THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FRANCISCO PALMON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Francisco Palmon was charged before the Court of First Instance of
Capiz with serious physical injuries committed on November 19, 1948, in
the municipality of Batan, Capiz, by firing a carbine at one Pedro
Cipriano, thereby hitting and wounding Eliseo Flogio on the left thigh,
which had to be amputated to save his life.

Before the arraignment of the accused His Honor Judge Hipolito Alo motu proprio
dismissed the case on the ground that, under section 87 of Republic Act
296, the crime charged falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace. From that order the provincial fiscal appealed.

The crime with which the accused is charged is defined and penalized
by Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 2, which reads as
follows:

“Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and
shall suffer:

“*           *            *            *            *            *            *”

“2. The penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of the physical
injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or a leg, or shall have lost
the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for the
work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged.”

Prision correccional in its medium and. maximum periods ranges from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years.

Section 44 of Republic Act ho. 296 provides that the Courts of.First Instance shall have original jurisdiction:

“(f) In all criminal cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos.”

Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised Penal Code and of
the Judiciary Act of 194$, there can be no question that the Court of
First Instance has original jurisdiction to. try and decide the case at
bar. The question arises from the provisions of section 37 of the same
Judiciary Act which reads in part as follows:

“Sec. 87. Original jurisdiction to try criminal cases.—Justices of the peace end judjes of municipal courts of chartered cities shall have original jurisdiction over:

“(a) All violations of municipal or city ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;

“(b)
All offenses in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
not more than six months, or a fine of not more than two hundred pesos,
or both such fine and Imprisonment;

“(c) All criminal cases arising under the laws relating to:

“(1) Gambling and management of lotteries;

“(2) Assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident upon the trial;

“(3) Larceny, embezzlement and estafa where the amount of money or
property stolen, embezzled, or otherwise involved, does not exceed the
sum or value of two hundred pesos;

“(4) Sale of intoxicating liquors;

“(5)Falsely impersonating an officer;

“(6) Malicious mischief;

“(7) Trespass on Government or private property; and

“(8) Threatening to take human life.”

We note that some of the cases enumerated under paragraph (c)
of the above-quoted section 87 also fall under the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. For instance, some cases
of gambling, operation of lotteries, embezzlement and estafa are punished with imprisonment of more than six months or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. (See
Article 195, paragraph 2, [referring to gambling and betting], Article
217, paragraph 1, [referring to malversation or embezzlement of public
funds or property], and Article 315, paragraph 4 (b) [estafa through falsification], of the Revised Penal Code..)

Likewise an assault without intent to kill may constitute a crime
punishable with imprisonment of more than six months if it results in
serious physical injuries, as in the present case. The provincial
fiscal contended in the court below that the assault mentioned in
section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1946 comprehends only an aggression
which produces no physical injury and which necessarily falls within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace. That
view was rejected by the trial judge and is not shared by the Solicitor
General in this appeal, and we think they are right. An assault
causing no physical injury is penalized in paragraph 3 of Article 266
of the Revised Penal Code with arresto menor in its minimum
period or a fine not exceeding fifty pesos. That would necessarily fall
under the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in accordance with
paragraph (b) of Article 87. There would, therefore, be no need for sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph (c) if the assault mentioned therein meant only an aggression which produces no physical injury.

The Solicitor General agrees with the trial judge that the crime in
question resulted from an assault mentioned in section 87. But, whereas
the trial judge holds that such a crime falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, the Solicitor
General contends that the Court of First Instance and the Justice of
the Peace Court have concurrent original jurisdiction over the offense.

We uphold the contention of the Solicitor General for the following reasons:

1. Section 44 (f) of the Judiciary Act of 1943
   expressly confers original jurisdiction on the Courts of First Instance
   over all criminal cases, like the present, in which the penalty
   provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of
   more than two hundred pesos. And section 87 of the same Act also
   confers original jurisdiction on justices of the peace and judges of
   municipal courts of chartered cities over all criminal cases arising
   under the laws relating to assaults where the intent to kill is not
   charged or evident upon the trial. The serious physical injuries
   charged in the information resulted from such assault. There is no
   inconsistency in giving two courts concurrent jurisdiction over the
   same offense. To construe section 87 (c) as conferring exclusive
   original jurisdiction on justices of the peace and judges of municipal
   courts over all criminal cases therein enumerated, would be to nullify pro tanto section 44 (f) of the same Act. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible.

2. formerly judges of municipal courts of chartered cities had concurrent
   jurisdiction with the Courts of First Instance over all criminal cases
   mentioned in section 87 (c), while was justices of the peace
   did not. Sections 86 and 87 of Republic Act ho. 296 put justices of the
   peace end judges of municipal courts on the same level by giving them
   the same jurisdiction in both criminal and civil cases. Section 87 (c)
   of Republic Act No. 296 was adopted from the provisions of the Revised
   Administrative Code on Chartered Cities with regard to the jurisdiction
   of municipal courts. Both sections 2468 (Manila) and 2562-A (Baguio) of
   the Revised Administrative Code provide that the municipal court “shall
   also have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over
   all criminal cases arising under the laws relating to gambling and
   management of lotteries, to assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or evident ipon the trial, to larceny, embezzlement and estafa
   where the amount of money or property stolen, embessled or otherwise
   involved coes not exceed the sum or value of two hundred pesos, to the
   sale of intoxicating liquors, to falsely impersonating an officer, to
   malicious mischief, to trespass on Government or private property and
   to threatening to take human life.”

From the foregoing considerations, it seems clear that the
jurisdiction given to justices of the peace and judges of municipal
courts over all criminal cases enumerated in paragraph (c) of section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 is not exclusive but concurrent with the Courts of First Instance.

The trial court therefore erred in dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction.

The order of dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, without any finding as to
costs.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.