CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE VARELA, HON. IGNACIO DEBUQUE AND FELIX V. VALENCIA, RESPONDENTS.

On
November 16, 1950, Felix V. Valencia, general superintendent of the
Cebu Portland Cement Company, was dismissed and retired with gratuity
by the company’s board of directors. Contesting his dismissal, the
labor union to which he belonged took the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations, and that court, under date of July 8, 1952,
rendered its resolution, finding Valencia’s dismissal unjustified and
ordering his reinstatement in office with full backpay and “with all
the privileges and emoluments thereunto attached * * *.” That
resolution is now before this court for review, but it is not the
subject of the present petition for certiorari and mandamus, and is
here mentioned only because of its bearing on the case.

The
present case arose as a consequence of the company’s attempt to oust
Valencia from the company house which as general superintendent he was
entitled to occupy free of charge. Because Valencia refused to leave
the house despite his removal from office, the company brought suit
against him for illegal detainer in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Naga, Cebu, and that court, on August 20, 1951, rendered judgment
ordering him to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental of P100
from November 16 of that year. Valencia appealed to the Court of First
Instance, the appeal being perfected on September 12, 1951 with the
filing of the appeal bond on that date.

Once the case was in
the Court of First Instance, the company had an order issued for writ
of execution, but the order was lifted on October 8, 1951, following
the filing of a supersedeas bond for P1,500. Ordinarily such bond
answers only for rents due at the time of the perfection of the appeal.
But in the present case the bond, in express terms, guarantees not only
the rents already due (P1,000), but also those that were still to
become due (“los alquileres devengados y los por devengar”).

On December 7, 1951, the company was again able to secure a writ of
execution because of Valencia’s failure to make a cash deposit for the
rents corresponding to September and October of that year. Valencia
moved for a reconsideration, deposited P400 to cover four months’ rent
and called attention to the fact that the question of his separation
from the company was still pending in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Acting on this motion, the court issued its order of
December 29, 1951, suspending the writ of execution on the grounds that
Valencia’s right to continue occupying the premises depended upon the
result of the case in the Industrial Court, which had not yet been
decided, that his supersedeas bond for P1,500 was answerable for the
rents up to the final determination of the case, and that the deposit
of P400 to cover rents up to and including December, 1951, negatived
any intention on his part to enjoy the occupancy of the house without
paying any rent. A motion to lift this order of suspension having been
denied, the company brought the present petition for certiorari and
mandamus, asking that the said order be annulled as having been issued
without jurisdiction, and that a writ issue commanding the judge below
to lift the stay of execution.

Courts of first instance in
detainer cases are authorized to grant execution upon appellant’s
failure to deposit the monthly rents on time during the pendency of the
appeal. But this court has already ruled that execution may be denied
where the delay in making the deposit was due to fraud, error or
excusable negligence. (Bantug vs. Roxas, 73 Phil., 13; Cunaan vs. Rodas^[1] 44 Off. Gaz., 4927; Yu Phi Khim vs. Amparo,^[2]
47 Off. Gaz., Supp. 12, 98). In the present case, the deposit was late,
but the lower court has excused the delay as being due to an honest
belief that the supersedeas bond covered both past and future rents-as
therein expressly stipulated-and that, after all, appellant’s right to
remain in office and enjoy its emoluments, including free quarters, was
still pending determination in the Court of Industrial Relations. The
lower court, in our opinion, acted with justice and equity and only
followed the precedent established in the cases above cited when it
rendered the resolution herein complained of.

Pending
decision on this petition for certiorari and mandamus, counsel for the
company, on March 18, 1952, filed a supplemental pleading, complaining
that on the 3rd of that month the lower court had denied another motion
for execution based on Valencia’s failure to deposit the rental for
January of that year. It appears from the order of denial that the
lower court considered the new motion for execution as involving the
same question as those which gave rise to the present case and which
were denied because of “unique or exceptional circumstances” that, in
its opinion, made suspension of execution “more in consonance with
justice and equity,” for which reason the court again had to deny
immediate execution “at least, until the Supreme Court has passed upon
the questioned orders.” Now that a decision has come down from the
Court of Industrial Relations ordering Valencia’s reinstatement, and
with the certiorari case (G. R. No. L-6158) for the review of that
decision already heard, we are not disposed to interfere with the
exercise of discretion which the lower court has made in the last order
complained of for the maintenance of a status quo.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 78 Phil., 800.

[2] 86 Phil., 441.