PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. JOHN RANDRUP, VICENTE TOMAS AND PEDRO AGOY, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On October 31, 1941, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
rendered a judgment, “sentencing the defendants to pay jointly and
severally unto the plaintiff, the sum of P591.92, with daily interest
thereon from today at P0.137 plus an additional sum of P59.19 as
attorney’s fees, and to pay the cost of this suit.” On June 30, 1947,
the plaintiff, Philippine National Bank, filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija a petition for reconstitution, in view of the
loss of the records of the case. By an order dated October 1, 1947, the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija declared the record
reconstituted with the presentation of a copy of the decision of
October 31, 1941, and ordered that, after the expiration of thirty days
from receipt by the defendants of copy of said order of October 1,
1947, without the defendants having taken any measure against said
order, execution be issued. On October 28, 1947, the defendants filed a
notion for suspension of execution in view of the debt moratorium
(Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by
Executive Order No. 32 dated March 10, 1945), which motion was granted
by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order dated
November 17, 1947. Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration filed
by the plaintiff, the latter interposed the present appeal.

Although proper step for the plaintiff to have taken was to
institute an action for the revival of the judgment of October 31,
1941, the error may be considered as non-prejudicial, especially when
account is taken of the fact that the defendants had never objected to
the procedure pursued by the plaintiff and the lower court.

The appeal is without merit, it appearing that the debt moratorium
is general in scope and does not make any discrimination in favor of
the plaintiff bank. We cannot subscribe to the arguement that
Commonwealth Act No. 672, passed on July 19, 1945, had the effect of
repealing the Moratorium Order in so far as the plaintiff bank is
concerned, because the principal purpose of said Act was merely to
allow the plaintiff bank to resume business with the view to its
rehabilitation, and this purpose may obviously be accomplished in spite
of the debt moratorium.

While the order suspending execution of the judgment of October 31,
1941, is correct, attention must be called to Republic Act No. 342
lifting the debt moratorium as regards prewar obligations subject to
certain conditions.

The appealed order is therefore affirmed without costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.