DANILO BUSTAMANTE, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMO MACEREN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Bustamante versus Maceren

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Danilo Bustamante against Judge Maximo Maceren and the People of the Philippines. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to nullify two acts: the order of Judge Jorge Coquia reopening a criminal case after Bustamante had already pleaded guilty, been sentenced, and begun serving his sentence, and the later judgment of Judge Maceren convicting him anew after a fresh trial. The case matters because it is a clean illustration of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, and of the rule that once a judgment of conviction has become final through actual service of sentence, no court, not even the Supreme Court, may set it aside and impose another punishment for the same offense.

Procedural History

Bustamante was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Two. Upon arraignment on December 14, 1970, he entered a plea of guilty. The trial court, presided over by Judge Jorge Coquia, rendered judgment the same day, sentencing him to one year of imprisonment after finding incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance, together with plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong. The judgment was promulgated that same day, Bustamante expressly waived his right to appeal, a commitment order was issued to the Provincial Warden of Laguna, and he began serving his sentence immediately.

Three days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed a motion for modification of the penalty. On the same day, Bustamante's counsel filed a motion for withdrawal of the plea of guilty and waiver of commitment. On December 21, 1970, Judge Coquia issued an order setting aside the judgment of December 14, 1970 and directing a trial on the merits. Judge Coquia was later transferred to Manila, and the case was reassigned to Judge Maximo Maceren. Bustamante was rearraigned, entered a plea of not guilty, and after a new hearing on the merits, Judge Maceren rendered a new judgment on February 28, 1972, promulgated on March 17, 1972, convicting Bustamante of homicide and imposing an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day to twelve years and one day.

Bustamante moved for reconsideration, raising double jeopardy. Judge Maceren took the position that he could not nullify an order of a judge of equal rank and that only a higher court could do so. Bustamante then filed this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on August 9, 1972, praying for the nullification of the reopening order, the new judgment, and the denial of his motion for reconsideration, and for his immediate release, he having by then fully served the original one-year sentence. The Solicitor General filed an answer offering no opposition to the petition and no objection to the prayer for release.

Facts

Danilo Bustamante was accused of murder in an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna. On December 14, 1970, he was arraigned and pleaded guilty. The trial court found incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance, along with plea of guilty, voluntary surrender, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of twelve thousand pesos, and to pay the costs.

The judgment was promulgated the same day, and Bustamante expressly waived his right to appeal. A commitment order was issued to the Provincial Warden of Laguna, who acknowledged receipt of his body that same day, and Bustamante forthwith began serving his sentence. Three days later, on December 17, 1970, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion for modification of the penalty, and Bustamante's counsel filed a motion for withdrawal of the plea of guilty and waiver of commitment.

On December 21, 1970, Judge Coquia issued an order setting aside the judgment of December 14, 1970 and directing a trial on the merits. After Judge Coquia's transfer, the case was reassigned to Judge Maceren, before whom Bustamante was rearraigned on February 1, 1971. He entered a plea of not guilty, a new hearing was held, and on February 28, 1972, Judge Maceren rendered a new judgment convicting him of homicide and imposing a much heavier indeterminate penalty. By the time the petition reached the Supreme Court, Bustamante had already fully served the original one-year sentence.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of Judge Coquia setting aside a judgment of conviction already promulgated and in the process of execution violated Bustamante's constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
• Whether or not the withdrawal of the plea of guilty by Bustamante amounted to a waiver of the defense of double jeopardy.
• Whether or not Bustamante, having fully served the valid one-year sentence, is entitled to release.

Applicable Provisions

The Constitution, Article Three, Section One, paragraph Twenty, provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This is the constitutional command on which the entire ruling rests, and the Court held that the reopening of the case after Bustamante had begun serving his sentence was a defiance of it.

The Rules of Court, Rule 120, Section 7, provides:

A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.

This provision fixes the moment of finality, and the Court applied it to hold that the judgment became final the very day Bustamante began serving his sentence and waived his right to appeal.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of Bustamante. The undisputed facts spoke for themselves: he was arraigned on a valid information before a competent court, he pleaded guilty, judgment was rendered, and on the very same day he was committed to jail and actually started serving sentence. There was no valid justification for the order of Judge Coquia setting aside a decision already in the process of execution. That amounted to a defiance of the constitutional command that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Court described this guarantee as a rule of finality, a single prosecution for any offense being all the law allows, protecting the accused from harassment and barring unnecessary litigation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the withdrawal of the plea of guilty did not amount to a waiver of the defense of double jeopardy. The Solicitor General himself observed that while the defense of double jeopardy is waivable if not raised at the proper time, Bustamante's counsel raised it during the new trial and before Judge Maceren rendered judgment, and the plea should have been entertained in the interest of justice, especially since Bustamante had by then fully served the one-year sentence.

On the third issue, the Court held that Bustamante, having served the full one-year period imposed in the valid judgment, was entitled to be released. The Court relied on the doctrine of Gregorio versus Director of Prisons, quoting its reasoning that where the defendant has executed or entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot set it aside and render a new sentence, for to do so is to punish him twice for the same offense. The Court also stressed that the rights assured an accused, while intended for his protection, promote the public interest, and that the State as dispenser of justice should not subject him to greater and other punishment than the law allows.

Doctrine

First, the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows, and it protects the accused from harassment and from unnecessary litigation.

Second, under Rule 120, Section 7, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. Once final, the judgment may no longer be modified or set aside by the court rendering it.

Third, where the defendant has executed or entered upon the execution of a valid sentence, the court cannot set it aside and render a new sentence, even during the period for perfecting an appeal. To do so is to punish him twice for the same offense.

Fourth, a final and executory judgment is not appealable, and no court, not even the Supreme Court, has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or modify it, even if it is claimed to be erroneous.

Fifth, the defense of double jeopardy is waivable if not raised at the proper time, but where it is raised before judgment in the new trial, the court should entertain it in the interest of justice.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was granted; the order of Judge Coquia of December 21, 1970 and the decision of Judge Maceren of February 28, 1972 were set aside and declared null and void, and Bustamante, having fully served his valid sentence of December 14, 1970, was ordered released forthwith, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that once a judgment of conviction has become final through actual service of sentence, no court, not even the Supreme Court, may set it aside and impose another punishment, for that is to put the accused twice in jeopardy. Examiners like to use this case to test the moment of finality of a criminal judgment under Rule 120, Section 7, and the rule that double jeopardy, though waivable, must be raised at the proper time.