CATALINO GAMALOG, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The law in its solicitude for the welfare of tenants has not only
assured them security of tenure but has also created a special tribunal, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, entrusted with
the sole responsibility to act with promptness in the enforce­ment of such
statutory rights pursuant to the principle of social justice and protection to
labor as ordained by the Constitution.^[1]
It has not always worked as intended.  What is worse, disputes have arisen
unfortunately at times between groups of tenants themselves.  Equally regrettable is the inability of the
Court of Agrarian Relations at times to supply the remedial measures without
unnecessary loss of time, especially so where the juris­diction of the regular
courts has been mistakenly invoked.  So
it is in the litigation now before us, an appeal from a decision by respondent
Court of Appeals.

The private respondents, as noted in the appealed decision,
“are tenants of the brothers Lorenzo and Roberto, both surnamed
Hernandez.  The land under litigation
belongs to Magdaleno Tinio
with whom the Hernandezes had a contract of lease
executed on March 10, 1965, after the expiration of a prior lease contract
which the former had with one Lope Soriano who was
duly notified thereof.” A suit^[2]
was filed by the Hernandez brothers against the tenants of Soriano, petitioners before us, in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela “for recovery of possession
of the landholding subject of the lease contract when the latter refused to
vacate and surrender the possession thereof to the new lessees.  Pursuant to a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued therein, plaintiffs took possession of the land where they
placed their own tenants, [private respondents], who started to work and
planted crops thereon.” Then the Court of Appeals decision continues:  “On February 20, 1967, judgment was rendered therein * * *
dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the case
involves tenancy disputes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.  Said decision is now
pending appeal [in] the Court of Appeals.”^[3]

Further according to the Court of Appeals:  “On March 29, 1967, [petitioners] filed a complaint with a
motion for an inter­locutory order * * * for their immediate reinstatement to
the land in question.  Instead of
answering the complaint, defendants [now private respondents] filed a motion to
dismiss with an opposition against the immediate reinstatement therein prayed
for, alleging among others, lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Agrarian
Court.  The
opposition was overruled, and on June 28, 1967, respondent Judge issued an
order * * * which, reduced to its basic terms, directs [petitioners’] immediate
reinstatement to the land in controversy, the possession of which should be
restored to them upon a bond of P500 each, and further enjoining defendants
[now private respondents] to respect said possession until otherwise ordered by
the Court.”

Then, on July 25, 1967
the private respondents filed a certiorari proceeding with a plea for
preliminary mandatory injunction seeking that the order of reinstatement of the
Agrarian Court be annulled
and that they be placed in possession instead until the final determination of
the civil action for eject­ment then on appeal with
respondent Court of Appeals.  Notwith­standing
the express admission made that the petitioners in this case, respondents with
the Court of Appeals, were tenants of the former lessee, the order of the Court
of Agrarian Relations was set aside and the writ of prohibition granted, the
Court of Appeals relying on its reading of our decision in Evangelista v. Court
of Agrarian Relations.^[4]

The petition for review of such decision filed with us on
February 13, 1968 rightfully stressed the admission in the decision now on
appeal recognizing the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners
and the former lessee, a relationship that must be respected by the new lessee
in accordance with the controlling statutory provisions as authori­tatively
construed by us.  Petitioners thus sought
the reversal of such decision.  We gave
due course to the petition, requiring respondents to answer.  That they did on February 28, 1968, but they were unable to blunt
the force of the contention solidly buttressed in the tenancy relationship as
their denial could not prevail against such a finding in the appealed
decision.  Stress was however laid on
respondent Court of Appeals having deferred to the Evangelista doctrine.

Adherence to the clear terms of the statutory provision that
calls for application, what it commands having elicited from us a constant
interpretation, compels a conclusion different from that reached by respondent
Court of Appeals.  It is to be admitted
that it did feel bound by what it considered to be the pronouncement in our
Evangelista decision.  A closer scrutiny
however could have revealed that the facts as found by it in the present case
justify a different approach.  Respondent
Court failed to do so.  It reached a
decision far from acceptable, the law being what it is.  Accordingly, we reverse.

1. The decisive fact is the existence of a tenancy relation­ship
between petitioners here and the former lessee of the land in litigation, Lope Soriano.  That is
beyond question.  The law is equally
clear.  The Agricultural Tenancy Act
explicitly provides:  “The
expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, or the sale, alienation or transfer of
legal possession of the land does not of itself extinguish the relation­ship.  In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee
shall assume the rights and obligations of the former landholder in relation to
the tenant.”^[5]
The statutory mandate is thus clear and un­ambiguous.

We have applied it
repeatedly according to its literal language. 
Not that we have any choice on the matter.  As we have pointed out in the leading case of
Alarcon v. Santos:^[6] “Note that even if there is a contract
creating a leasehold or tenancy relationship between the owner of the
land and a tenant, the mere expiration of the period of the contract does not
terminate outright the relationship between the parties, because the law
imposes upon the new landholder or owner the duty to assume all the rights and
obligations of the former land­holder with the particularity that if the latter
dies, his heirs shall likewise assume the same rights and obligations.  Should this eventuality happen, if the owner
or transferee dispossess the tenants of the land, the remedy of the latter is
to seek rein­statement with
damages.  Such is the action taken by
petitioners.  This incident comes within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.” As a
matter of fact, even earlier in 1959, we had, as we ought to, given it the
force and effectivity that its clear language
requires:  “The termination of the
lease, there­fore, did not divest the tenant of the right to remain and
continue on his cultivation of the land. 
Furthermore, should any doubt exist as to the applicability of the
aforementioned provision of law to the case at bar, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the tenant.”^[7]

We have likewise manifested fidelity to the view that even if
there were any doubt, and certainly there is none in this case, whatever doubt
must be resolved in favor of the tenants. 
Our recent decisions, to mention only those of the last three years, yield no other
conclusion.^[8]
The fact that in this litigation the dispute is between two groups of tenants
is not material.  The law recognizes the
security of tenure of the original set of tenants.  That is but right and proper.  The Court of Appeals decided otherwise.  Its judgment cannot be sustained.

2. Nor does the case relied upon by respondent Court of Appeals,
Evangelista v. Court of Agrarian Relations, call for a different
conclusion.  It certainly cannot be a bar
to the statutory right of the tenants as ordained by law.  It is to be conceded that the authoritative
force accorded to it by respondent Court of Appeals could on a cursory reading
be not entirely implausible. 
Nonetheless, a more careful analysis, called for in the light of the
constitutional mandate of social justice and protection to labor, ought to have
re­sulted in this case being excepted from the operation of such a
holding.  The situation before us now can
easily be dis­tinguished.  The
Evangelista decision is to be strictly confined to the facts then before this
Court.  Certainly, there can be no
possible thought of its extension to other cases that would in any wise impair
or adversely affect the rights of tenants.

What the Court of Appeals
ignored was that in the Evangelista case, unlike the litigation before us, the
question of the existence of the tenancy relationship was very much in
issue.  Here, to repeat, the Court of
Appeals, after a study of the records of the case, cate­gorically spoke, at the
outset of its decision, of petitioners being the tenants of the former lessee.  Moreover, it is undisputed in this case that
the Court of First Instance of Isabela did dismiss
the complaint of the new lessee for lack of jurisdiction, precisely as noted by
respondent Court of Appeals in its decision, “on the ground that the case
involved tenancy disputes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Agrarian Relations.” It was only then and not until then that present
petitioners invoked the aid of the Court of Agrarian Relations.  On the other hand, in the Evangelista case the
alleged tenant was ordered to vacate by the decision of the justice of the
peace court in the ejectment case.  It certainly would
penalize petitioners still further contrary to the law and our decisions if on
the facts as thus disclosed they still would have to await the outcome of the
appealed decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela
which, as respondent Court of Appeals likewise did, could not but take due note of the indubitable existence of a tenancy
relationship.  Its relying then on the Evangelista
decision is to set at naught the constitutional and statutory policy of
protection to labor both in industry and in agriculture.

3. Private respondents would impute to the procedure followed by
us a significance it does not possess. 
One thing is clear and beyond dispute. 
This is an appeal by way of certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals.  We did, as we had done in some
cases before, expedite matters by requiring respondents to answer and then set
the matter for oral argument, although the parties sought and were granted
permission to file memoranda instead.

It is to be admitted that such procedural steps are those
indicated for the special civil action of certiorari.  It does
not follow, however, as respondents would imply that the nature of the
proceeding was thereby altered.  It
remained an appeal by way of certiorari, not the special civil action provided
for by the Rules of Court.  All that is
required then to call for a reversal of the judgment is an error of law.  Such an error as above shown was
committed.  It calls for correction.  That is what we did.  There is no merit in the assertion more than
just hinted that there must be a showing of grave abuse of discretion
sufficient to oust the respondent Court of jurisdiction for such appealed
decision to be set aside.

Moreover, insistence on the utmost regularity of procedure, in
itself not always to be heeded if our decisions mean anything at all, is even
less persuasive in tenancy litigations. 
Only recently, on a matter that perhaps involve a failure to abide by
what hitherto controlling principles of procedure require, we had occasion to
hold: “Social justice would be a meaningless term if in a situation like
the present, an element of rigidity would be affixed to procedural precepts and
made to cover the matter.  Flexibility
should not be ruled out.  Precisely, what
is sought to be accomplished by such a fundamental principle expressly so declared by the Constitution is
the effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the economically
underprivileged.  For under existing
conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able
to secure justice for themselves.”^[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals decision of January 29, 1968 is set aside, and
the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations of the First Judicial District,
Branch II, Ilagan, Isabela
of June 28, 1967 ordering
the reinstatement of peti­tioners to the land in question, with respondents
being required to respect such possession of petitioners, is revived.  With costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Art. II, Sec. 5 and XIV, Sec. 6, Constitution. Rep. Acts Nos. 1199 (1955), 1267
(1955) and 3844 (1963).

^[2]
Civil Case No. 1807.

^[3]
CA-GR No. 40567-R.

^[4]
60 O.G. 7932 (1960).

^[5]
Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 as amended by Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 2263
(1959).

^[6]
5 SCRA 558 (1962).

^[7]
Joya v. Pareja, 106
Phil. 645, 652. The Joya case was cited with approval
in Ponce v. Guevarra, 10 SCRA 649 (1964).

^[8]
Amante v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 18 SCRA
427 (1966); Mipalar v. Santos,
20 SCRA 935 (1967); Del Rosario v. De los Santos, 22 SCRA 1196
(1968); Ibaviosa v. Tuazon, 21 SCRA 1438 (1967); Carillo v.
Allied Workers Asso., 24 SCRA 566 (1968); and Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 27
SCRA 7 (1969).

^[9]
Carillo v. Allied Workers’ Asso. of the Phil., 24 SCRA 566, 573 (1968). The above
excerpt was cited with approval in Teodoro v. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969).