NORBERTO G. SUDARIO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIP­PINES (BUREAU OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS), RESPONDENT.

Petition for review^[1]
of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission which reversed the
award made by Regional Office No. 10, Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Zamboanga
City, in favor of petitioner.

Petitioner, Norberto G. Sudario, Jr. was employed as Senior
Telegraph Operator with a monthly salary of P386.00 by the Bureau of
Telecommunications from September 16,
1953 until his retirement on January
1, 1973.  His duties
consisted of starting the telegraph engine for about four or five times daily
in order to provide the power link between the Liloy telegraph station and the
nearby stations.  He also had to deliver
telegrams on foot to the residents of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.  Most of the time he was at the mercy of the
elements.  After some years in the
service, he started suffering chest pains and difficulty in breathing.  When he was transferred to Ipil, Zamboanga
del Sur he had himself x-rayed by Dr. Henry Sevilla and was found to be
suffering from cardiac enlargement. 
An x-ray examination made by Dr. Milagros Fernandez con­firmed said
findings.  Due to his ailments, he was
cons­trained to file an application for sick leave from November 11, 1971 to
December 12, 1971.  After recuperating
from his ail­ment he returned to work but only to perform light jobs.  The recurrence of his ailment eventually
forced him to apply for retirement on January 1, 1973.  Prior to his retirement, however, petitioner
filed a claim for compensation with Regional Office No. 10, Workmen’s
Compensation Unit, Zamboanga City on March 20, 1972.  The Regional Office, however, did not act on
his application because he failed to submit a physician’s report of his ill­ness.  On March 26, 1975, petitioner refiled his
claim and submitted an electrocardiographic examination performed on him by Dr.
Jose Generoso.  The Acting Referee of the
Regional Office gave due course to the application and set the case for hearing
after which he rendered a decision granting compensation benefits to petitioner
in the sum of P2,315.56, pursuant to Section 18 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act.^[2]

Respondent Republic Bureau of Telecommunications filed a motion
for reconsideration of said decision on the ground that petitioner’s illness
medically known as “cardiomegally-carditis chronic,” is not
compensable.  The motion was denied.  After the denial of the motion, the records
of the case were forwarded to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission as provided
by Section 4, Rule 15^[3]
of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commis­sion.

The respondent Commission reversed the decision of the Acting
Referee on the following grounds:

1) That petitioner failed to present substantial evidence to show
that his sickness which is not per
se a compensable illness, was service-connected or was aggravated by the
nature of his employment.

2) That petitioner failed to show that prior to January 1, 1973,
he had been disabled to work for a certain period of time and that petitioner
having filed his claim after having retired from the service can no longer
claim for benefits under Act 3428.

We reverse and set aside the ruling of the respondent
Commission.  By presenting a physician’s
report regarding his illness and his application for sick leave due to his
heart ailment, petitioner has sufficiently substantiated his claim.  Considering the nature of his work which
consisted of deliver­ing telegrams to distant places by foot plus doing odd
jobs in the office due to lack of personnel therein, it is not difficult to
sustain the claim of petitioner that he acquired his illness in the course of
his employment or at least aggravated during his employment.  It has long been settled that once an illness
supervenes in the course of one’s employ­ment, the presumptions established by
Section 44^[4]
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act stand in the employee’s favor.  It is then incumbent upon the employer to
rebut the said pre­sumptions with substantial evidence, which respondent
Republic failed to do in the instant case. 
While it might have contested the claim, it has not presented sufficient
evidence to overcome Section 44 of Act 3428 except to contend that the illness
of petitioner is non-compensable.

It is claimed by
respondent Republic that petitioner has never been disabled before his
retirement on Jan­uary 1, 1973.  The
transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of the Regional Office
shows that in 1972 petitioner was still sick and was incapacitated from doing
his regular work in the office.  True it
is that he reported for work but with his physical condition at the time he
could not perform the work he used to do for the respondent Republic, like
starting the engine, delivering telegrams
and so forth.  He was in such a bad shape
that it was physically impossible for him to perform his old job in the Bureau
of Telecommunications.  As a matter of
fact his retirement was approved by the government, which only shows that he
had met, the conditions
prescribed for optional retirement pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 133
issued by the Office of the President which among others provides that
“all applications for optional retirement under Commonwealth Act No. 180,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1616 and No. 4968 shall not be recommended for
approval unless funds are available in the office or bureau concerned for the
payment of applicant’s retirement of its programmed projects and activities and
provided any of the following circumstances or conditions is present:  1.  x x
x (2) The employee is below 65 years of age, is physically incapacitated to
render further efficient service.” The approval of petitioner’s application
for retirement is a clear indication that he was physically incapacitated to
render further efficient service.

It is also claimed by respondent Republic that petitioner is no
longer entitled to compensation benefits after having received his retirement
benefits from the government.  While it
is true that retirement from the service results in the severance of
employer-employee relationship which relationship is the jurisdictional
foundation for a claim for compensation benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, nevertheless, as long as the illness or injury for which compensation is
claimed arose out of or in the course of the employment, the retired employee
is still entitled to compensation benefits under the provisions of Act 3428.  The enjoyment by government employees covered
by the GSIS law of retirement benefits under said Act (C.A. 186, as amended),
concurrently with benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is expressly
provided for in Section 3 of Act 3428 which reads:

“This Act is also applicable to all officials, employees and
laborers in the service of the National Government and its political
subdivisions and instrumentalities; Provided, however, ‘That officials,
laborers and employees insured with the Government Insurance System, and their
dependents when entitled to the benefits of the said in­surance system shall,
in addition to the same, be entitled to the benefits granted by this Act.”

Thus in one case^[5]
the Supreme Court speaking thru Associate Justice Felix V. Makasiar has ruled
that the claim for death benefits is compatible with compulsory retirement
benefits from the service.  Apart from
the fact that the retirement of government officials and employees and the
award of death benefits to them are governed
by different laws and therefore should be treated separately one from the
other, in Reynaldo vs. Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public
Schools), et al., G.R. No. L-43108, June 30, 1976, finding that the
claimant therein had been on sick and vacation leaves from 1971 to sometime
1972 when she retired at the age of 55 due to further aggravation of her
illness, this Court sustained the award of compensation benefits after finding
therein that petitioner’s illness was traceable to her working condition which
was obtained by continuous and long use of her eyes in connection with her work
and that her illness might have been aggravated by her employ­ment.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the appealed decision of the respondent Com­mission is hereby reversed and set
aside and another one entered ordering private respondent to pay the petitioner
the amount of P2,315.56 as
compensation benefits pur­suant to Section 18 of the Workmen’s Com­pensation
Act; to reimburse to him his medical expenses properly receipted for and also
to pay attorney’s fee in the amount of P230.00 and P61.00 as administrative
fees.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Treated as a special civil
action by Court resolution of October 1, 1976.

^[2]
SEC. 18.  Amputation and non-scheduled
dis­ability. – Amputation between elbow and wrist shall be considered as
equivalent to the loss of a hand. 
Amputation between knee and ankle shall be considered as loss of a
foot.  Amputation at or above the elbow
shall be considered as equivalent to the loss of an arm.  Amputation at or above the knee shall be
considered an equivalent to the loss of a leg.

Compensation for the injuries above
specified shall exclude all other compensation except the benefits provided for
in Sections thirteen, fourteen and fifteen.

In case of an injury producing a
serious disfigurement of the face or head, the Commission may, at the request
of a interested party, determine and award such compensation as may seem fair
and proper in view of the nature of the disfigurement, but which shall not
exceed six thousand pesos.

In all other cases of this kind of
disability not mentioned in other sections of this Act, the compensation shall
be fifty per centum of the difference between the average weekly wages of the
injured person and his subsequent earning capacity in the same or some other
employment, payable while the partial disability lasts; but subject to
reconsideration of the degree of impairment by the Commission at the request of
an interested party:  Provided, however,
That the weekly payments shall in no case be continued for a period longer than
two hundred and eight weeks.

The total compensation prescribed
in this and the next preceding section and the total compensation prescribed in
Sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shall, together, not exceed the sum
of six thousand pesos:  Provided,
however, That after the payment has been made for the period specified by the
Act in each case, the Workmen’s Compensation Commission may from time to time
cause the examination of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of compensation which shall not however,
exceed the said amount of six thousand pesos.

^[3]
SECTION 4.  Duties of Referee.  – Upon receipt of a petition for
review, the referee having control of the case shall immediately act upon the
same.  Should he decide to re-open the
case and order a new trial, his decision is deemed vacated so that after the
re-hearing or reception of new or additional evidence, he shall render a new
decision or order.  He may merely amend
or modify his decision or order.  The new
amended or modified decision or order, shall become final unless a petition for
review is filed with the referee within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the aggrieved party.

In case the referee does not render
a new decision or amend or modify the decision or order sought to be reviewed,
he shall immediately issued an order denying the petition for view or motion
for reconsideration and elevating the entire case to the Commission for review.

^[4]
SEC. 44.  Presumption.  – In any
proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under this
Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary –

1. 
That the claim comes within the provisions of this Act;

2. 
That sufficient notice thereof was given;

3. 
That the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another;

4. 
That the injury did not result solely from the in­toxication of the
injured employee while on duty; and

5. 
That the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in
evidence by claimants for compensation are correct.

^[5]
Magpantay vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-43457, October 26, 1976.