[With resolution of November 21, 1961]

This special action of mandamus is now before this Court on the
appeal by certiorari interposed by the petitioner against the judgment
therein rendered by the Court of Appeals dismissing the action with
costs.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

“In Civil Case No. 28836 of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, of the City of Manila, the petitioner herein,
Josephine Cotton, and the respondent Eugenio S. Baltao were the
plaintiff and defendant respectively (Annex “A”, petition). Sometime
after the filing of the Answer (Annex “B”, petition) to the complaint
therein, defendant Baltao proposed that the case be settled, and after
several negotiations, the parties reached a settlement and on July 26,
1936, executed and signed, with the assistance of counsel, a compromise
agreement, copied in full, as follows:

“COME
NOW the parties, personally and by counsel, and to this Honorable Court
respectively state that they have arrived at an amicable settlement of
the above-entitled case as follows:

“1. Defendant will pay
to plaintiff guardian for the support of plaintiff minor, the sum of
TWO HUNDRED FIFTY(P250.00) PESOS per month, payable within the first
five (5) days of each month; it being understood that this sum shall
not include extraordinary hospital or medical expenses, which shall be
paid separately by defendant;

“2. Defendant will continue
to administer without need of an accounting, the properties of
plaintiff described in the complaint, provided that:

(a)
Defendant binds himself to pay all obligations encumbering the
aforesaid properties within the period set forth in the contracts to
sell executed by and between Josephine Cotton and the Guaranteed Homes,
Inc., the said contracts being Doc. No. 155, Page 34, Book No. 1,
Series of 1951 of the notarial register of Notary Public Eugenio T.
Estavillo of Manila and Doc. No. 170, Page 37, Book No. 1, Series of
1952 of the same Notary Public;

(b) Defendant
will turn over to plaintiff, through her judicial guardian, upon the
expiration of the said agreements the properties mentioned therein, to
wit:

“Lot No. 31, Psd-33597, TCT No. 23678, containing an area of 478 sq. m.
Lot No. 36, Psd-33598, TCT No. 23678, containing an area of 401 sq. m.
together with all improvements that may now be existing or may be
erected thereon, as well as the 5,000 shares of stock in Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., mentioned in the complaint, and any stock or other
dividends declared thereon, all free from any and every lien and
encumbrance. It is understood, however, that the plaintiff will not
sell, cede, transfer or convey the 5,000 shares of stock in Guaranteed
Homes, Inc. to any person, without first giving an opportunity to
defendant to purchase the same at the same price being offered to
plaintiff by any third party;

(c) Defendant will, every six (6) months from this
date, submit to this Honorable Court the receipts of payments called
for in the aforesaid contracts; and should he fail to do so, plaintiff
may immediately take possession of the aforesaid assets, with all their
improvements, through her judicial guardian;

(d)
In the event that defendant should leave the country, either
temporarily or permanently, he hereby designates JOSEFINA P. LOPEZ as
the person to whom plaintiff may look for the fulfillments of the
obligations assumed by defendant in this compromise agreement; and
Josefina B. Lopez hereby acquieces thereto by signing at the bottom
hereof;

“3. Defendant shall pay plaintiff’s counsel fee in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;

“4. This agreement is subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal in Sp. Proc. No. 1813 entitled ‘Guardianship of the
Minor Genevieve Cynthia Cotton Baltao’.

“WHEREFORE, the parties respectfully pray this Honorable Court to
approve the foregoing agreement and to render judgment in accordance
therewith, enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and
conditions set forth therein.”

On
August 31, 1956, respondent Judge rendered a decision which, after
reciting the contents of the compromise agreement, disposed that the
terms and conditions thereof were in conformity with law, morals, good
customs and public policy, and enjoined the parties therein to comply
with the said agreement, without special pronouncement as to costs
(Annex C, petition). On November 19, 1957, (after one (1) year and four
(4) months, from the execution of the agreement), on the ground that
respondent Baltao, had failed to comply with his commitments under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of the compromise agreement,
petitioner filed with the respondent Judge a motion for the execution
of the judgment, praying that an order be issued directing the
respondent Baltao to comply with his commitments under the said
compromise agreement (Annex D, petition). On December 28, 1957, date
set for the hearing of the motion, respondent Baltao, asked for 5 days
from January 2, 1958, within which to comply with the agreement,
manifesting that he had already effected the payments required under
paragraph 2, subpar. (a) of the agreement, but needed more
time within which to produce the receipts evidencing the payments as
required in paragraph 2, sub-par. (c). At the hearing on
January 7, 1958, respondent Baltao asked for more time to produce the
receipts. On January 14, 1958, respondent Baltao, filed an opposition
to the motion for execution, alleging that on January 11, 1958, he had
submitted to respondent Judge the receipts of payment and prayed for
the denial of the motion for execution, on the ground that it had
already become moot (Annex E, petition). The only payment made by
respondent Baltao on the properties in question, however, was made on
January 10, 1958, far beyond the period agreed upon and several weeks
after petitioner’s motion for execution of judgment had been filed. On
January 15, 1958, respondent Judge issued an order, denying
petitioner’s motion for execution, for the reason that defendant
(respondent Baltao) had complied substantially with the terms of the
compromise agreement (Annex F, petition). The motion for
reconsideration of said order was denied on March 12, 1958.”

Upon the above facts, the Court of Appeals, in its judgment of June
27, 1958, dismissed the action with the costs taxed against the
petitioner. This is the judgment now before this Court for review.

It is contended by counsel for the appellant that as it is well
settled that “a judgment upon a compromise agreement of the parties is
not appealable and is immediately executory,” Reyes vs. de Ugarte, 75 Phil., 505; Enriquez vs.
Padilla, 77 Phil., 373; that “upon a final and executory Judgment,
execution becomes a matter of right and it is a ministerial duty of the
court to order its execution,” Buenaventura vs. Garcia, 78
Phil., 759; and that “mandamus is the proper remedy should the court or
judge fail to comply with said ministerial duty,” Seifert vs.
Bachrach, 79 Phil., 748, the trial court failed to comply with its
ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution of the judgment in
question, and that the Court of Appeals committed error in dismissing
this action with costs, instead of compelling said trial court by mandamus to do so.

We do not share counsel’s view. We agree with counsel that the rules
he is invoking are each backed up by decisions of this Court, and that
they are good law. We are, however, of the opinion that said rules only
hold true when the judgment sought to be executed is complete and
certain in itself. Where the judgment is indefinite or uncertain, or
requires the performance of a condition, or obligates the parties or
one of them to do certain acts, the rules above enunciated have no
application. In such cases, the court must construe the judgment and
declare first whether or not the condition imposed therein had been
complied with, and then act accordingly. And this is particularly true
as regards consented judgment. For, although judgments by consent have
the same force and effect as any other court judgment, nevertheless
they partake of the nature and have the force and effect of contracts
and must be construed and enforced as such. 49 C. J. S. 314-317; 31 Am.
Jur., 107; Freeman on Judgment 2773-2776.

“A judgment by consent ordinarily has the force and
effect of a contract and is so construed, although it also partakes of
the nature of a judgment and will be upheld and enforced as such.” 49
C. J. S. 314.

The judgment involved in this action is one by consent, and it is
not complete in itself, or definite, or certain. It requires the
performance of a condition by and obligates the respondent Eugenio S.
Baltao to do an act, upon the compliance or non-compliance with which
depends the respective rights of the parties. It is not a judgment,
therefore, upon which a writ of execution should ministerially issue
upon its becoming final and executory. The question whether or not such
condition has been fulfilled must be determined first before a writ of
execution should or should not issue. And in case of dispute between
the parties on the matter, the trial court, before taking any action on
a motion to order its execution, must construe it and determine,
through proper proceedings, whether or not the condition imposed has
been fulfilled. Such action calls for the exercise of judgment on the
part of the trial court, and whatever error it may commit in arriving
at a decision is error committed in the exercise of its jurisdiction
and is only correctible by appeal. Castro vs. Surtida, 87 Phil., 166; 47 Off. Gaz., Supl. No. 12; p. 351. Mandamus would not lie. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals.

“It is a familiar rule that mandamus will not issue
to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the right to exercise judgment in reference to the
matter he is required to act. (Blanco vs. B. of Medical Examiners, 46 Phil., 190; Diokno vs. R.F.C., 91 Phil., 608; 48 Off. Gaz., 2717, cited in II Moran’s 1957 Ed., p. 186).”

We, therefore, find that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
appealed from is in accordance with law. Consequently, the same is
hereby affirmed, with the costs taxed against the appellant.

Bengzon, C. J. Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., took no part.

---

R E S O L U T I O N

November 21, 1961

LABRADOR, J.:

Upon considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
and it appearing that the obligations imposed upon respondent Eugenio
S. Baltao by the judgment were complied with by said Baltao only after
a court order, the motion to reconsider the grant of costs against
petitioner is hereby granted and the decision is, with respect to the
grant of costs to respondent Baltao set aside.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.