HILARION C. TOLENTINO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE BOABD OF ACCOUNTANCY, ROBERT OR FERGUSON AND HANS HAUSAMANN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiff in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for the purpose of testing the
constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3105,
otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by
Commonwealth. Act No. 342. The ground advanced for the claim of
unconstitutionality is that “it is a class legislation since by its
very terms it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions
from adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with the
practice of such callings or professions.”

The action is addressed against the Board of Accountancy, Robert
Orr Ferguson, and Hans Hausamann and notice thereof has been served on
the Solicitor General under section 4 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court;
but the Board of Accountancy did not answer the complaint, nor has the
Solicitor General intervened. Only Ferguson and Hausamann appeared and
answered through counsel. Attorney Claro It. Recto was allowed to
intervene as amicus curiae. The case was submitted for judgment on the
pleadings. After the parties had submitted their memoranda, the court
dismissed the complaint holding that the disputed law does not offend
against the constitution. From that decision the plaintiff appealed to
this Court.

As the facts are not disputed, and the case was submitted on the
pleadings, we are quoting hereunder the facts as found by the lower
court in its decision.

“The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a
Filipino citizen and a certified public accountant duly admitted to the
practice of accountancy as per certificate No. 1224 issued on March 16,
1948; that the Board of Accountancy is an administrative body created
by law and vested with the power and authority to regulate and
supervise the practice of the profession of accountancy in the
Philippines, and that the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans
Hausamann are foreigners, the former being a British subject and the
latter a Swiss subject, both admitted to the practice of accountancy in
the Philippines, that said two defendants have been and are practicing
their profession as certified public accountants under the trade name
‘Fleming & Williamson’; and that Section 16-A of Act No. 3105 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No, 342, authorizing accountants to
practice their profession under a trade name, is unconstitutional on
the ground that it excludes persons engaged in other ‘Callings and
professions from adopting or acquiring or using a trade name.

“In their answer the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans Hausamann
practically admitted the foregoing allegations of the complaint. Said
defendants allege that Commonwealth Act No. 842 amending Act No, 3105,
authorizing the use of a trade name in the practice of the profession
of accountancy is not a class legislation, nor does it violate the
provision of the Constitution with respect to equal protection of the
laws; that the plaintiff has no right or interest adversely affected by
said law and that he is entitled to the benefits thereof and may use a
trade or firm name in the practice of his profession as accountant.

“Upon leave of court Atty. Claro M. Recto appeared as amicus curiae supporting the validity or constitutionality of the provision of law questioned by the plaintiff.

“The parties are agreed as to the material facts alleged in the
pleadings. They are also agreed that the firm name ‘Fleming &
Williamson’ is an old trade name of accountants which was used
originally in 1925 by Messrs. D. M. Fleming and J. Williamson. The
right to use this firm name was sold to various parties until in the
end it was acquired by the defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and Hans
Hausamann in 1946. On June 10, 1946, defendants Robert Orr Ferguson and
Hans Hausamann formed a copartnership styled ‘Ferguson &
Hausamann’ doing business under the trade name ‘Fleming &
Williamson’. The articles of copai’tnership were presented for
registration in the Securities and Exchange Commission on the same
date. On June 13, 19S6, this trade name ‘Fleming & Williamson’ was
registered in the Bureau of Commerce in accordance with Act No. 3883,
as amended by Act No. 4147, as the firm name of the partnership
‘Ferguson & Hausamann,’ under which the said defendants would
practice their profession as certified public accountants in the
Philippines.

“On September 17, 1948, the partnership of
‘Ferguson & Hausamann’ applied for the renewal of the registration
of ‘Fleming & Williamson’ as their trade name in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 3883, as amended by Act No. 4147, and on the
same date said trade name or business name was so registered.

“The defendant Board of Accountancy did not appear or answer
notwithstanding service of summons upon it and upon the Solicitor
General. By agreement of the parties, the case was submitted for
decision upon the pleadings presented and the memoranda filed by the
parties.”

We believe that the issues involved in the present case may be
boiled down as follows: (1) whether or not the plaintiff, has
sufficient cause of action to question the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 342; and (2) whether or not said Act is
constitutional

1. Plaintiff brought this action for the purpose of testing,
   the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 342 because, according to
   the complaint, it constitutes class legislation for “by its very term
   it excludes persons engaged in other callings or professions from
   adopting, acquiring or using a trade name in connection with such
   calling or profession.” His main objection centers on the exclusive
   character of the law which extends its benefits only to those engaged
   in the profession of accountancy. It is obvious that he seeks the
   declaratory relief not for his own personal benefit, or “because his
   rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an individual, are
   adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging to
   other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case. He
   does not claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his
   rights or prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name
   by the defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the
   propriety of the use of said trade name by the defendants because it is
   misleading and is liable to defraud the public. Plaintiff, therefore,
   has no actual justiciable controversy against the herein defendants
   which may give him the right to secure relief by asserting the
   unconstitutionality of the law in question. This case, therefore, does
   not properly come under rule 66 of the Rules of Court which authorizes
   the institution of an action for declaratory relief.

The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for
declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the
following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons
whose interests are adverse; (S) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue
involved must be ripe for judicial determination. These requisite facts
are wanting and, therefore, the complaint must fail for lack of
sufficient cause of action.

“Justiciability; its requisites.—Except
that accomplished physical wrong need not be alleged in a petition for
declaratory relief, a case of such nature must exhibit all the usual
conditions of an ordinary action. There must he (1) .real parties in
interest (2) asserting adverse claims and (3) presenting a ripe issue.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarized its exhaustive opinion on
the requisites of justiciability of an action for declaratory relief by
saying that the court must be ‘satisfied that an actual controversy, or
the ripening seeds of one, exists between parties, all of whom are sui
juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will be a
practical help in ending the controversy.’ Justice Brandeis thought
that ‘the fact that the plaintiff’s desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others * * * does not confer a cause of
action.’ But the doubt becomes a justiciable controversy wlien it is
translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.” (Moran’s
Com. on the Rules of Court, vol. II, pp. 131-132, 3rd. Ed.)

Granting for the sake of argument that plaintiff has established the
requisite facts to entitle him to claim for declaratory relief, we are,
however, of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 342 does not offend
against the equal protection clause of our Constitution on the ground
of class legislation, for the reason that said Act applies alike to all
persons pursuing the same calling or profession under the same
conditions or requirements. Said Act gives the same right or affords
the same privileges to all accountants without distinction or
discrimination. This benefit is extended to the defendants as well as
to the plaintiff. The only requirement is. that they should comply with
the provisions of Act No. 3883 asto the procedure to be followed
relative to the use of the chosen trade name. So long as the law
applies to all alike, the requirements of equal protection are met.
(Louisiana ex rel. Francis vs. Reswober, 329 U. S. 559). The
discriminations which are open to objections are those in which persons
engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions or
are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.
(Soon Hing vs. Crowley, 113 U. S., 703). The authorities on this point
are numerous but for our purpose it is sufficient to quote some which
are deemed representative.

“It is a general rule that legislation which
affects alike all persons pursuing the same business under the same
conditions is not such, class legislation as is prohibited by
constitutional provisions, The discriminations -which are open to
objection are those in which persons engaged in the same business are
subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different
privileges under the same conditions. Part of the liberty of a citizen
consistsin the enjoyment, upon terms of equality with all others in
similar circumstances, of the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling
or trade and of acquiring, holding, and selling property. The
constitutional guaranty as to the equal protection of the laws,
moreover, requires that no impediment should be interposed to the
pursuits of anyone except as applied to the same pursuits by others
under similar circumstances and that no greater burdens irt engaging in
a calling should be laid upon one than are laid upon others in the same
ealling and condition.” (12 Am. Jur., 187.)

“The general
rule is well settled that legislation which, in carrying out a public
purpose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its
operation it affects all persons similarly situated, is .not within the
prohibition of the 14th Amendment. The mere fact that legislation is
based on a classification and is made to apply only to a certain
limited group of persons, and not to others, does not affect its
validity, if it is so made that all persons subject to its terms are
treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions.” (12 Am.
J.ur., 143.)

“The legislature may classify professions,
occupations, and business, according to natural and reasonable lines of
distinction, and if a statute affects alike all persons of the same
class it is not invalid as class legislation; * * *” (16 C. J. S., 966.)

“Classification of businesses, occupations, and callings may be made
according to natural, reasonable, and well-recognized lines of
distinction, and the mere fact that a statute or ordinance applies only
to a particular position or profession, or to a particular trade
occupation, or business, or discriminates between persons in different
classes of occupations or lines or business, does not render it
unconstitutional as class legislation, and such statutes are valid
whenever the partial application or discrimination is based on real and
reasonable distinctions existing in the subject matter, and affects
alike all persons of the same class or pursuing the same business under
the same conditions; * * *” (16 C. J. S., 967.)

It is not true that Commonwealth Act No. 342 precludes
practitioners of other professions, occupations or calling from using a
trade name in connection with the practice of their professions,
occupation or calling. While said Act does not mention other
professions, occupations or calling, it does not mean that they are
precluded from using a trade name as this privilege is likewise given
to them in other similar laws. We may mention Commonwealth Act No. 294
for mechanical engineers, Republic Act No. 318 for chemical engineers,
and even the corporation law as regards corporate names (Tolentino’s
Commentaries on Commercial laws, Vol. II, p. 753).

Assuming that Commonwealth Act No. 342 grants to accountants a
privilege not accorded to members of other professions or callings,
that alone would not render the Act discriminatory or violative of the
equal protection clause of the constitution, for that clause only means
“that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection
of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances”. (Missouri vs. Lewis, 101 U. S.
22, 81.) And the “Legislature may classify professions, occupations,
and business according to natural and reasonable lines of distinction,
and if a statute affects alike all persons of the same class it is not
invalid as a class legislation.” (16 C. J. S., 966).

The claim that Commonwealth Act No. ,342 is discriminatory because
it was approved only to protect foreign accountants has no basis in law
or in fact, for there is nothing that bears it out. Said Act applies to
all accountants1 in general without distinction.

The claim that said Act contravenes the principle of separation of
powers is likewise untenable. The Act does not’encroach upon the powers
of the Executive Department as represented by the Board of Accountancy
simply because it attempts to regulate the profession of accountants.
If our legislature can create the Board of Accountancy, it can
certainly amend the law that gave life to it without in any way
encroaching on the prerogatives of the Executive Department of our
government.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellants.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason and Jugo, JJ., concur.

Feria and Reyes JJ., concur in the result.