MARIA THERESA T. TUGADI-DAVID, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.
DE GUIA-SALVADOR, J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 26 as amended by Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to RECONSTITUTE the Original Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459 in the names of Orlando Tiamson and Erlinda Tiamson, upon finality of this Order and upon payment by the petitioner of the fees required therefore, subject to such encumbrances as may be subsisting thereon and provided that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned.
SO ORDERED.”[2]
The Facts
It appears that, under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459 of the Quezon City registry, the siblings Orlando and Erlinda Tiamson were the owners of the 310.80 square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 14-B of the subdivision plan (LRA) Psd 71300, situated in Diliman, Quezon City.[3] Upon his death on September 18, 1969, Orlando Tiamson was survived in intestacy by his wife, Violeta Servero and their only son, Orlando Tiamson. Erlinda Tiamson also died intestate on August 27, 1994 and was, in turn, survived by her children with her husband Simeon Tuonquin Tugadi, namely, Jose Christopher, Maria Susana and appellee Maria Theresa, all surnamed Tugadi. It was on August 31, 2002 that said heirs of the registered owners executed the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating the subject parcel unto themselves in accordance with the rules on succession.[4]
On June 24, 2003, appellee commenced the case at bench with the filing of her petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459. She alleged, among other matters, that the owner’s duplicate copy of said title had been lost one week prior to the loss of the original thereof in the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall Building on June 11, 1988; and that having already executed the aforesaid deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their predecessors-in-interest, she and her co-heirs were unable to complete the process in view of the loss and/or destruction of the original and duplicate copies of said title. In support of her prayer for the reconstitution thereof, appellee attached to her petition[5] plain copies of the same title,[6] the special power of attorney executed in her favor by her brother, Jose Christopher Tugadi,[7] the certification regarding the loss of the original issued by the Quezon City Registry of Deeds,[8] the tax declaration filed for the property,[9] the certifications issued by the Office of the Quezon City Assessor regarding its boundaries[10] and the assessed value of the land as well as the improvements thereon,[11] together with copies of the August 31, 2002 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[12] and the affidavit attesting to the due publication thereof in the weekly newspaper Thunderer.[13]
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued the July 11, 2003 order setting the same for hearing on November 7, 2003 and directing, among others, the sending of copies thereof to appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Land Registration Authority and the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor.[14] At the request of the Chief of the Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority,[15] the trial court likewise directed appellee to submit to said office copies of the petition, the certification regarding the loss of the original of the title sought to be reconstituted, the technical description of the subject parcel as well as the sepia film plan therefore and the blue print copies thereof.[16] Alongside the compliance with its service[17] and posting requirements,[18] the trial court’s July 11, 2003 was, likewise, published in the September 8 and 15, 2003 issues of the Official Gazette.[19]
With the initial hearing having been reset thrice,[20] the trial court received evidence of appellee’s compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for the petition on March 5, 2004. Authorized thereat to present her evidence ex parte,[21] appellee went on to take the witness stand[22] and to proffer the following additional pieces of documentary evidence, viz: (a) the Technical Description of the property;[23] (b) the report from the Land Registration Authority that said technical description had been verified to be correct;[24] and, (c) the Sketch/Special Plan for the subject property.[25] Having been appointed as commissioner, the Branch Clerk of Court also submitted her report dated May 7, 2004.[26]
On May 28, 2004, the trial court rendered the appealed decision upon the following findings and conclusions, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
“Accordingly, considering that all records, deeds and documents filed with the Register of Deeds were burned in the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988, petitioner’s recourse is only to submit the documentary evidence under par. (f), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26, consisting of the above-cited Report from the LRA based on the Special Plan of Lot 14-B (LRC) PSD-71300 covered by the TCT No. 117459, and the technical description of the property as prepared by the DENR on February 27, 2001, and certified and found correct by the Land Registration Authority; as well as the Tax Declaration I the name of Orlando Tiamson and Erlinda Tiamson.
All premises considered, the Court finds that petitioner has substantially established and shown that the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459 is warranted under the premises on the basis of the plan and description of Lot 14-B of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71300, as recommended by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and approved by the Land Registration Authority. Notices and other fundamental requirements of the law for reconstitution having been complied with and on the basis of the evidence adduced in support thereof, the Court finds that petitioner has sufficiently established her claim with clear and convincing evidence as warranting the relief prayed for.”[27]
xxx xxx xxx
Dissatisfied with the foregoing decision, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the June 18, 2004 Notice of Appeal on behalf of appellant Republic of the Philippines.[28]
The Issues
Appellant seeks the reversal of the appealed decision on the ground that the trial court reversibly erred as follows:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRESENT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION BECAUSE APPELLEE FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTIONS 12 AND 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 26 IN RELATION TO SECTION 110 OF P.D. NO. 1529.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (T.C.T.) NO. 117459 FOR FAILURE OF APPELLEE TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND.”[29]
The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Reconstitution is simply a remedy which prays for the reissuance of a new certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.[30] Its purpose is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law,[31] in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.[32] The rule is settled that the trial court is duty bound to issue an order of reconstitution where, after hearing, it finds: (a) that the evidence presented is sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate; (b) that the petitioner is the registered owner or has an interest in the property; and, (c) that said certificate was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed. The aforesaid duty is mandatory, i.e., the law does not give the court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been complied with.[33]
It goes without saying, however, that the application of the foregoing principles requires that the person seeking judicial reconstitution should comply with the requirements and procedures therefor laid down by law. Insofar as the petition at bench is concerned, appellant calls our attention to Sections 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 which provides as follows:
“Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) of 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Section 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.”
Contrary to the requirements specifically laid down under the foregoing provisions, however, our perusal of the petition from which the instant suit stemmed shows that appellee had, indeed, failed to allege the fact, among other matters, that no co-owner’s mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been likewise lost or destroyed. Aside from the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, appellee had also failed to include the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property such that no notices were, in fact, sent to them in the course of the proceedings a quo. Neither did appellee bother to include in the petition a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property or, for that matter, a statement of the fact that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. As a consequence, these material data were likewise absent in the July 11, 2003 the trial court issued for the purpose, among other matters, of setting the petition for initial hearing.[34]
To our mind, appellant correctly argues that the foregoing omissions are fatal not only to appellee’s cause but also the trial court’s acquisition of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain her petition. In Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Republic of the Philippines,[35] the Supreme Court found occasion to reiterate the following pronouncements it made in Alabang Development Corporation vs. Valenzuela,[36] to wit:
“Upon examination of the subject petition for reconstitution, the Court notes that some essential data required in Section 12 and 13 of Republic Act No. 26 have been omitted: the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements, and the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have an interest in the property. Neither do these data appear in the Notice of Hearing such that no adjoining owner, occupant or possessor was ever served a copy thereof by registered mail or otherwise. On these glaring conspicuous omissions, the Court repeats its pronouncement in the case, Bernal to wit:
And since the above data do not appear in the Amended petition, the same data do not also appear in the Notice of Hearing of the Petition published in the Official Gazette. Patently, the provisions of Section 12 which enumerates mandatorily the contents of the Petition for Reconstitution and Section 13 which similarly require the contents of the Notice have not been complied with. In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void xxx xxx xxx.”[37]
Republic Act No. 26 specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the trial court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. It bears emphasizing that these requirements and procedure are mandatory[38] and failure to comply therewith deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings.[39] In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the same must be complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.[40]
The jurisdictional requirements prescribed for reconstitution proceedings also help avoid litigations and controversies, as well as discordant supervening events that may well be spawned by a hasty grant of reconstitution.[41] Lest they become unwitting accomplices in the reconstitution of questionable titles, courts have time and again been exhorted to exercise extreme caution in granting petitions for reconstitution in order to promote the stability of our system of land registration.[42] More than the filing thereof by only one of the several heirs of the registered owners of the subject parcel, we find the fact that the petition at bench failed to comply with the above-discussed jurisdictional requirements should have warranted its dismissal.
It does not also help appellee’s cause any that the documents she presented as bases for the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459 are not among those enumerated under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26. While admittedly adverting to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459 and/or containing a description of the subject parcel, a perusal of the provisions of said law shows that the certification regarding the loss of said title,[43] the technical description for the property,[44] the certification from the City Assessor’s Office,[45] the Report from the Land Registration Authority,[46] the Tax Declaration filed for the property[47] and the Sketch Plan[48] are – far from being documents upon which a petition for reconstitution may be based – merely documents required to be further submitted in support thereof. The same may be said of the August 31, 2002 Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate[49] which, having been executed by appellee and her co-heirs long after the loss of the original copy and duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459, had not admittedly been registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.[50] Not having shown any effort exerted to obtain the documents considered to be acceptable as basis therefor, neither can appellee expediently anchor her petition upon the plain copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117459[51] which, being uncertified, is considered inferior evidence for reconstitution.[52]
WHEREFORE, the appealed March 28, 2004 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of appellee’s petition for reconstitution.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, (Chairman) and Roxas, JJ., concur.
[1] pp. 71-79, Orig. Rec.
[2] p. 79, ibid.
[3] Exhibit “K”, p. 5, ibid.
[4] Exhibit “L”, pp. 7-8, ibid.
[5] Exhibit “A”, pp. 1-4, ibid.
[6] Exhibit “K”, p. 5, ibid.
[7] Exhibit “N”, pp. 10-11, ibid.
[8] Exhibit “O”, p. 12, ibid.
[9] Exhibit “S”, p. 15, ibid.
[10] Exhibit “Q”, p. 13, ibid.
[11] Exhibit “R”, p. 14, ibid.
[12] Exhibit “L”, pp. 7-8, ibid.
[13] Exhibit “M”, p. 9, ibid.
[14] Exhibit “B”, pp. 16-18, ibid.
[15] Exhibit “C”, p. 20, ibid.
[16] Exhibit “D”, pp. 21-22, ibid.
[17] Exhibit “H”, p. 37, ibid.
[18] Exhibit “I”, p. 28, ibid.
[19] Exhibit “G”, p. 23, ibid.
[20] pp. 25; 38; 41, ibid.
[21] p. 50, ibid.
[22] pp. 3-21, TSN, March 18, 2003.
[23] Exhibit “P”, p. 53, Orig. Rec.
[24] Exhibit “R”, pp. 60-61, ibid.
[25] Exhibit “T”, p. 59, ibid.
[26] pp. 71-72, ibid.
[27] p. 79, ibid.
[28] pp. 88-89, ibid.
[29] p. 20, Rollo
[30] Heirs of Eulalio Ragua vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 7, 23
[31] Serra Serra vs. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 482, 490
[32] Puzon vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 353 SCRA 699, 710
[33] Republic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 196 SCRA 422, 430
[34] Exhibit “B”, pp. 16-18, Orig. Rec.
[35] 465 SCRA 419.
[36] 116 SCRA 261.
[37] p. 433, ibid.
[38] Republic of the Philippines vs. Planes, 381 SCRA 215.
[39] Sta. Lucia Realty & Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715.
[40] Dordas vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 328.
[41] Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110.
[42] Republic vs. Planes, 381 SCRA 215.
[43] Exhibit “O”, p. 12, Orig. Rec.
[44] Exhibit “P”, p. 53, ibid.
[45] Exhibit “Q”, p. 13, ibid.
[46] Exhibit “R”, pp. 60-61, ibid.
[47] Exhibit “S”, p. 15, ibid.
[48] Exhibit “T”, p. 59, ibid.
[49] Exhibit “L”, pp. 7-8, ibid.
[50] pp. 2-3, ibid.
[51] Exhibit “K”, pp. 5-6, ibid.
[52] Ortigas & Company Ltd. Partnership vs. Velasco, 277 SCRA 342.