ESCOLASTICO DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER, VS. NUMERIANO CUEVAS, SR., AND COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

De Guzman versus Cuevas

The Case

This is Escolastico de Guzman versus Numeriano Cuevas, Senior, and the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, Escolastico de Guzman, was the losing defendant in a civil case decided by the Court of First Instance of Cavite. He appealed, but the Court of Appeals refused to give his appeal due course because he paid the docketing fee a few days late, even though he had filed a timely motion for a short extension and paid within the period he asked for. He came to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari, asking it to set aside the appellate court's resolutions. The case matters because it fixes the standard for how courts must handle motions for extension of time to pay docketing fees: discretion, not rigid mechanical rules, in the interest of substantial justice.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, where Numeriano Cuevas, Senior, sued Escolastico de Guzman and obtained a judgment against him. De Guzman perfected his appeal to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. The Court of Appeals then required him to pay the docketing fee within fifteen days from notice. He filed a motion for a ten-day extension within that period, and paid the fee within the extension he had prayed for. The Third Division of the Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension in a minute resolution dated November 27, 1967. He moved for reconsideration, which was denied on December 26, 1967, on the strength of a 1949 resolution of the Court of Appeals en banc stating that no extension of time for the payment of docketing fees would be entertained. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. De Guzman then filed this petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Facts

Numeriano Cuevas, Senior, sued Escolastico de Guzman in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, and judgment was rendered against De Guzman. De Guzman appealed to the Court of Appeals, perfecting his appeal well within the reglementary period.

On November 3, 1967, counsel for De Guzman received a notice from the Court of Appeals requiring payment of the docketing fee of 53 pesos within fifteen days. Because De Guzman was suffering a recurrence of a chronic lung ailment that required medical treatment and expense, his counsel filed, on November 15, 1967, and within the fifteen-day period, a motion for a ten-day extension within which to pay. Without waiting for the court to resolve the motion, De Guzman paid the 53 pesos by postal money order on November 23, 1967, well within the ten-day extension he had requested.

Despite this, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals denied the motion for extension on November 27, 1967. It denied reconsideration on December 26, 1967, relying on its 1949 resolution that no extension of time to pay docketing fees would be entertained. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for extension of time within which to pay the docketing fee for his appeal.
• Whether or not the payment of the docketing fee beyond the original period, but within the extension prayed for and after a timely motion, warrants dismissal of the appeal.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on motion of the appellee or on its own motion, upon any of the following grounds: (a) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the perfection of the appeal within the period prescribed by these Rules; (b) Failure to file the appellant's brief within the time prescribed; (c) Failure to pay the docketing fee within the time prescribed; (d) Failure to comply with the requirements of these Rules regarding the contents of the appellant's brief; (e) Failure to serve copies of the appellant's brief upon the appellee within the time prescribed; (f) Failure to appear at the hearing of the case; (g) Failure to file a motion for new trial within the time prescribed; (h) Failure to comply with the requirements of these Rules regarding the record on appeal; (i) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the mailing of the appellant's brief; (j) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the service of the appellant's brief; (k) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the filing of the appellant's brief; (l) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the contents of the record on appeal; (m) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the approval of the record on appeal; (n) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the transmission of the record on appeal; (o) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the filing of the record on appeal; (p) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the service of the record on appeal; (q) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the contents of the appellant's brief; (r) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the service of the appellant's brief; (s) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the filing of the appellant's brief; (t) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the contents of the record on appeal; (u) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the approval of the record on appeal; (v) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the transmission of the record on appeal; (w) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the filing of the record on appeal; (x) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the service of the record on appeal; (y) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the contents of the appellant's brief; (z) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding the service of the appellant's brief.

This provision supplies the ground invoked against the petitioner, but the Court treats it as directory rather than mandatory, which is decisive here.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the petition meritorious. The petitioner had explained why he needed a ten-day extension, and he cited several cases in which the same appellate court had granted extensions to pay docketing fees. The Third Division gave no reason for its dismissal except to rely on a nineteen-year-old resolution insisting on rigid and mandatory compliance. The Court held that the allowance or denial of motions for extension of time is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the court, but that such discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. The exercise must be compatible with the right of litigants to be heard and with the best interests of justice.

On the second issue, the Court held that the payment of the appeal docket fee is not a requirement for the protection of the prevailing party, and that non-compliance within the prescribed time causes no substantial prejudice to anyone. The delay was not due to laches or to a desire to delay or defeat the ends of justice. To apply the legal requirements strictly would block the right of review to which a party is entitled under the law. The Court quoted its earlier ruling:

The provision of Section 1, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal 'manifestly confers a power and does not impose a duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.'

The Court added that excusable imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, or lapses in the literal or rigid observance of a procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline, should be overlooked and brushed aside as trivial and indecisive in the interest of fair play and justice when public policy is not involved, no prejudice has been caused the adverse party, and the court has not been deprived of its authority or jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the allowance or denial of a motion for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, but that discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. Second, the payment of the appeal docket fee is not a requirement for the protection of the prevailing party, and delay in paying it causes no substantial prejudice to anyone. Third, the provision of Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, which lists the grounds for dismissal of an appeal, confers a power and does not impose a duty; it is directory, not mandatory, and must be exercised with great circumspection, considering all the attendant circumstances. Fourth, excusable lapses in the literal or rigid observance of a procedural rule or non-jurisdictional deadline should be brushed aside as trivial when public policy is not involved, no prejudice has been caused the adverse party, and the court has not been deprived of its authority or jurisdiction.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, and ordered that court to accept the docketing fee of 53 pesos, docket the case, and give due course to the appeal, with costs against the private respondent.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 are directory, not mandatory, and must be applied with wise and prudent discretion in the interest of substantial justice. Examiners use this case to test whether a late payment of docketing fees, made after a timely motion for extension and within the period prayed for, justifies dismissal of an appeal.