PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER AND ASSISTANT CITY FISCAL ERNESTO M. BROCOY OF BUTUAN CITY, PETITIONERS, VS. CITY JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA OF BU…

People versus Villanueva

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus brought before the Supreme Court by the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his Assistant City Fiscal against City Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva of the City Court of Butuan City. The fiscals assail the judge's order dismissing a criminal information for serious slander by deed on his own motion, on the ground of prescription, without waiting for the accused to be arraigned or for a warrant of arrest to be issued. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between the fiscal's determination of probable cause and the judge's constitutional power to issue a warrant of arrest, and because it reminds every practitioner that certiorari and mandamus cannot revive a remedy that was lost through the failure to appeal.

Procedural History

The City Fiscal of Butuan City filed an information for serious slander by deed in the city court against Rogelim Yee, attaching the affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses and certifying that he had conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation and found probable cause. Instead of issuing a warrant of arrest, the respondent judge conducted an ex parte preliminary examination of the record, concluded that the offense was either slight slander by deed committed in the heat of anger or slight physical injuries, both light felonies, and dismissed the case on his own motion on the ground of prescription, two days after the information was filed. The fiscal moved for reconsideration, and the respondent judge denied the motion. The fiscal received a copy of the order of denial on January 6, 1981. The prosecution did not appeal the order of dismissal. Instead, on March 17, 1981, long after the dismissal, the city fiscal and his assistant filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Supreme Court, assailing the dismissal order on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts

On July 14, 1980, in the afternoon, Rogelim Yee allegedly attacked and assaulted Ofelia V. Torralba, a fourth-year student, inflicting a contusion on her left cheek in the presence of her visitors, teachers, and classmates, with the deliberate intent of bringing her into discredit, disrepute, and contempt. On September 15, 1980, the city fiscal filed an information for serious slander by deed, certified that he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, found probable cause, and recommended bail of 600 pesos. The affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses were attached to the information.

Rather than issuing a warrant of arrest, the respondent judge conducted an ex parte preliminary examination by scanning the record. After perusing the affidavits, he concluded that the offense committed was either slight slander by deed committed in the heat of anger or slight physical injuries, a light felony. Because the information was filed sixty-four days after the offense was committed, he dismissed the case on his own motion on the ground of prescription. The dismissal order was issued on September 17, 1980, two days after the filing of the information.

The respondent judge denied the fiscal's motion for reconsideration, and the fiscal received a copy of the denial on January 6, 1981. No appeal was taken from the dismissal order. On March 17, 1981, the fiscals filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

• Whether or not certiorari and mandamus may be entertained to annul an order of dismissal where the ordinary remedy of appeal was available but was not seasonably taken.
• Whether or not a trial judge, after the fiscal has filed an information and certified that he conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, may hold another preliminary examination to determine probable cause.
• Whether or not the judge, believing that there is no probable cause, may dismiss the information outright on his own motion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, Article IV of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution provides:

No warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

This is the constitutional source of the judge's power to ascertain probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest, and it also recognizes that a responsible officer authorized by law, such as the fiscal, may make that determination.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, governs the availability of certiorari, and the Court reads it together with section 2 of the same Rule on mandamus to hold that these remedies are generally not proper when ordinary appeal is available as an adequate remedy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition cannot be entertained because certiorari and mandamus are not proper when ordinary appeal is available as an adequate remedy. As a rule, certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal. Where an appeal would have been an adequate remedy but was lost through the petitioner's inexcusable negligence, certiorari is not in order. The prosecution failed to appeal the order of dismissal, and so the petition must fail.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, is clothed with the prerogative of ascertaining probable cause, a power granted by section 3, Article IV of the Bill of Rights and by section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and the charter of Butuan City. But the Court held that, as a rule, a trial judge should not hold another preliminary examination to determine probable cause once the fiscal has filed an information and certified that he conducted the requisite preliminary investigation. That certification means there is a prima facie case against the accused and that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is justified. The fiscal is a responsible officer authorized by law within the meaning of the Bill of Rights, and his determination of probable cause is a sufficient justification for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, those of the fiscal should normally prevail.

On the third issue, the Court held that the judge's power to ascertain probable cause does not include the authority to dismiss outright the information if the judge believes there is no probable cause. The judge should require the fiscal to present additional evidence to show probable cause, and if the fiscal refuses, the case may be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Here, the respondent judge did not merely verify the fiscal's determination of probable cause; he inquired into whether the criminal liability of the accused was already extinguished by prescription, which presupposes not merely probable cause but the guilt of the accused. The Court found that the city court erred in dismissing the case on its own motion on the controversial ground of prescription, but dismissed the petition because no appeal was seasonably made and certiorari and mandamus are not substitutes for an appeal that had lapsed.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, certiorari and mandamus are not substitutes for appeal; where appeal was available and was lost through inexcusable negligence, certiorari will not lie. Second, the fiscal's certification that he conducted the requisite preliminary investigation is ordinarily sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the trial judge should not duplicate the fiscal's preliminary examination. Third, the judge's power to determine probable cause does not include the power to dismiss the information outright; he should require the fiscal to present additional evidence, and dismissal is proper only for lack of prosecution if the fiscal refuses. Fourth, the extinction of criminal liability presupposes guilt and is a matter for trial, not for a pre-arraignment determination of probable cause.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, without costs, because no appeal was seasonably taken from the dismissal order and certiorari and mandamus are not substitutes for an appeal that had lapsed.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the fiscal's certification of a prior preliminary investigation is ordinarily sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the judge may not dismiss the information outright on his own motion. Examiners use this case to test the limits of the judge's probable-cause power and the rule that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.