G.R. No. L-38383. May 27, 1981
WILLELMO C. FORTUN, PETITIONER, VS. RUFINO O. LABANG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY FISCAL OF PAGADIAN CITY; ATTORNEY MARTIN VERA CRUZ; AND ATTORNEYS ANDRES BERSALES, PABLITO PIELAGO,…
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The decisive issue in this prohibition and certiorari
proceeding, filed on March 20, 1974 by Judge Willelmo
C. Fortun, then the incumbent District Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur and Pagadian City, Branch III, is the
applicability of the basic principle that while this Tribunal in the exercise
of its equitable powers will not restrain any action taken in the enforcement
of a criminal statute, an exception is made, and prohibition lies, as set forth
in the leading case of Dimayuga and Fajardo v. Fernandez,[1]
“where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law
in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions.”[2] As was pointed out in the opinion, this
doctrine is traceable to the earlier decision of Kwong
Sing v. City of Manila,[3] with Justice Malcolm as ponente. In brief, petitioner Judge was accused by a
member of the bar[4] and a former employee[5] in a letter-complaint of a possible
irregularity in his claim for gasoline allowance, originally
considered by them sufficing to
hold him liable administratively. Five of the nine members of the Board of Directors
of the provincial chapter of the Integrated Bar endorsed such administrative
charge to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes being the
President at that time. After four
months, such letter-complaint with the affidavit was endorsed to the City
Fiscal, respondent Rufino O. Labang.[6] Then came these
crucial allegations: “10. On
February 16, 1974, respondent City Fiscal, acting with precipitate haste and
without exercising the utmost care and prudence which the case required,
considering the seriousness of the charge and the sensitive nature of
petitioner’s office, and without bothering to comply with the mandatory provisions
of Section 1 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 77, dated December 6, 1972, namely,
that the statement of the complainant or his witnesses should be sworn to
before him as investigating fiscal, and without taking into account Paragraphs
2 and 6 of Executive Order No. 264, dated October 6, 1970 in conjunction with Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which require that complaints against CFI Judges should
be filed with the Supreme Court, peremptorily gave due course to said complaint
and its supporting papers by immediately issuing a subpoena (I.S. Nos. 392-403-74) requiring petitioner to file and
serve his answer or counter-affidavits and other supporting papers
thereto. 11. On the morning of February
18, 1974, just as petitioner was about to ascend the rostrum to start the first
session in his Court, after 6 months absence therefrom
due to his detail as CFI Judge of Tarlac, Branch I,
said subpoena was served upon him in a jam-packed courtroom, filled with
practitioners and spectators who were not there for any case but to witness the
reaction of petitioner to the service of said subpoena, in further disregard of
the spirit behind Section 6 of Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, on the
confidentiality of proceedings against judges.”[7]
Petitioner Judge contested the legality of the issuance of said subpoena and
asked for the dismissal of the complaint, but he was unsuccessful. Hence, this petition before
this Tribunal.
The
petition on its face being indicative of a possible harrassment
to which Judge Fortun was subjected by reason of his official action, the
letter-complaint coming from a member of the bar who had lost six of the nine
cases in petitioner’s sala[8] and the supporting affidavit coming from a disgruntled former employee,[9] this Court issued
a temporary restraining order, and, in the same resolution of March 25, 1974, required comment from the
respondents. Only respondent City Fiscal
filed a comment on May 6, 1974.
There was no explicit denial of certain allegations indicative of the
hostility manifested towards petitioner Judge.
Instead, the ten-page comment relied on what was considered to be
applicable decisions. There was no
effort to refute the allegation that there was a failure to abide by the
requirements of Presidential Decree No. 77, but, it was argued that there was
substantial compliance. Also, there was
a misreading of the opinion of this Court in Tecson
v. Salas,[10] concerning the broad scope of the power of
the President over executive officials.
It certainly lacks the necessary persuasiveness to justify the lifting
of the restraining order. Petitioner
Judge saw the opportunity to file a reply, and on June 27, 1974, did so.
After noting that the other private respondents failed to contest the
petition, the reply stressed that the pattern of harrassment
was quite obvious. Thus: “Under date of September 17th, 1973,
Atty. Martin Vera Cruz, a
disgruntled barrister who lost 6 out of the 9 cases he filed before petitioner’s
sala, sent a letter, not to the City Fiscal,
but to Atty. Andres Bersales, President of the Zamboanga
del Sur Chapter of the Integrated Bar, asking, in effect, that administrative charges be
initiated against petitioner for alleged misuse of this travel allowances. What did Atty. Bersales
do? He convened the Board of Directors
of the local IBP chapter and out of its 9-man membership, 5 attended, as
follows: 1) Atty. Andres Bersales, its President and the Provincial Board
Secretary, who lost all his cases before petitioner’s sala. 2) Atty. Pablito Pielago, who works with
Atty. Bersales in the Governor’s Office. 3) Atty. Glicerio Carpio, who works also
with Atty. Bersales in the Governor’s Office. 4) Atty. Santiago Eisma – Provincial Treasurer who, in the first place,
officially approved in such capacity payment of all the disbursements of
petitioner now being questioned.
5) Atty. Leonardo Zulueta, who lost all except
one of the cases he handles before petitioner’s sala. The five of them, without the concurrence or
attendance of the remaining 4 members of the 9-man Board of Directors of the
Integrated Bar Chapter of Zamboanga del Sur on so important a subject, peremptorily passed
resolution no. 7 resolving to file not only administrative but criminal charges
against petitioner. The resolution
discloses 2 things: first, it is not reflective of the collective
will of the IBP Chapter concerned because it was a divided Board that acted on
it and, second, the five members who voted for it without the participation of
the 4 others have ‘axes to grind’ against petitioner. Two of them, Atty. Bersales
and Zulueta, invariably lost their cases before
petitioner’s sala while Atty. Pielago
and Carpio are subordinates of Atty. Bersales in the Governor’s Office.”[11]
To indicate that the
complaint was filed as a manifestation of vindictiveness and for the
humiliation of petitioner judge, the reply characterized the resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines chapter as having been
“railroaded,” petitioner not having been given a chance to explain
his side contrary to procedural due process. He strengthened his
petition by quoting the full text of the answer of retired Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines rejecting the plea of such chapter to
support the criminal case filed with the respondent City Fiscal.[12] Such letter of Justice J. B. L. Reyes should be quoted in full: “We have just received copy of
Resolution No. 10 of your Chapter, recommending that administrative and
criminal charges be filed against Judge Willelmo Fortun of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur and Pagadian City
and requesting the preventive suspension of said Judge. One thing that immediately attracted our
attention is that nowhere in the resolution is there any indication that the
respondent Judge was informed of the charges studied
by the Grievance Committee, nor does it appear that said respondent was given
an opportunity to present his side before the Grievance Committee or the Board
of Officers adopted said Resolution No. 10.
It is thus manifest that the action of the Chapter officers violated the
cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of
Law. Not only this, but the Chapter’s
action in this case has disregarded the fact that the integration of the Bar
sought to make it possible not only to protect lawyers and litigants and to
discipline and/or remove incompetent and unworthy judges, but also to ‘(4)
Shield the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its
own forum,
from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist
it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence.’ * * * The
unseemly haste with which the Chapter appears to have acted, referring the
charges to the City Fiscal’s office, without notice
to the respondent nor giving him opportunity to present his side before taking
action, precludes this national office from supporting the aforesaid Resolution
No. 10. Not only this, but in the
absence of adequate explanation for such one-sided action on the part of your
Chapter, it will become the unavoidable duty of this Office to oppose the
suspension asked for. It is unfortunate
that lawyers who have taken an oath to support and defend the law and the
Constitution should choose to ignore the fundamental principle of due
process. It is therefore requested that
you remit to this Office a full report of the proceedings of the Grievance
Committee and the adoption of its recommendations by the Board of Officers, as
soon as possible. Pending receipt
thereof, we have asked the Honorable Supreme Court to withhold action on your
Chapter’s request for preventive suspension.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar is due to meet on March 23, 1974. It would be best if your report is received
by this Office before said date.”[13]
No effort was made either
by respondent City Fiscal or any of the private respondents to dispel in any
way the grave doubts raised as to the bona fides in the filing of this complaint against
petitioner. A memorandum was
submitted by petitioner. Respondents
maintained their silence. The only explanation appears to be
their realization that the petition is meritorious.
So we find. Prohibition lies.
1. At the outset, reference
was made to the invocation by petitioner-Judge of the leading Dimayuga decision.
Seven years after its promulgation, in 1930 to be precise, it was relied
upon in Tong v. Santamaria & Standard Oil Co.[14]
Justice Villamor as ponente
stressed that “the remedy of prohibition is somewhat sui-generis,
and is one more or less of legal discretion, and is intended to prevent the oppressive exercise of legal
authority.”[15]
Such categorical enunciation of one of the most highly valued principles of
equity ought to have cautioned respondent City Fiscal against, in the language
of then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes, acting with “unseemly haste.” This is
one occasion then that calls for the exercise of the equitable powers of this
Court to repudiate what was clearly an “oppressive exercise of legal
authority.” It only remains to be added that Dimayuga
has been cited with approval in a number of cases subsequent to Tong v. Santamaria.[16]
2. The sad and lamentable
spectacle that this case presents, a judge being subjected to harrassment and humiliation, fortunately is not
typical. It can diminish public
confidence in the courts. At the very
least, it minimizes the respect properly owing an occupant of the bench. Whatever be the motive of respondent City
Fiscal, the impression yielded is that
such excessive zeal was not prompted solely by obedience to his oath of
office. The appearance, hopefully not
the reality, could only be that of sheer vindictiveness or oppressive exercise
of state authority. He was oblivious of
the fact that the judiciary and the prosecution service are both essential
agencies in the enforcement of penal statutes, not antagonists. At times it has been said, and with reason,
that the rights of an accused person could be emasculated, even rendered
nugatory, if a judge and the prosecuting fiscal are on the most amicable terms. Respondent
City Fiscal in this case erred on
the other extreme. He was the first to
lend himself to a scheme that could have no other
purpose than to place petitioner-Judge in contempt and disrepute. Such conduct calls for vigorous
condemnation. The Constitution cannot be
any more explicit: “Public office
is a public trust.”[17]
A public official must keep uppermost in his mind that the sole guide in the
performance of his duties is the paramount need of the public service.
3. The petition made
reference to an Executive Order outlining the procedure on complaints charging
government officials and employees with commission of irregularities.[18]
It is therein provided that complaints against presidential appointees,
and judges are included among them, “shall be filed with the Office of the
President or the Department Head having direct supervision or control over the
official involved.”[19]
At present, the department head is the Supreme Court, the Constitution having
expressly vested the power of supervision over all courts to this Tribunal.[20]
The removal of such power in the Department of Justice in 1973, now the
Ministry of Justice, is a recognition of the need to preserve unimpaired the
independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents
and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative
branches. Many are the ways by which
such independence could be eroded. While
the present instance is a rare aberration, it could happen again. When such a case occurs, this Court must act – and
promptly to set matters right. This is what
the Court did in its resolution immediately issuing a temporary restraining
order upon the petition being filed. It
cannot be too strongly emphasized that a judge of an inferior court is deserving of the full protection of this Tribunal against any form of
vexation, inconvenience, or harrassment, the more so
when, as is quite evident, haste and recklessness marked the conduct of respondent City Fiscal. Let there be no misunderstanding. Our ruling
does not signify that this Tribunal is averse to a judge facing charges against
him, if presented in the manner provided for by law and with bona fides. The power of administrative supervision
precisely has been granted to
this Court to assure that malefactors on the bench suffer for their
misdeeds. Conversely, however, when, as
did happen here, a complaint was utilized to embarrass and humiliate a member
of the judiciary, it is broad enough to include such remedial action in aid of
a judge, who, to all the appearances, is the victim of a deliberate attempt to
impugn his good name and reputation. The
judicial power constitutionally granted to this Court, independently of the grant
of supervisory
authority, justifies the intervention of this Court in a case like the present.
4. The characterization by
retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes, then President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
of the “unseemly haste” that marked the actuation of respondent
members of the Board of Directors of the Integrated Bar Chapter of Zamboanga del Sur, Pagadian City Chapter, appears to be rather mild – all
things considered. He pointed out that
there was a violation of the cardinal principles of fairness and due process
that underlie the Rule of Law.
Petitioner-Judge was not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend
himself against the accusation. There
was, on the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a
Resolution of the Integrated Bar stressing that precisely integration could
shield “the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at
it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence.'”[21]
A greater sense of responsibility, not to say a more adequate grasp of the cardinal requirements of due
process as well as of the applicable procedural rules, ought to have been
displayed by private respondents.
Moreover, they did not even make any effort to dispute the accuracy of
the imputation of being disgruntled members of the bar with a record of losing cases. That apparently was the motive for their
accusation. They paid no attention to
the norm of conduct that lawyers should observe as officers of the Court. The then officers of the Integrated Bar, included
as private respondents, have an even greater responsibility. Clearly, they were recreant
to the trust reposed on them. The
penalty of censure is imposed on each and everyone of
the private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted restraining
respondent City Fiscal or any one acting in his place from enforcing the
subpoena dated February 16, 1974 in I.S. Nos.
392-403-74 and from proceeding with the preliminary investigation based on the
letter-complaint of respondent Martin Vera Cruz to the President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Zamboanga del Sur Chapter and Pagadian
City. The writ of certiorari is
likewise granted annulling the order of February
22, 1974 issued by respondent City Fiscal denying the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner. The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed.
The restraining order is hereby made permanent. Let a copy of this decision be spread on the
record of private respondents Martin Vera Cruz, Andres Bersales,
Pablito Pielago, GlicerioCarpio, Santiago Eisma
and Leonardo Zulueta.
This decision is without prejudice to a bona fide
investigation of the charges against petitioner, Judge Willelmo
C. Fortun, who has since then been appointed to the
Court of First Instance of Lingayen, Branch I. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Ministry of Justice and the Tanodbayan. Costs against respondents.
Barredo, Aquino,
Guerrero, Abad Santos, and
De Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
43 Phil. 304 (1922).
[2]
Ibid, 307.
[3]
41 Phil. 103 (1920).
[4]
Respondent Martin Vera Cruz.
[5]
Modesto Radaza
was not named respondent.
[6]
The other private respondents are: Attorneys Martin Vera Cruz, Andres Bersales, Pablito Pielago, Glicerio Carpio, Santiago Eisma and
Leonardo Zulueta.
[7]
Petition, pars. 10 and 11, 3-4.
[8]
Ibid, par. 5, 2.
[9]
Ibid, par. 6, 2.
[10]
L-27525, 34 SCRA 275.
[11]
Reply, par. 3, 2-3.
[12]
Ibid, par. 4, 3-5.
[13]
Memorandum of petitioner, citing Bar Integration Resolution
of January 9,
1973, 4-5.
[14]
54 Phil. 371 (1930).
[15]
Ibid, 376.
[16]
Cf. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925); Aglipay
v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937);
Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 (1939); People v.
Zulueta, 89 Phil. 751 (1951); University of the Philippines v. City Fiscal of Quezon City, 112 Phil. 880 (1961).
[17]
Article XIII, Section 1, opening sentence.
[18]
Executive Order No. 264 (1970).
[19]
Ibid, Section 2.
[20]
According to Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution: “The
Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.”
[21]
Memorandum of petitioner, citing Bar Integration Resolution
of January 9,
1973, 4-5.