🎧 Case Brief Lecture

EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, COMPLAINANT, VS. PEDRO B. CARRANZA, RESPONDENT.

Adm. Case No. 716. January 30, 1969 January 30, 1969

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Berenguer versus Carranza

The Case

This is an administrative case for disbarment or disciplinary action filed by Eduardo J. Berenguer against Attorney Pedro B. Carranza. The complainant charges the respondent with deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, because the respondent introduced in evidence an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer containing a false statement that the deceased left no heirs other than the affiant, when in truth the deceased was survived by several other children. The case matters because it fixes the standard of a lawyer's duty of candor toward the court: liability may attach even without any intent to deceive, where the lawyer's inattention or carelessness misleads the court.

Procedural History

The complaint was filed with the Supreme Court on July 15, 1966. The respondent was required to answer, and he filed his answer on August 17, 1966. On September 1, 1966, the Court referred the matter to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation. Both complainant and respondent were duly heard. The then Solicitor General, Antonio Barredo, submitted his report on March 18, 1968, finding no evidence that the respondent prepared the false documents, but finding him liable for want of diligence, and recommending that a complaint for violation of his oath be instituted. That complaint was filed by the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General on March 18, 1968. The respondent filed his answer on May 16, 1968, raising no issue as to the facts. The matter thus reached the Supreme Court as an original administrative proceeding, and the Court resolved it in this decision.

Facts

The respondent was the counsel who appeared for the petitioner in a cadastral case in Sorsogon. The petition and the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer attached to it were prepared and sworn to in Pasay City, not by the respondent. The affidavit stated that the affiant's mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except the affiant herself. That statement was false: the deceased was survived by four other daughters and one son, who was the complainant's father.

At the cadastral hearing on January 17, 1966, the respondent presented the affidavit in evidence. He admitted that he was not very meticulous about the petition because there was neither private nor government opposition to it, and that he did not bother to read the entirety of the affidavit. He claimed that his failure to notice the incorrect statement was a mere oversight, that he had no hand in making the documents, and that he did not consent to the doing of the falsity.

The investigation found no apparent causal link between the falsehood and the respondent's act of handling the case, and no evidence that he participated in preparing the documents. It nonetheless concluded that the circumstances, involving various estates and family litigations rooted in successional rights, warranted a greater exercise of diligence on his part, and that his failure to read the affidavit showed indifference to proof inconsistent with facts he definitely knew.

Issues

  • Whether or not the respondent is guilty of deliberate deception of the court, given that he had nothing to do with the preparation of the false affidavit and there was no evidence of wilful intent.
  • Whether or not the respondent may be held liable for violation of his oath as a lawyer for his inattention and carelessness in presenting false evidence, even absent any intent to deceive.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the lawyer's oath, provides:

I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients.

This oath is the measure of the respondent's conduct: it binds him not to do falsehood nor consent to its doing in court, and to conduct himself with good fidelity to the courts.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, cited in the complaint as the sanction for the respondent's failure to discharge his duties consistent with his oath, provides:

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This provision supplies the ground for disciplinary action where a lawyer violates his oath, even as the Court calibrates the penalty to the gravity of the conduct.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the charge of deliberate deception cannot be sustained. The Solicitor General found nothing wilful in the respondent's conduct, and the respondent had nothing to do with the preparation of the affidavit, which was executed in Pasay City.

On the second issue, the Court answered in the negative to the suggestion that this absence of intent entirely exculpates him. His failure to exercise greater care did result in the confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit, and it would be to err on the side of undue leniency to hold him blameless. His fidelity to his oath as attorney was less than entire. The Court stressed that every member of the bar must be on guard lest, through oversight or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could result in a failure of justice. Lawyers owe their clients complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, but they are likewise held to strict accountability for candor and honesty toward the court. Even without intent to deceive, a lawyer whose conduct betrays inattention or carelessness cannot free himself from a charge by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he did not consent to the falsity.

Doctrine

A lawyer's oath is impressed with the utmost seriousness and must not be taken lightly. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and the lawyer's duty of candor and honesty toward the court is enforced to strict accountability.

Intent to deceive is not essential to disciplinary liability for presenting false evidence. A lawyer who, through inattention or carelessness, presents evidence containing a false statement, thereby causing confusion and the prolongation of a suit, violates his oath and may be disciplined, even where he did not prepare the false document and did not act wilfully.

The duty is affirmative: a lawyer must take all necessary measures to avoid the court being misled, and must clear up doubts and inconsistencies in the evidence he presents, particularly where the circumstances, such as family litigations rooted in successional rights, call for greater diligence.

Disposition

The respondent Pedro B. Carranza was reprimanded and warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with, with the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon directed to administer the reprimand in public, and the complainant to be informed of the date of its administration.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: even without intent to deceive, a lawyer whose conduct betrays inattention or carelessness in presenting evidence violates his oath and cannot escape responsibility. Examiners use this case to test the duty of candor toward the court and the rule that disciplinary liability for a lawyer's carelessness does not require wilfulness.