THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REMEGIO ESTEBIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

What is before this Court is the automatic review of a lower
court decision convicting the accused and sentencing him to death.  Its correctness is to be tested in the light
of the principal contention that the plea of guilt of the accused under the
circumstances disclosed did not suffice for the lower court’s judgment of
conviction.  There is, as will hereafter
be made evident, justification for such a stand as a reading of the transcript
would indicate that there were positive and categorical statements denying
culpability by the accused in the course of answering questions asked by the
lower court.  Accordingly, the conviction
should be reversed and the case remanded.

The information under which the accused was arraigned reads as
follows:  “That on or about the 7th
day of June, 1966, in the afternoon, in Bo. Gobarogwan,
Municipality of Mondragon, Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, actuated by lust and with lewd designs and by means of
force and intimidation, and with the use of deadly weapon locally known as ‘depang‘, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Felisa
Buenaobra, 26 years old, an unmarried woman of good
reputation, against the will and consent of the latter.  That in the commission of the crime, the
following aggravating circumstances were present:  (1) in an uninhabited place; and (2)
recidivism, the accused having been convicted by final judgment before the
Honorable Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Catarman
Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-445 for Forcible
Abduction, on May 18, 1959, convicting the accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P500.00 and to pay
the costs.” This information filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on August 26, 1966 arose from a com­plaint
for rape against the accused by the offended party, Felisa
Buenaobra, dated June 21, 1966.

The arraignment was held on August 26, 1966 in the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch IV then presided by Judge Manuel R. Pamaran.  The accused
was represented by an attorney de oficio,
Gabriel de Guia. 
After the counsel de oficio
stated that the accused would want to enter a plea of guilty, the lower court
twice asked him whether such was the case, after informing him that the penalty
imposed could be death.  Twice the
accused answered in the affirmative.^[1]
He was then informed by the presiding judge that in order to give him enough
time to deliberate maturely on such a grave matter, he was given up to 2:00
o’clock that afternoon.  Accordingly,
when the session was resumed, he was asked “what is his stand now?”
This was the reply of his lawyer: 
“Upon arrival, this repre­sentation inquired from the accused,
after having been duly informed by the Court of the effect of the plea of
guilty, and he still makes his decision to proceed with his plea of guilty as
stated this morning to this Court.”^[2]
When the accused was asked directly whether such manifestation of the lawyer
was true, the accused categorically affirmed: 
“Yes, sir.”^[3]
Then, through the court interpreter, this question was put to him: “Are
you guilty or not?” The answer: 
“Guilty.”^[4]

Thus far, it would seem that the accused did really intend to
enter such a plea, but what transpired in the subsequent questioning would, at
the very least, raise doubts on the matter. 
The court wanted to find out why he entered the plea of guilty.  This was his response:  “To be candid, sir, I would have not
entered the plea of guilty.”^[5]
When the question was repeated, he answered: 
“Because I already asked the woman to marry her.  What was lacking was our marriage.”^[6]
Again, when queried as to his plea of guilt, he spoke of the real reason, which
was not an admission of culpability: 
“Because I cannot do anything, sir, because I cannot fight this
case as I am very poor.”^[7]
He was given the opportunity to elaborate by the court stating that he would be
furnished counsel de oficio.  What came from him in effect was a denial
that the crime of rape was committed: 
“To tell the truth also, sir, in this case when it happened it is
not true that I raped her.  We were at
that time going to town to buy our necessities. 
It so happened that my supposed brother-in-law, a younger brother of the
woman, desires that another person marry her. 
As a matter of fact, I was even wounded. 
The first slash blow I received was this one.  (Witness showing a scar extending one finger
at the lower left scapula and about 1 centimeter wide).”^[8]
When pressed further why he had to plead guilty, if what he said was true, he
had an explanation:  “Because I had
already a previous case, and I believe that the government will still prosecute
me.”^[9]
The lower court, desirous of further clarification, informed the accused that
he could reconsider his plea and that he would be given a lawyer so that he
would have a fair trial.  All that was
said in reply was:  “I submit myself
to the discretion of the Court.”^[10]
When pressed to be specific on the matter, he categorically stated:  “I would desire not to plead guilty in
this case if I have the funds or money to pay for this.”^[11]
There would still, however, appear to be some slight confusion in the mind of
the accused, for when reminded that he did not have to pay a single centavo, he
surprisingly came out with the statement that “he would plead guilty to
the charge.”^[12]
At that stage, he was reminded again that the penalty imposed would be death.^[13]

Then and there, in open court, the decision now on review was
rendered, with the accused sentenced to death, the crime being one of rape with
the use of a deadly weapon, attended by the two aggravating circumstances of
uninhabited place and recidivism, which was offset by the mitigating
circumstance of a plea of guilty.  This
Court, as announced, is of a different mind. 
The plea, considering the totality of the replies made by the accused to
the questions propounded by the lower court, could not in law be said to be one
of guilt.  The conviction cannot stand.

1.  The principal error
assigned, as set forth in the very able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Gonzalo W. Gonzalez, is that the lower
court did not fully inform the accused of the consequences of a plea of
guilt.  In a recent opinion promulgated a
year ago,^[14]
this Court speaking through Justice Dizon, there is
this timely reminder to trial judges as to the course of conduct to be followed
whenever an accused in a capital offense enters such a plea.  Thus: 
“We have gone over the record and We find that the motion for new
trial mentioned heretofore is justified. 
The present being one for murder for which the defendant was sentenced
to suffer the maximum penalty of death, We find it proper to invite the
attention of the court a quo and of all trial courts in general to what We said
in People v. Apduhan, G. R. L-19491, August 30, 1968
and People v. Solacito, G. R. L-29209, August 25,
1969 on the matter of what the trial court should do upon arraignment of a
defendant charged with a capital offense, before he is allowed to enter a plea
of guilty.”^[15]

In People v. Apduhan,^[16]
Justice Castro, for the Court, did properly stress the need for such care and
circumspection in these words: 
“Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must
hasten to commend the trial judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the
entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan,
notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and hence presumed to have been advised
properly.  Judge Alo
made sure that the accused clearly and fully understood the seriousness of the
offense charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it.  When the accused proposed to confess his
guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the death
penalty might be imposed despite his plea of guilty.  As aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan’s plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge Alo reopened the case to determine with definitiveness the
nature of his plea.  The virtue of Judge Alo’s efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan
pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the signifi­cance and consequences of his
act, recommends itself to all trial judges who must refrain from accepting with
alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands
fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.”^[17]
In People v. Solacito,^[18]
there is this realistic appraisal of the matter by the Chief Justice:  “No comparable assurance is imparted by
defendant’s affirmative answer to the questions propounded by the lower court
‘whether he understands the meaning of a plea of guilty and whether he is
admitting all the material averments in the information.’ The questions were,
apparently, formulated in such a technical language that a layman is likely to
miss the far-reaching implications thereof. 
There is every reason to believe that the accused, who claims to be an
‘ice-plant delivery boy’ is not capable of understanding the precise
connotation of the term ‘material averments’ of the information, used by His
honor the trial Judge, without any explanation thereof, which, seemingly,
was not given.”^[19]

There is, in addition, this equally relevant excerpt from People
v. Arpa,^[20]
where Justice Teehankee, as ponente,
after referring to the early cases of United States v. Talbanos^[21]
and United States v. Rota,^[22]
quoted with approval this excerpt from People v. Bulalake:^[23]
“It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to
the discretion of the trial court. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme
penalty of death are subject to review by the Supreme Court as law and justice
shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic review
neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade, it would seem that the
proper and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a plea of ‘guilty’
to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person with little or no
education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but
to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of
his plea.”^[24]
Tested by such authoritative pronouncements, it would appear that the lower
court, while not lacking in awareness of the proper procedure to be followed in
the event that the plea of the accused is one of guilt, ought, in the light of
the answers made, to have called to the stand witnesses to ascertain exactly
what did really transpire.

2.  In that sense, the
principal error assigned is not without basis. 
Moreover, precisely because of the line of questioning pursued, the
answers elicited from the accused did cast enough doubt as to his intention to
accept culpability.  There were explicit
statements made that cannot be interpreted as other than a denial that he was
liable for the crime of rape imputed to him. 
It has been the constant, uninterrupted holding of this Court from United
States v. Dineros^[25]
that the essence of such a plea “is that the accused, on arraignment,
admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the
consequences and the meaning of his act.”^[26]
As further elaborated by Justice Carson, who likewise penned the opinion in the
subsequent case of United States v. Jamad:^[27]
“The effect of that ruling is to make it clear that the doctrine just
referred to is not applicable unless the plea of ‘guilty’ is in truth and in
fact made under the conditions indicated, that is to say on arraignment, freely
and voluntarily, as an express admission of the guilt of the accused of the
offense with which he is charged, and with full knowledge of the consequences
and the meaning of his act.  A mere
formal plea of ‘guilty’ made under compulsion, or under any condition other
than those just indicated will not suffice.”^[28]

There is need, then, for such a categorical declaration by the
accused that he is guilty of the crime charged, one made with full knowledge of
the consequences that such an admission would entail.  The plea entered in this case was not
impressed with such an attribute.  To so
construe the statements of the accused, characterized by inconsistencies and
express disclaimers of guilt, as amounting to an acknowledgment of criminal
liability, would be to disregard what has so long and so constantly been
adhered to.^[29]
There is force in the observation that the Constitution cannot be satisfied
with anything less.^[30]
It presumes the innocence of the accused; it is imperative then that the fact
of guilt be demonstrated by competent and credible evidence beyond reasonable
doubt.  The accused could, of course,
dispense with the need of proof by the express admission at his arraignment
that he is guilty of the offense charged. 
There must be a clear and categorical showing, though, that such indeed
was his intention.  The plea of guilt
must be unequivocal.  It must not give
rise to contrary interpretations. 
Unfortunately, that is what happened in this case.  The lower court should not have been
satisfied that the accused did in fact plead guilty.  Thus, his judgment of conviction cannot
stand.

3.  With the conclusion thus
reached, there is no need to pass upon the other three errors assigned by the
accused to the effect that the lower court should not have appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, should not have imposed the
death penalty, and should not have considered the plea of guilt as an admission
of the allegations in the amended information.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 26,
1966, convicting the accused of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly
weapon and sentencing him to death, is set aside, and the case remanded to it
for further proceedings in conformity with law. 
Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon and
Ruiz Castro, JJ., on official leave.

^[1] T.s.n., Session of August
26, 1966, p. 2.

^[2] Ibid,
p. 3.

^[3] Ibid,
p. 4.

^[4] Ibid.

^[5] Ibid,
p. 5.

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10] Ibid,
p. 6.

^[11] Ibid.

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] Ibid,
p. 7.

^[14]
People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245.

^[15] Ibid,
p. 251.

^[16]
L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 798.  The following cases either
explicitly or implicitly followed the Apduhan
doctrine:  People v. Villas,
L-20953, April 21, 1969, 27 SCRA 947; People v. Arpa,
L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037; People v. Mongado,
L-24877, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 642; People v. Nabual,
L-27758, July 14, 1969, 28 SCRA 747; People v. Solacito,
L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v. Serafica,
L-29092, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Tilos,
L-27151, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 734; Longao v.
Fakat, L-23978, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 866; People v.
Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245;
People v. Espejo, L-27708, Dec. 19, 1970, 36
SCRA 400.

^[17] Ibid,
p. 817.

^[18]
L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29
SCRA 61.

^[19] Ibid,
pp. 67-68.

^[20]
L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27
SCRA 1037.

^[21]
6 Phil. 541 (1906).

^[22]
9 Phil. 426 (1907).

^[23]
106 Phil. 767 (1959).

^[24] Ibid,
p. 770.

^[25]
18 Phil. 566 (1911).

^[26] Ibid,
p. 572.

^[27]
37 Phil. 305 (1917).

^[28] Ibid,
p. 313.

^[29]
In addition to the cases cited above, the following decisions come to
mind:  People v. Zulueta, 78 Phil. 413 (1947); People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 562 (1948); People v. Serrano, 85
Phil. 835 (1950); People v. Santa Rosa, 88 Phil. 487 (1951); People v.
Villasco, 90 Phil. 512 (1951); Cadimas
v. Director of Prisons, 97 Phil. 697 (1955); People v. Acosta, 98
Phil. 642 (1956); People v. Triompo, 100 Phil.
83 (1956); People v. Rapirap, 102 Phil. 863
(1958); People v. Lambino, 103 Phil. 504
(1958); People v. Santos, 105 Phil. 40 (1959); People v. Salazar,
106 Phil. 221 (1959); People v. Bulalake, 106
Phil. 767 (1959); People v. Remollino, 109
Phil. 607 (1960); People v. Arconado, L-16175,
Feb. 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 559; People v. Tenorio,
L-15478, March 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 700; People v. Boyles, L-15308, May 29,
1964, 11 SCRA 88; People v. Sta. Maria, L-19929, Oct. 30, 1965, 15 SCRA
222; People v. Coronel, L-19091, June 30,
1966, 17 SCRA 509; People v. Balisacan,
L-26376, Aug. 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 1119; People v. Halasan,
L-21495, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 701; People v. Roldan,
L-22030, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 907.

^[30]
According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 17; “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, * *
*.”