present case by analogy.

* * * * *

“It shall be noted that the 300 or so families who are to be favored by the
expropriation can easily be accommodated in the expropriation area of about 391
plus hectares.

“The foregoing reasoning operates likewise against the right of the plaintiff
to expropriate the 85 hectares now presently owned and occupied by the
defendants-spouses Carmen R. Ciocon and Jaime Ciocon. Considering that the
Ciocon family had already agreed to the expropriation of about 108 hectares of
their property; that the said family is composed of seven children and 16
grand-children; that the Ciocon family are actually occupying and cultivating
the said 85 hectares through mechanized methods and not through tenants, much
less through any of the alleged 300 or so occupants of the other lots; the said
85 hectares could not be considered as a big landed estate within the purview of
Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution.”

The NARRA appealed from the decision, contending that the authorities cited
by the Court below were not applicable because they involved condemnation
proceedings under Commonwealth Act No. 539; that in view of the terms of
Republic Act 1266, “the Court can not inquire into nor review the action of the
Legislature in designating the particular property it has authorized the NARRA
to expropriate.”

We see no merit in the appeal. The power to expropriate, under both Republic
Act 1266 and Commonwealth Act No. 539, is predicated upon the provisions of
Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution, providing:

“Sec. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals”;

hence, the rulings of this Court as to the limits of the condemning power
rendered in expropriation proceedings instituted pursuant to Commonwealth Act
No. 539 are applicable to the case at bar.

This Court, in the Guido and Bayiosis cases, has already-ruled that, under
the quoted constitutional provision, the government may only expropriate landed
estates with extensive areas, and that once a landed estate has been broken up
and divided into parcels of reasonable extent, the resulting portions are no
longer subject to further expropriation, the existence of tenancy troubles
therein notwithstanding.

The doctrine, while not unanimous, still stands unre-versed; hence, it must
be applied to the present case, since the subdivision of the original Hacienda
del Rosario, and the reasonable size of the portions now involved in this
appeal, is uncontested. There is the more reason for adhering to the rulings
above-mentioned, now that the NARRA has already acquired almost two-thirds of
the original hacienda, and the court below found as a fact that the tenants’
families intended to be favored by the expropriation can be easily accommodated
in the area already acquired.

The appellant relies on City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 350,
wherein it was stated that where the legislature has directly determined the
necessity of appropriating private property for a particular public improvement
at a specified location, the utility, necessity and expediency of the
improvement and the suitableness of the location are questions for the
legislature to determine and the courts have no power to interfere and
substitute their own discretion. The doctrine thus invoked is entirely
inappropriate, for the question now before the Court is not the necessity of the
expropriation but the power or authority to expropriate under Article XIII, Sec.
4, of the Constitution. The validity of the statute directing the expropriation
is certainly a judicial question.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera,
Gutierrez David, and Paredes, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.