DIRECT FUNDERS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ERNESTO L. MARAJAS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BATANGAS CITY, BRANCH 8, AND CITY OF BATANGAS, RESPONDENTS.
PERALTA, JR., E. B., J.:
We unfurl some pertinent available datum of the backdrop.
Following the filing of a suit by public respondent City of Batangas for nullity of title and reconveyance principally against petitioner, petitioner supposedly filed the Answer. In the course of the pre-trial conference on October 20, 2011, petitioner caused the marking of exhibits and entered into stipulations. On an unspecified date, the pre-trial conference resumed on another occasion and because of non-appearance of Juan Javier, Jr. who was presumably a different defendant in the suit, Javier, Jr. was declared in default, inclusive of petitioner, per the Order of March 6, 2012.
After a lull, petitioner presented a Motion for Reconsideration on April 11, 2013 to secure relief from the Order of default. Subsequent to public respondent’s Opposition, the court below resolved to deny petitioner’s recourse which constrained it to utilize the current Petition based on three ascriptions on the propriety of the Order of March 6, 2012, the rebuff of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, and the concept of “immutability of decisions.”
In keeping with the incipient Resolution of September 30, 2013,[2] public respondent City of Batangas’ Comment[3] materialized which essentially demurred to petitioner’s thesis of wanton exercise of discretion.
We resolve to reject the Petition for Certiorari.
Insofar as technical glitches, it was beyond cavil that petitioner is a domestic corporation[4] but the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was signed by a certain Richard Neil S. Chua as authorized representative sans any concrete authority therefor from the Board of Directors of petitioner. On this score, pertinent excerpt of Mr. Justice Regalado assumes resonance:[5]
“This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons. Where the petitioner is a corporation, the certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative. The same is true with respect to any juridical entity since it has of necessity the proper officer to represent it in its other transactions (Digital Microwave Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 128550, Mar. 16, 2000). In National Steel Corp. vs. CA, et al. (G.R. No. 134468, Aug. 29, 2002), the rule was liberally applied pro hac vice in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and in the interest of substantial justice.”
However, in BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, et al. (G.R. NO. 131214, July 27, 2000), it was held that the certification of non-forum shopping may be signed, for and on behalf of a corporation, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. This does not mean, though, that any lawyer representing the corporation may routinely sign that certification. That lawyer must be specifically authorized in order to validly sign the same. Further, while said counsel may be the counsel of record, there must be a resolution of the board of directors that specifically authorizes him to file the action and execute the certification (BPI Leasing Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127624, Nov. 18, 2003). ”
Neither was the Petition accompanied with a certified true copy of the so-called Order of default on March 6, 2012[6] which was likewise assailed by petitioner.[7] A contrario, what was appended was only a certified true copy of the Resolution of July 9, 2013 from the trial court in regard to the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Independently of the foregoing hitches, it was clarified by public respondent’s Comment that after petitioner’s ‘default’ on August 23, 2011 was lifted, petitioner was again subjected to the identical sanction referred to in Section 5, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure during the hearing of March 6, 2012 as prelude to presentation of the plaintiff’s evidence.[8] Even on the assumption that there was an inaccuracy on the part of the court below, relative to terminology[9] for the repercussion of a defendant’s non-appearance during pre-trial conference, inclusive of the aspect of “immutability of decision”, such misconceptions will not necessarily denigrate the disputable inference of regularity in the performance of official duty enjoyed by every magistrate.[10] Certainly, the procedural faux pas as attributed by petitioner to the court below only amounted to a ‘harmless error’ in Section 6, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” [underscoring Ours]
It is a well-established rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven where they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.[11]
Indeed, the remedies in Rule 65 are extraordinary, and their use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases.[12] By contrast, the method of petitioner’s presentation of procedural alpha, nay, requisite documentations to fortify petitioner’s submissions, barely scratched the surface, so to speak.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[13]
SO ORDERED.
De Leon, M.M., (Chairperson), and Cruz, S.C., JJ., concur.
[1] Dated September 19, 2013, Rollo, pp. 3-15.
[2] Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[3] Dated October 29, 2013, Rollo, pp. 48-60; Resolutions dated December 16, 2013, June 10, 2014 and November 17, 2014, Rollo, pp. 61-63.
[4] Petition, paragraph 9, page 3, Rollo, page 5.
[5] 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 10th edition, 2010, pp. 169-170.
[6] Second paragraph, Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7] Reliefs, Petition, page 9, Rollo, page 11.
[8] Comments to the Petition for Certiorari, paragraphs 12 and 17, pp. 3-4, Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[9] 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 10th Edition, 2010, page 315 – “This is a substantial reproduction of Sec. 2 of the former Rule 20 with the change that, instead of the defendant being declared “as in default” by reason of his non-appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff’s evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While actually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety or terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word “default” in the former provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, not non-appearance in court.”
[10] Section 3 (m), (n), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence; Peralta, Jr., Perspectives of Evidence, pp. 375-376, page 376, citing 1 Jones on Evidence, The Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal, 5th edition, 1958, page 94, citing a plethora of cases, 4 Wigmore on Evidence, A Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1905, page 3534; Weissenberger and Duane, Federal Rules of Evidence: Rules, Legislative History, Commentary and Authority, 2007, page 92, citing 2 McCormick, $344.
[11] 2 Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, 2013 edition, page 425, citing Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 [1910], Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 [1918], Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 [1946];
cf. Gaw vs. Chua, et al., G.R. No. 160855, April 16, 2008, Justice Nachura – “If there was an error committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondent’s testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.”
[12] 1 Regalado, Vide, page 795, citing Republic vs. Villarama, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 117733, September 5, 1997; cf. Sangguniang Panglunsod ng Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, G.R. No. 160025, April 23, 2014, and other cases., C.J. Sereno.
[13] Second paragraph, Section 8, Rule 65.