MARIA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE ESPIRITU, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, ANASTACIA TOPACIO, JOSEFA JARDINIANO AND REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE,…

Espiritu versus Court of First Instance of Cavite

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Maria San Miguel Vda. de Espiritu against the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Anastacia Topacio, Josefa Jardiniano, and the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to set aside, as null and void, the trial court's order dismissing her complaint on the ground of prescription, the later order requiring her to return the transfer certificates of title to the defendants, and the orders refusing to give due course to her appeal. The case matters because it teaches two enduring lessons: first, that a final order or judgment must be served either personally or by registered mail before the period to appeal can begin to run; and second, that under the Civil Code the action of a vendee to compel the execution of a deed of conveyance is not imprescriptible, but must be brought within the periods fixed by law.

Procedural History

The petitioner filed her complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite in October 1964, seeking to compel the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance over two parcels of land. The defendants answered, setting up the statute of frauds and prescription, and later filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription. No opposition having been filed, the trial court issued an order on July 31, 1967 dismissing the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff. On January 23, 1968, acting on the defendants' motion for the return of the transfer certificates of title, the trial court ordered the petitioner to return the titles to the defendants. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal in November 1968, and later a notice of appeal and a record on appeal. In an order dated April 1, 1969, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, holding that the dismissal order had already become final and executory, and disapproved the record on appeal as filed out of time. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Facts

Sometime in 1948, according to the complaint, the defendants verbally sold to the petitioner two parcels of land for three thousand pesos. Delivery of the lands and of the corresponding transfer certificates of title was made to her, but no deed of sale was executed at the time because the defendants promised to do so as soon as the titles, then still in the name of their predecessor in interest, were transferred to their names. The petitioner demanded the execution of the deed time and again, but the defendants adamantly failed and refused to comply.

The defendants denied that the transaction was a sale. They alleged that it was a contract of antichresis, that is, a security arrangement, whereby the petitioner had loaned them one thousand five hundred pesos and demanded delivery of the lands and titles as security, with the right to collect the income therefrom pending payment of the loan. They interposed the statute of frauds and prescription as affirmative defenses, and moved to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The dismissal order was sent to counsel by ordinary mail, not by registered mail, and there is no showing that the petitioner or her counsel ever received it. Only much later, through motions and pleadings filed by the defendants, did the petitioner learn of the dismissal. She then moved for reconsideration and sought to appeal, but the trial court ruled that the dismissal order had long become final and denied her relief.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of dismissal had become final and executory when the petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration, considering that the order was served by ordinary mail and there is no proof of receipt by her or her counsel.
• Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription without hearing.
• Whether or not the petitioner's action to compel the execution of a deed of sale is imprescriptible.
• Whether or not the order of dismissal, which adopted by reference the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss, complied with the constitutional requirement that a decision state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

Applicable Provisions

Section 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides:

Final orders or judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail.

This is the pivotal rule: because the dismissal order was served by ordinary mail, service was defective and the period to appeal never began to run.

Article 2270 of the Civil Code provides:

The following laws and regulations are hereby repealed: The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on prescription as far as inconsistent with this Code.

This repealing clause supplanted the old statute of limitations invoked by the petitioner, including the provision she claimed made her action imprescriptible.

Article 2258 of the Civil Code provides:

Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue.

This confirms that the exercise and duration of the petitioner's right are governed by the Civil Code, not by the old Code of Civil Procedure.

Article 1357 of the Civil Code provides:

If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the contract.

This shows that the action to compel the execution of the deed cannot outlast the action upon the contract itself.

Article 1145 of the Civil Code provides:

The following actions must be commenced within six years: Upon an oral contract; Upon a quasi-contract.

This is the period the Court applies to the petitioner's action, which is founded on an oral contract.

Article 1149 of the Civil Code provides:

All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues.

This is the alternative period, in case the action is not deemed one upon an oral contract.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the dismissal order had not yet become final and executory when the petitioner moved for reconsideration. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, the period for appeal starts only from notice of the final order or judgment, which means when it is duly served. Section 7 of Rule 13 requires that final orders or judgments be served either personally or by registered mail, and under this provision a final order cannot be served by ordinary mail. Since there was no showing that the petitioner or her counsel ever received the ordinary mail containing the dismissal order, the motion for reconsideration was timely filed. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendants' motion for the return of the titles, which mentioned the dismissal, operated as notice, because such indirect imparting of knowledge is not a mode of service under the rules.

On the second issue, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on prescription. The trial court had given the petitioner every opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss, and no opposition was ever filed.

On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioner's action had prescribed. The old statute of limitations in the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed by Article 2270 of the Civil Code, and the Civil Code does not consider the action of a vendee to compel the execution of a deed of conveyance as imprescriptible. Only the rights enumerated in Article 1143, namely the right of way and the action to abate a nuisance, are not extinguished by prescription. The petitioner's action is founded on an oral contract, which is governed by the six-year period of Article 1145, or, at the latest, by the five-year period of Article 1149. Since the cause of action accrued in 1948 and the suit was filed in 1964, sixteen years later, and no interrupting circumstance under Article 1155 was shown, the action had clearly prescribed.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the dismissal order, which adopted by reference the reasons stated in the motion to dismiss, substantially complied with the constitutional requirement that a decision state the facts and the law on which it is based. The Court nevertheless advised judges to avoid mere general reference and to quote the subject of the reference textually.

Finally, the Court held that although the petition was procedurally well grounded, mandamus to compel the approval of an appeal must be denied where it is evident that the appeal has no merit, for mandamus is mainly a remedy in equity and it would serve no useful purpose to reinstate an appeal certain to fail.

Doctrine

A final order or judgment must be served either personally or by registered mail, and the period to appeal runs only from such valid service. Service by ordinary mail is ineffective, and knowledge acquired indirectly through other pleadings does not cure the defect.

The statute of limitations in the Code of Civil Procedure was repealed by Article 2270 of the Civil Code, and the Civil Code does not treat the action to compel the execution of a deed of conveyance as imprescriptible. Such an action, founded on an oral contract, prescribes in six years under Article 1145, or in five years under Article 1149. Only the actions enumerated in Article 1143 are imprescriptible.

Mandamus to compel the approval of an appeal will be denied where the appeal is clearly without merit, even if the procedural ground for the petition is sound.

Disposition

The petition was denied, with costs against the petitioner, and the dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her appeal were left standing.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a final order served by ordinary mail is not validly served, so the period to appeal never begins to run. Examiners use this case to test service of judgments under Rule 13 and the prescriptibility of actions to compel the execution of a deed of sale under the Civil Code.