MARCELA DIONISIO, PETITIONER, VS. ROSARIO JIMENEZ, ERNESTO P. HERNANDO, COMMISSIONER CESARIO DE LEON, THE HONORABLE JUDGE BIENVENIDO A. TAN, AND SEVERO ABELLERA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks the annulment of all
the proceedings had in Case No. 480 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission as well as those had in Civil Case No. 2354 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in so far as they may affect petitioner,
Marcela Dionisio, on the ground that the latter was not served with
summons, nor notified, nor given an opportunity to be heard in said
proceedings and, therefore, unless nullified, she will be deprived of
her property without due process of law.

This petition stems from a claim for compensation and notice of
injury filed by Rosario Jimenez on August 2, 1952 before the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission against Esperanza Lime Factory seeking
compensation for the death of her husband who met an accident while in
the employ of the factory as a laborer (Case No. 480). Copy of the
claim was served on the manager of respondent—one Esperanza Antonio de
Carranglan.

On January 23, 1953, respondent, through her manager, answered the
claim which under section 37 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as
amended takes the form of a report, known as Employer’s Report of
Accident. In said report it was stated that the owner licensee of the
factory is Marcela Dionisio. The claim and the report are the main
pleadings in a compensation case, which correspond to the complaint and
answer in an ordinary civil case.

The claim was set for hearing through a referee at which petitioner
and respondent, each represented by counsel, presented their evidence.
After the reception of the evidence, the referee rendered judgment on
July 30, 1953 ordering respondent to pay to petitioner-claimant the sum
of P4,000 as compensation, plus burial expenses not exceeding P200, and
the sum of P41 as costs. It was stated in the decision that the amount
of compensation may be paid on installment basis provided that, in case
of failure to pay one installment, the claimant may ask for the payment
of the whole claim without any reduction. This judgment was promulgated
on August 5, 1953 and as no petition for review was filed with the
Commission within the reglementary period, the same became final and
executory.

Availing herself of this decision which had become final for lack of
appeal or a petition for review as above stated, petitioner filed an
urgent petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal in order that
it may be enforced pursuant to section 51, of Act No. 3428, as amended
by Republic Act No. 772, and said petition was docketed in said court
as Civil Case No. 2354. This petition was heard ex parte and
thereafter the court, in a decision rendered on October 27, 1953,
reaffirmed the judgment of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. This
decision also became final and, forthwith, petitioner filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was granted, and the
sheriff proceeded to levy upon a parcel of land belonging to Marcela
Dionisio who is the owner of the factory which was adjudged as party
responsible for the compensation both by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission as well as by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. It is
for these reasons that Marcela Dionisio now comes before this Court
seeking the annulment of all the proceedings as already stated in the
early part of the decision.

It is the contention of petitioner that all the proceedings had
before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission as well as of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which culminated in the rendition of the
judgment which the widow seeks now to enforce by virtue of a writ of
execution are null and void because she has never been summoned, nor
notified, nor given any opportunity to be heard, and that, unless
nullified, and the writ of execution is given due course, the effect
would be to deprive her of her property without due process of law.

In every case arising under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No.
3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772), the proper respondent is the
employer or person for whom the victim has rendered the service. The
word “employer” has a definite legal meaning. Thus, under section 39 of
said Act as amended, the word ’employer’ includes every person or
association of persons, incorporated or not, public or private, and the
legal representative of the deceased employer. It includes the owner or
lessee of a factory or establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business
carried on in the establishment or place of work * * *.” (Italics
supplied.) In the instant case, it is true that the claim was
originally filed by Eosario Jimenez, the widow against the Esperanza
Lime Factory, naming as manager Esperanza Antonio de Carranglan. But it
is likewise true that the connection of Marcela Dionisio with said
factory appears well established. Thus, in the report submitted by
Esperanza Antonio de Carranglan in answer to the claim, she stated that
the owner and licensee of the factory was Marcela Dionisio, she being
merely a manager thereof, while at the hearing of the case she not only
reiterated this fact but even added that Marcela Dionisio is her
mother. It cannot therefore be denied that the summons served upon her
as manager of the Esperanza Lime Factory was made not only in
accordance with the law but is valid and binding upon Marcela Dionisio
upon the theory that service upon the manager is service upon the
owner. The fact that the Esperanza Lime Factory is merely a trade name
is of no moment, for the word “employer” includes any association of
persons whether incorporated or not, or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business.

On the other hand, the law regarding service of notice of injury or
claim for compensation support this view. Thus, section 26 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act 3420) provides that if the employer is
a corporation the notice may be served on “any agent in charge of its
business at the place where the injury was received”, and supplementing
this provision, we have section 9, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court which
provides that when persons associated in business are sued under a
common name the service may be effected “upon the person in charge of
the office or place of business maintained in the common name”, and
section 15, Rule 3, which allows two or more persons who transact
business under a common name to be sued under such common name even if
their names are not comprised therein. And commenting on this
provision, Chief Justice Moran has the following to say:

“The above provision does not change the rule of
substantive law to the effect that when an association has acquired a
juridical personality of its own, it may sue or be sued as such. It is
when such association has no separate juridical personality, or the
plaintiff baa no means of acquiring knowledge thereof, that the above
provision applies, for, in such a case, plaintiff must seek relief from
the members of the association. But often times it is hard, if not
impossible, to determine who those members are, particularly when they
try to conceal their connection so as to frustrate the action, and the
social agreement, on the other hand, is not known. To overcome this
difficulty, the above provision authorizes the action against the
associates by the common name under which they have been transacting
business, and, as will be seen later, the association in its answer is
bound to disclose the name of its members, and thus a judgment may be
rendered affecting the members individually, as may be seen in Rule 35,
section 8.” (Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 1, pp.
96-97.)

Marcela Dionisio cannot therefore complain that she was not
personally served with the summons or notice of the claim of Rosario
Jimenez because of the fact that she has assumed a business name and
held herself out as the owner of the business under that name, nor can
she avoid the responsibility that may attach to her business by
claiming that the only one notified of the action taken is her manager
or associate in the business. Neither can she claim that in the present
case she has not been given her day in court, or the action was taken
against her without due process of law, because, in contemplation of
law, service upon her manager is service upon her. In fact, her manager
and daughter, Esperanza Antonio de Carranglan, took upon herself the
duty to defend her and protect her interest, as in fact she appeared in
the case personally and by counsel and presented evidence in defense of
her interest. It is evident that her claim has no legal basis.

Petition is denied, without pronouncement as to costs.

Pards, C. J., Pablo, Bengon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.