ISIDORO LIMQUIACO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH III, CFI, CEBU; AND PEPSI COLA BOTTLING CO., INC., (CAGAYAN DE ORO PLAN…

For consideration is a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu which dismissed the petitioner’s
complaint in Civil Case No. R-13938, entitled “Isidoro
Limquiaco, Jr., plaintiff, versus Pepsi
Cola Botlling Co., Inc., et al, defendants”.

The undisputed facts of
the case are as follows:

The petitioner, Isidoro Limquiaco, Jr., was
employed as a regular route salesman of the respondent Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.,
Inc., (PEPSI COLA, for short) with a salary of P325.00 a month, including
commissions.  On 27 April 1972, he was
dismissed for union activities so that he filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, discrimination, and unfair labor practice with the Regional Office
of the National Labor Relations Commission at Cebu
City against PEPSI COLA, Frank Peck, president of PEPSI COLA, and Luis Dabao, Jr., Plant Branch Manager of PEPSI COLA in Cagayan de Oro City.  The case
was docketed therein as NLRC
Case No. 006.  After hearing, judgment
was rendered in favor of the herein petitioner and PEPSI COLA was ordered to
reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority, and to pay him
back wages and attorney’s fees.  PEPSI COLA appealed therefrom but its appeal was dismissed by the NLRC sitting en
banc.  Thereafter,
the NLRC office in Cebu
City issued a writ of execution.

To satisfy the judgment, the Sheriff of Cagayan
de Oro levied upon a Ford Truck belonging to PEPSI COLA and offered it for sale at
public auction.  PEPSI COLA, however, filed an
action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental, docketed therein
as Civil Case No. 4411, and the sale at public auction was stopped.  On the date set for the hearing of the prayer
of PEPSI COLA for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary
injunction, or on 2 April 1974, the parties presented to the court, for
approval, a Compromise Agreement, wherein they agreed:  (1) that PEPSI COLA shall pay the petitioner Limquiaco
the amount of P8,805.21, pursuant to the decision in NLRC Case No. 006, and the
sum of P2,817.56 for Termination Pay, unenjoyed
Vacation Leave and accumulated Sick Leave and Christmas Bonus; (2) that the
total amount of P11,622.77 constitutes the full satisfaction of all claims that
the petitioner Limquiaco has filed against the
company as well as of any other claim that he may have against PEPSI COLA arising out of his employment with the company; and (3) that both
parties mutually waive any and all other claims arising out of the present case
and/or of NLRC Case No. 006 and any claims whatsoever in relation to petitioner
Limquiaco’s employment with PEPSI COLA.  The Compromise Agreement was approved by the
trial court on that same day and the petitioner Limquiaco
was paid the amount of P11,622.77.

The petitioner, however, was not satisfied.  On 30
April 1974, he filed an action before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, docketed therein as Civil Case No. R-13938,
against PEPSI COLA, Frank Peck, and Luis Davao, Jr.,
for the recovery of damages which he allegedly sustained by reason of the
illegal, criminal, malicious, and harassing acts of PEPSI COLA, Frank Peck, and
Luis Davao, Jr. in dismissing him from his employment
as route salesman of PEPSI COLA in 1972^[1].

In its answer, PEPSI COLA and its co-defendants denied the
allegations in the complaint, except as to their personal circumstances, and interposed the affirmative
defenses that the complaint states no cause of action; that the cause of
action, if any, has been waived, paid, or otherwise extinguished and/or that it
is barred by prior judgments rendered in
NLRC Case No. 006 and Civil Case No. 4411 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
where a compromise agreement
was approved and judgment rendered in accordance therewith; and that the petitioner has split his cause of
action, if any^[2].

After trial, the complaint was dismissed^[3].  Whereupon,
the petitioner filed the instant
petition for certiorari, praying that the decision of the respondent
court be reversed and set aside and another one entered ordering the private
respondents to pay him damages asked for in his complaint.

There is no merit in the petition.  It is the view of the Court that the question
of damages which arose out of, or were connected with a labor dispute should be
determined by the labor court to the exclusion of the regular courts of
justice.  To hold that the demand for
damages is to be passed upon by the regular courts independently or separately
from the labor dispute would be to sanction split jurisdiction which is
prejudicial to an orderly administration of justice.

Besides, under the facts of this case, it should be noted that the labor case was filed
before the ad hoc National Labor Relations Commission which was
created, soon after the declaration of martial law, to replace the Court of
Industrial Relations.  Under Presidential
Decree No. 21, which created the ad hoc NLRC, the Commission had
jurisdiction over the following:

“1)   All matters involving employee-employer
relations including all disputes and grievances which may otherwise lead to
strikes and lockouts under Republic Act No. 875;

2)   All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and

3)   All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor
Relations^[4]“.

In the case of Ruby Industrial Corporation vs. Court of First
Instance of Manila^[5],
the Court ruled that “the only claims arising from employer-employee
relationships which are beyond the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Commission are those already pending in courts on or before September 21,
1972”, and, in the case of Garcia vs. Martinez^[6],
the Court stated that if the Court of Industrial Relations had the prerogative
to award damages, there is no justification for denying that power to its successor,
the National Labor Relations Commission.

It was only after the issuance of Pres. Decree No. 1367 on 1 May 1978, that the Labor Arbiters
were deprived of their authority to entertain claims for moral or other forms
of damages.  But, this was nullified by
Pres. Decree No. 1691.  “Evidently,
the lawmaking authority had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters
and the NLRC of the jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that
setup would mean duplicity of suits, splitting
the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by
two tribunals on one and the same claim”^[7].

Since the National Labor Relations Commission did not award
damages in NLRC Case No. 006, the action instituted by the petitioner in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu for the recovery of
such damages was not in order.  It is
barred by the prior judgment rendered in NLRC Case No. 006.

The case of Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines-Malale
Veneer & Plywood, Inc.^[8], cited by the petitioner, cannot be invoked since the issue raised
therein is not whether an action for damages should be filed separately from
the unfair labor practice suit.  In said
case, the Court recognized the right of an employee who had been illegally
dismissed from his employment to file an action against his employer before the
regular courts of justice, instead of the labor court, since the complaint is
grounded, not on the employee’s dismissal per se, but on the
manner of said dismissal and the consequent effects thereof.  The Court therein said:

“Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to
constitute ‘matters involving employee-employer relations’ as Quisaba’s dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing
employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per
se, as in fact he does
not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner
of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.

****      ****      ****      ****

“The ‘right’ of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba
should not be confused with the manner in which the right was exercised
and the effects flowing therefrom.  If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint
alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which
prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of
moral damages, is provided in article 2219, No. 10.

****      ****      ****      ****

“The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil
(not a labor) dispute, it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba’s rights as a
member of society, and does not involve an existing employee-employer relation
within the meaning of section 2(1) of Presidential Decree No. 21 The complaint
is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
not by the National Labor Relations Commission”.

The doctrine enunciated
appears to be an adaptation of the rule now obtaining in workmen’s compensation
cases to the effect that an employee or his heirs, in case of death, are given
the option to claim compensation from the employer under the Labor Code, or
proceed against him as a tortfeasor in an ordinary
action for damages before the regular courts of justice; but, once an election
has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt for the
other remedy, and that the employee cannot also pursue both actions
simultaneously^[9].  The
reason for the rule was explained in Floresca vs. Philex Mining
Company^[10],
as follows:

“The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the Civil Code.  The compensation acts are based on a theory
of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under
the acts being made as a compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53).  Compensation is given to mitigate harshness
and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family.  Hence, an employer is liable whether
negligence exists or not since liability is created by law.  Recovery under the Act is not based on any
theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 D.J.S. 36)

“In other words, under compensation acts, the employer is
liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death,
sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the
employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). 
On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the
wrongful invasion of his rights.  It is
the indemnity recoverable by a person
who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights,
through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).”

In view of the foregoing considerations, we no longer find it
necessary to discuss the issue of whether or not the petitioner’s claim for damages
had been waived, paid and/or extinguished, or is barred by the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 4411 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied.  Without pronouncement as to costs in this
instance.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Paras,
and Sarmiento,
JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result.

^[1]
Rollo, at 57

^[2]
Id., at 62

^[3]
Id., at 36

^[4]
Sec. 2, PD 21

^[5]
G.R. No. L-38893, Aug. 31, 1977,
78 SCRA 499

^[6]
G.R. No. L-47629, Aug. 3, 1978,
84 SCRA 577

^[7]
Ebon vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 58265, March 15, 1982, 113 SCRA 52

^[8]
G.R. No. L-38088, Aug. 30, 1974,
58 SCRA 771

^[9]
Floresca vs. Philex
Mining Co., L-30642, April 30, 1985,
136 SCRA 141; Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino, L-43674, June
30, 1987.

^[10]
Supra