THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEONARDO D. ROSALES, ALIAS “NARDING DE ROSA­LES”, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Rosales

The Case

This is People versus Rosales, a criminal case for murder arising from a shooting during a drinking spree in Barrio Cabay, Tiaong, Quezon, on the evening of January 29, 1966, which killed Miguel Hernandez. The People charged Leonardo D. Rosales, together with three others, with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The case matters because the Supreme Court, agreeing with the Solicitor General, acquitted the appellant on the ground that the lone eyewitness on whom the conviction rested was not credible, and because it illustrates the paramount rule that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the fiscal's duty is not only to prosecute the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

Procedural History

The Provincial Fiscal of Quezon filed an information for murder in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against Leonardo D. Rosales, Genaro Lardizabal, Renato de Rosales, and Cesar Razon. After arraignment, a plea of not guilty, and trial, the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch Two, in its decision dated September 23, 1969, acquitted Genaro Lardizabal, Cesar Razon, and Renato de Rosales, but convicted Leonardo D. Rosales of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of 6,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. Rosales appealed to the Supreme Court. On appeal, the Solicitor General, convinced that the accused was entitled to acquittal unless his guilt was shown beyond reasonable doubt, recommended the acquittal of the appellant.

Facts

At about six o'clock in the evening of January 29, 1966, at the Home Economics Building of the Cabay Elementary School in Barrio Cabay, Tiaong, Quezon, a shooting occurred during a drinking spree and Miguel Hernandez was killed. The next day, the Deputy Chief of Police recovered from the scene two copper forty-five caliber slugs, one deformed lead thirty-eight caliber slug, and a thirty-eight caliber Smith and Wesson revolver found with the body of the victim. The Chief of Police forwarded a progress report stating that his office had not yet found sufficient evidence to warrant filing a criminal action against anyone.

An autopsy by Dr. Ernesto Brion of the National Bureau of Investigation showed four wounds on the deceased: two on the left chest, one on the left upper arm, and one on the upper right part of the back. He concluded that the first three wounds were caused by a forty-five caliber firearm and the fourth by a thirty caliber bullet, and that the assailant must have been on the left side of the victim, slightly in front of and on a higher level than the latter. Ballistics examination showed that nine forty-five caliber empty shells were fired from the same forty-five caliber firearm, while three other forty-five caliber shells were fired from another firearm of the same caliber, and that one thirty caliber shell was fired from a thirty caliber carbine.

Statements taken on February 1, 1966 from Emilio Robles, Virgilio Matuto, and Ireneo Guerra uniformly stated that only five persons were present at the drinking spree: the three affiants, the victim Miguel Hernandez, and the appellant Leonardo D. Rosales. They said they suddenly heard shots from outside and, when the shooting stopped, saw Hernandez lying dead, but could not say who shot him. The Chief of Police first filed a case of homicide in a tumultuous affray against Rosales, Guerra, Matuto, and Robles. Later, on the strength of statements executed by the widow Natividad Magadia and by Armando Castillo, a second case for murder was filed against Rosales, Lardizabal, Renato de Rosales, and Cesar Razon. The municipal judge dismissed the first case and forwarded the second to the Court of First Instance, where the information for murder was filed. The appellant was convicted on the testimony of Armando Castillo, the only supposed eyewitness, who claimed he was present at the drinking spree and saw Rosales shoot Hernandez. The defense, through Matuto and Guerra and through the appellant himself, maintained that only five persons were present and that Castillo was not among them.

Issues

• Whether or not the guilt of the accused appellant Leonardo D. Rosales for murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the testimony of the lone supposed eyewitness, Armando Castillo, was credible and sufficient to sustain the conviction.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant despite the recommendation of the Solicitor General for his acquittal.

Applicable Provisions

The information charged the crime of murder as defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which the trial court applied in convicting the appellant. The decision quotes the accusatory allegation in these terms:

That on or about the 29th day of January, 1966, in the Barrio of Cabay, Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Leonardo D. Rosales alias "Narding de Rosales" and Genaro Lardizabal, together with Renato de Rosales and Cesar Razon, who are both still at large, armed with pistols and carbine, calibers .45 and .30, respectively, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their superior strength in arms and in person, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot at one Miguel Hernandez while the latter was sitting in a drinking spree, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body which caused his death.

This allegation frames the charge of murder that the prosecution was bound to prove beyond reasonable doubt, and its failure to do so is the very reason the conviction was reversed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the guilt of the appellant was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It agreed with the Solicitor General that the appellant is entitled to an acquittal, and it reversed and set aside the judgment of conviction.

On the second issue, the Court found the testimony of Armando Castillo completely lacking in credibility. Castillo claimed that he and the deceased were the only residents of Barrio Cabay present at the drinking spree and that six other persons were visitors from other places. But the impartial investigation of the Tiaong Police Department the very day after the drinking spree clearly revealed that five persons, all residents of Cabay, were present: Emilio Robles, Matuto, Ireneo Guerra, the victim Miguel Hernandez, and the appellant Leonardo D. Rosales. The Court held that the falsehood uttered by Castillo on this point destroyed his credibility completely, since his presence at the scene was overwhelmingly negated by the evidence for the defense. The Court also noted that Castillo's conduct after the incident was strange and unnatural: although he claimed to have witnessed the sudden shooting of a barrio mate known to him for fifteen years, he did not stop at the house of Hernandez, did not report to any authority, calmly went home, told no one, and remained silent even after learning of the death the following day, revealing what he knew for the first time only on February 15, 1966, more than two weeks after the crime. The Court observed that the trial court itself doubted Castillo's credibility, since he could not identify the three other accused as the persons who fired at the victim, and that no conspiracy was proven among the accused.

On the third issue, the Court gave weight to the position of the Solicitor General, who believed that the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, and that while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute the guilty, it is also his duty to protect the innocent.

Doctrine

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, and where the conviction rests solely on the testimony of a lone eyewitness whose credibility is destroyed by a demonstrated falsehood on a material point, the conviction cannot stand. The conduct of a supposed eyewitness after the crime, where it is strange, unnatural, and inconsistent with the instincts and promptings of human nature, may be taken against his credibility. The duty of the public prosecutor is twofold: to prosecute the guilty and to protect the innocent, so that the Solicitor General may properly recommend the acquittal of an accused whose guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision convicting Leonardo D. Rosales of murder and entered a new judgment acquitting him of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the fiscal's duty is not only to prosecute the guilty but also to protect the innocent, and that guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Examiners use this case to test the credibility of a lone eyewitness and the standard of proof in criminal cases.