G.R. No. L-15022. August 31, 1962
VICENTE STO. DOMINGO BERNARDO, GUADALUPE R. BERNARDO, FILOMENA R. BERNARDO, VICENTE R. BERNARDO, SUSANA R. BERNARDO, NATIVIDAD R. BERNARDO AND DOMINGO R. BERNARDO, PETITIONERS, …
REGALA, J.:
against the herein respondent Westminster High School, with the Municipal Court
of Manila, alleging that on November 15, 1946, both parties, the respondent
represented by Elizabeth Kho, entered into a contract of lease whereby the
latter leased from the former a parcel of land owned in common by them, located
at Tondo, Manila, at a monthly rental of P1,200.00, subsequently reduced to
P1,000.00 a month; that as provided in the lease contract, the monthly rentalis
were to be paid by the lessee to the lessors “at the end of each month”; and
that since the commencement of the lease on January 16, 1947, respondent had
been paying the stipulated rental up to March 15, 1958, but has defaulted in the
payment thereof since then.
In its answer, respondent admitted the basic allegations of the complaint,
including the existence of a contract of lease between the parties, but
interposed the defense that during the summer months of April and May of every
year the practice had been to allow deferred payment of the rentals.
Before hearing, respondent deposited with the said court the rentals in
arrears and on July 9, 1958, after trial, the court rendered the following
judgment:
“Upon confession of the defendant thru counsel to the effect that the amount
of P3,000.00 deposited in this Court shall be applied to the rental of the
premises in issue for the period covering March 16 to June 15, 1958,
inclusive;“JUDGMENT is hereby rendered for the plaintiff against the defendant to pay
the sum of P1,000.00 on or before July 31, 1958 as rental of the said premises
for the period covering June 16 to July 15, 1958, and, the sum of P1,000.00
every end of the month thereafter as long as defendant shall continue to occupy
the premises; the sum of P200.00 as and for attorney’s fees and costs.
Otherwise, ejectment execution shall issue.“Let the sum of P3,000.00 in check deposited with this Court be withdrawn by
the plaintiffs and applied accordingly.
Within the reglementary period, respondent perfected an appeal from the
aforesaid judgment to the Court of First Instance of Manila where the suit was
docketed as Civil Case No. 37014. The complaint in the court of origin was
reproduced, while resspondent filed an answer thereto alleging similar
defenses.
In the Court of First Instance, respondent deposited with the Clerk of Court
the rentals for June 16 to September 15, but not at the end of each month as
stipulated in the lease contract. The June 16 to July 15 rental was deposited
not on July 31, 1958, when it became due and payable, but on August 1, 1958; the
July 16 to August 15 rentals was deposited not on August 31, 1958 but on
September 12, 1958; and the rental for August 16 to September 15 was deposited
not on September 30, 1958 but on October 1, 1958. From the foregoing, it is
quite evident that the defendant was always late in the deposit of the
rentals.
Consequently, on October 1, 1958, the petitioners filed with the Court of
First Instance an urgent motion for execution of the judgment rendered by the
municipal court on July 9, 1958, “on the ground that the respondent had not
paid, on September 30, 1958, either to the plaintiffs or the said court the
rental of P1,000.00 corresponding to the period from August 16, 1958 to
September 15, 1958.” This motion was defined by the court in an order dated
December 2, 1958, pertinent portion of which reads:
“However, the Court thinks that to constitute an exception to the way of
payment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the existence of said contract of
lease must be stated in the judgment of the Municipal Court, as prescribed in
said Rule 72, Section 8, * * *. But the judgment of the Municipal Court,
which is the one appealed from in this case, does not contain any statement
about the existence of any contract of lease, and therefore, the way of payment
agreed upon in said contract should not be followed by the defendant during the
pendency of this appeal but that way of payment as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Teofila Salvador vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al.,
supra.“Consequently, the deposit made by the defendant on October 1, 1958, for the
rentals corresponding to the period from August 16 to September 15, 1958, is
within the period prescribed in said Rule 72, Sec 8, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court and, therefore, the motion for execution is hereby denied for
being groundless.” (Italics supplied).
Motion for reconsideration of this order was likewise denied on January 16,
1959.
Hence, the petitioners filed the present action for certiorari and mandamus,
praying for the annulment of the order denying petitioner’s motion foy immediate
execution and that a writ of mandamus be issued commanding the respondent judge
to order the immediate execution of the decision of the municipal court of
Manila, dated July 9, 1958, to eject respondent Westminster High School from the
premises in question.
The main issue hinges on the proper interpretation and construction of
Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows:
“SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same.—If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a
sufficient bond approved by the justice of the peace or municipal court and
executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance,
and to pay the rents, damages, and costs down to the time of the final judgment
in the action, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he pays to the
plaintiff or to the Court of First Instance the amount of rent due from time to
time under the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the justice of the
peace or municipal court to exist, or, in the absence of a contract, he pays
to the plaintiff or into the court, on or before the tenth day of each calendar
month, the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month at the rate determined by the judgment. * * * Should the
defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during
the pendency of the appeal, the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the
plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such
failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from, but such
execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final
disposition thereof on its merits. * * *”
The above-quoted provision prescribes two modes of payment of the rents
during the pendency of an appeal, to wit: (1) payment of the rent as stipulated
in the lease contract, or (2) in the absence of a contract, payment of the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises on or before the
tenth day of each calendar month, for the preceding month at the rate determined
by the judgment.
The respondent, apparently, has followed the second mode of payment, having
deposited its August-September rental on October 1, 1958. We held in Salvador
vs. Caluag, 98 Phil., 313; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 3 p. 1437, that in cases of monthly
rents which could be paid from a given day of a month up to a given day of the
following month, the calendar month within which the rent could be deposited or
paid should be that following the month when the rent matured, i.e., if the rent
matures on any day of the month of September, the calendar month referred to in
section 8, Rule 72, within which the rent should be paid to avoid execution of
the decision, would be the month of October and so on. Under the second mode,
respondent had until October 10, 1958 to make the deposit or payment of the
August-September rental in question, and it appearing, as already mentioned,
that the deposit was made on October 1, 1958, there is no question that there
was proper compliance with said mode.
We think, however, after a careful analysis of the above-quoted section of
Rule 72, that the procedure followed in the Caluag case (supra), which gives an
interpretation of the phrase “on or before the tenth day of each calendar month”
is not applicable to the case at bar, because the provision allowing payment or
deposit of rental within such a period applies only “in the absence of a
contract.”
An examination of the record reveals that the complaint filed with the
municipal court alleged three basic facts which were expressly admitted by the
respondent in its answer, to wit: (1) that there exists a written contract of
lease; (2) that the monthly rent is P1,000.00; and (3) that the said rent is to
be paid at the end of each month pursuant to the terms of the contract. Copy of
the alleged contract was attached to the complaint. Again, when this complaint
was reproduced in the Court of First Instance, the respondent, in its answer,
reiterated its admission of these three basic allegations. As between the
parties, therefore, there is no dispute as to the existence of a lease agreement
between them.
It is worthy to note that the judgment of the municipal court in question is
not entirely devoid of any indication of the existence of a lease contract
between the parties. The statement as to the amount of rent and the date of
payment thereof, which fully coincides with the terms of the contract, is enough
suggestion that the inferior court has been aware of the existence of a lease
agreement. However, there was no express finding of this regard.
In denying the motion for execution, the lower court has made capital of the
participial phrase “as found by a judgment of the justice of the peace or
municipal court to exist.” But the phrase applies only when there is doubt as to
the presence of a contract and the inferior court declares its existence. It
would be unnecessary for the justice of the peace or municipal court to make
such a finding, if, as in the present case, it is quite clear from the pleadings
of the parties that there is a lease agreement.
Section 15, Rule 4, of the Rules of Court, provides that the judgment of the
justice of the peace or municipal judge need not contain findings of fact or
conclusions of law. If Section 8, Rule 72, is to be construed in the sense that
the inferior court judge must, in all cases, make a finding as to the existence
of a lease contract, so as to give effect to said contract between the parties,
then, in ejectment cases, whenever the justice of the peace or municipal judge
chooses not to make findings of fact in its judgment, the second mode of
payment, as above discussed, would always be followed in cases of appeal and
immediate execution is justified. In other words, the giving effect to the terms
of the contract of lease, even if not the subject of dispute between the
parties, would depend upon the option of the inferior court judge—a very
dangerous interpretation because, as a result, the inferior court could
unjustifiably render nugatory or ineffectual the terms of a lease agreement.
This Court feels that the judgment in an ejectment case, where the
relationship of the parties is admittedly governed by a lease contract, need not
contain an express statement of the existence of such contract, and that payment
or deposit of the rents during the pendency of the appeal should be in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the lease agreement. It appearing
that defendant in this case failed to pay the rents within the stipulated time,
execution of the decision should have been issued.
Wherefore, the instant petition is granted. The orders of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 37014, dated December 2, 1958 and January
16, 1950, denying the motion for execution, are hereby set aside, and the
respondent judge is hereby directed to order the immediate execution of the
decision of the Municipal Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 58405, dated July 9,
1958.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Paredes, Dizon, and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Concepcion, and Barrera,
JJ., concur in the result.