EMILIANO MORABE, ACTING CHIEF, WAGE ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. WILLIAM BROWN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF CLOVER THEATER, RESPONDENT AN…

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila denying a petition of the chief of the Wage Administration
Service for the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang by the respondent
William Brown. The original petition filed in the Court of First
Instance alleges that the respondent had dismissed Pablo S. Afuang
because in an investigation conducted by the petitioner of charges
against the respondent that the latter paid his employees beyond the
time fixed in Republic Act No. 602, the said Afuang was one of the
complainants; that the respondent discharged the said employee in
violation of section 13 of said Act. The petitioner, therefore, prayed
that the respondent be ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang, and that a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issue for his reinstatement.
The court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Thereafter, the respondent presented a petition asking for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground that Pablo S. Afuang had
presented a letter asking excuse or apology from the respondent for
having taken his case to court. This motion to dismiss was, however,
not acted upon, and the case was heard and the parties presented their
evidence. On May 2, 1952, the Court of First Instance rendered judgment
finding that the dismissal from the service of Pablo S. Afuang is
unlawful and violates section 13 of the Minimum Wage Law, because the
fact that he testified at the investigation is not a valid ground for
his dismissal from the service. The court, however, refused to grant an
order for the reinstatement of said Pablo S. Afuang on the ground that
this remedy, which it considers as an injunction, is available only
against acts about to be committed or, actually being committed, and
not against past acts; that injunction is preventive in nature only;
and that as the law has already been violated, the remedy now available
is for the prosecution of the employer for the violation of the Minimum
Wage Law, and not for the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. It,
therefore, dismissed the action, as well as the petition for the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction, and that which was theretofore
granted was dissolved. Against this judgment an appeal has been
prosecuted to this Court.

The only assignment of error is that the lower court erred in not
ordering the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang in the service. It
is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that
mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by
the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been carried
out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but
one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the
reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary
mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in
character. In the case at bar, Pablo S. Afuang was entitled to continue
in the service of respondent, because his act is expressly provided to
be no ground or reason for an employee’s dismissal. Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 602 states that “it shall be unlawful for any person
to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against any
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act, *
* *.” Pablo S. Afuang was, therefore, unlawfully deprived of his right
or privilege to continue in the service of the respondent, because his
dismissal was unlawful or illegal. Having been deprived of such right
or privilege, it is within the competence of courts to compel the
respondent to admit him back to his service.

In the case of Manila Electric Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose, 22
Phil., 433, the lower court ordered the Manila Electric Co. to furnish
electric current to Jose, the electric company having cut the current
to Jose’s house because it suspected him of stealing electricity by the
use of a jumper. This Court held that the action was not one of
injunction but of mandamus, as it compelled the electric company to
furnish Jose with electric service. In the case at bar, the court can
also order the respondent to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang. Were we to hold
that Afuang may not be reinstated because he has already been
dismissed, there would not be any remedy against the injustice done
him, or for him to return to the position or employment from which he
was unlawfully discharged. This remedy (of ordering reinstatement) has
been granted in parallel situations by the Court of Industrial
Relations with our approval, when laborers have been illegally
separated by their employers without legal or just cause. This remedy
has also been granted in similar cases in the United States, from which
jurisdiction the Minimum Wage Law or Republic Act No. 602 has been
taken. (Walling, etc. vs. O’Grady, et al., No. 2140, Nov. 3, 1943, U.
S. District Court, Southern District of New York; 3 WH Case 781.)

The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and the respondent
William Brown is hereby ordered to reinstate Pablo S. Afuang to the
position he held prior to his dismissal. Without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Concepcion, JJ., concur.