G.R. No. L-2487. May 18, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. RICO ELIZAGA, FELIPE LOZADA, JR., AND ELIEZER TOLENTINO, ACCUSED AND APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions May 18, 1950 TUASON, J.:


TUASON, J.:


This appeal is from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan, which found Rico (Uldarico) Elizaga, Felipe lozada, Jr. and
Eliezer Tolentino guilty of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,500, and to pay the costs.

The facts, in so far as they are admitted by the appellants in
their brief, are these: On August 9, 1947, Father Narciso Guevara,
auxiliary parish priest of Gattaran, Cagayan, accompanied by a helper
(sacristan), Antonio Abad, went to barrio Comao, of the same
municipality, to officiate in that barrio’s fiesta. On the 12th, Father
Guevara said a mass in Bangatan, after which he and. Abad proceeded to
Palagao. From the latter barrio Abad returned to town with a note and
P21 in cash for Father Carreon, the parish priest.

At about 1:30 p.m of August 14, 1947, the chief and the sergeant of
police of Gattaran, having received report of the finding of a cadaver
at Tabiki river, repaired to the place and recognized the body as that
of Father Guevara. Later in the afternoon, Dr. Antonio Nolasco,
president of the 3rd sanitary division, with two other doctors, the
chief of police and other persons, fetched the cadaver to town where
Dr. Nolasco, with the aid of the other two doctors above mentioned,
made a superficial examination of the body. His opinion was that the
priest had died of asphyxia, possibly by drowning. On September 7,
1947, the body was exhumed and a second autopsy was performed by a
representative of the district health officer, an MP doctor and the
president of the third sanitary division. With the last mentioned
doctor dissenting and reiterating the conclusion reached at the first
autopsy, the other two doctors signed a majority report stating the
presence of congestion on the right and left cheeks of the cadaver,
more marked on the left side, and assigning as the cause of death:

“(1) Asphyxia due to occlusion of the respiratory
opening or passage as evidenced by the congestion of both cheeks and
the trachea.

“(2) Shock secondary, due to undue manipulation
and wounding of the genitalia as evidenced by tear wound of the scrotum
at the median raphe and the congestion of the vas deference.” (Exhibit
C, p. 8, folio of exhibits.)

The MP doctor who participated in the second autopsy declared on
the witness stand that the congestion on the right and left cheeks
indicated that the deceased was struck in that region.

The important questions for determination are (1) whether the death
was caused by accidental drowning or (2) if it was the result of a foul
play, who killed the priest? We shall take up the last question first.

The prosecution undertook to prove that the deceased was slain by
the three defendants. It introduced two supposed eye-witnesses, only
one of whom gave an account of what he claimed to have seen, the other
having backed out from what he had previously stated to the police
authorities.

Rafael Calavia testified that he had known Rico Elizaga and Eliezer
Tolentino for a long time because he had resided in the poblacion of
Gattaran, while Felipe Lozada, Jr. he used to meet in the streets. He
said that one day he pulled cogon grass for .attorney Alberto Antonio.
At about sunset, as he started for the river to wash up, he saw the
three defendants on the river bank and Father Guevara coming down the
slope toward the river on horseback. The defendants took hold of the
reins of Father Guevara’s horse and the priest fell down. Elizaga boxed
Father Guevara, Lozaga pressed his neck and Tolentino stepped on his
stomach. He hid behind a tree so as not to be seen. From the tree to
the place where the priest was assaulted, the distance was about forty
meters. The name of the river was Tabiki and its width at low tide was
about fifteen meters. At the time of the commission of the crime, the
water was shallow, about knee-deep. After Father Guevara fell off the
horse, the defendants dragged him to the river and after that they
grabbed his saddle bag. At this point of the attack he ran away because
he knew the defendants were coining across the river. He said he did
not have any grudge against any of the accused.

Isaac de la Cruz was sworn as a witness but he expressed complete
ignorance of Father Guevara’s misfortune. While admitting that he was
at Tabiki river until six p.m. on August 13, 1947, he said he did not
know anything. He admitted that the signature on Exhibit B, a statement
sworn to and subscribed before the justice of the peace of Gattaran,
was his. He also admitted that on February 16, 1947, he went with the
provincial fiscal and Calavia “to the place of the incident” and
pointed to the fiscal an elevated place to which, he told the fiscal,
he had gone looking for a carabao and from which he had seen Father
Guevara being attacked by three individuals. But he explained that
those statements he made by order of the military police when in truth
he had seen nothing of what happened. He also said that he had been
forced to sign the affidavit above mentioned by “those persons who came
to get us and maltreated us,” namely, Lieutenant Aguilar and Sergeant
Pascua. He admitted that he had come to Aparri to attend the trial of
this case with the mother of the deceased and promised her that he
would go to the convent where she was to stay. He said he did not show
up at the convent, as he had promised, because he got a headache and
could not get up.

Antonio Abad, Father Guevara’s boy-helper, testified that the
priest had a saddle bag’ in which he had about P500 in cash of 10-, 20-
and 50-peso denominations, besides, one kodak, one striped pajama, two
undershirts, two towels, one pair of trousers and two wrist watches. He
saw all these because as the priest’s assistant he arranged his
belongings.

Tomas Foster testified that between 5 and 6 in the afternoon of
August 13, he saw Father Guevara riding on a horse past his house in
barrio Tabiki, town bound; that the priest was carrying a saddle bag,
and that he and the priest exchanged greetings.

Jesus Endrada, the chief of police, declared that when he saw
Father Guevara’s cadaver at Tabiki river on August 14, it was lying on
its back half submerged in the water and the other half out of the
water. He said there was a watch on the left wrist, one cigarette case
in the right pocket of the priest’s polo shirt, and one chain on the
neck. The face was swollen with echimosis and the left cheek was
bruised, but the stomach was not distended.

Manuel Torrijos, Captain, MPC, Provincial Commander of Cagayan,
testified that in September, 1947, he questioned Rafael Calavia and
Isaac de la Cruz in the barracks of the Aparri detachment. He
identified Exhibit A as the statement of De la Cruz regarding what De
la Cruz said he “knew of the crime. He said that before De la Cruz
signed that affidavit, the affiant was apprised of his rights and
privileges as a citizen.

The defendants put up an alibi.

Apolinar Siriban testified that in the afternoon of August 13,
1947, Didarico Elizaga came to his house to have h haircut by one of
his employees, Roque Leaño. It was about three o’clock when Elizaga
came. The haircut was over at four o’clock but Elizaga did not leave
immediately. It was, he thought, after five o’clock when Elizaga left;
the sun was about to set.

Roque Leaño testified that he was a tailor in the employ of Apolinar
Siriban. About three p.m. of August 13, he gave Elizaga a haircut and
got through about five.

Uldarico Elizaga, 20 years old, testified that at three p.m. on
August 13, he went.to Apolinar Siriban’s shop to have a haircut. He got
through with his haircut about five o’clock and left the tailor’s shop
about dusk. He denied having gone to Domon or Tabiki creek. He did not
know, he said, Rafael Calavia. The first time he met Calavia was when
lit. Aguilar ; “let us stay together in one room in the camp in
Aparri.”

Florencio Castillo, high school teacher, declared that on August 13,
1947, he was in the Northern Philippine Academy where he taught
physics, national language, military drill and physical education.
Felipe Lozada, Jr. was his student, taking under him national language,
military drill and physical education. Lozada’s class in national
language was from 9:30 to 10:30 a.m. In the afternoon, he handled
military drill, from 4:10 to 5:00. On August 13, there was a military
review from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. followed by a literary-musical program up
to 6:00. Lozada was present at both the military drill and program. He
said he had three school registers attesting to Lozada’s presence.
(More of these records will be said later.)

Estanislao Quinagatan said that on the 13th of August 1947, he was
at home; that at about 4 o’clock in the afternoon Felipe Lozada came
“to invite jus to witness their program;” that at 6 o’clock Lozada!came
again to get the “fiambrera” for Mrs. Varela’s meal fecfc which
Lozada’s parents furnished; that Lozada used to get the “fiambrera”
from his (witness’) house at 11 o’clock in the morning and at 6 o’clock
in the afternoon.

Felipe Lozada, 16 years old, testified that on the 13th of August,
he was in school—from 7:30 to 10:00 in the morning and from 1:30 to
4:00 in the afternoon; that on that date there was a military training
and program given in honor of a visiting guest, Rev. Fr. Francisco
Galvez; that the program included songs, recitations and speeches and
was concluded at 6 p.m.; that from school he went to Estanislao
Quinagatan to get the food container.

Macario Melchor testified that he lived in barrio Darat, Barbarit,
Gattaran; that Eliezer Tolentino is his son-in-law, having married his
daughter on the 28th of the previous month; that on August 11,
Tolentino and his wife came to visit him; that upon arrival at his
house Tolentino was. attacked by asthma and was in bed for four days
without being able to go out.

Rafael Melchor testified that on togust 11, Eliezer Tolentino, his
brother-in-law, came with his wife to witness’ father’s house; that on
the 13th he saw this accused both at noon and in the afternoon, about 5
o’clock; that he called at his father’s house “because that was the
first time they (Tolentino and his wife) go to that house;” that
besides Eliezer Tolentino was sick with asthma and was in bed;; that he
left his father’s house at about 7 o’clock.

Elizier Tolentino, 21 years old, testified that on August 11 he
went to visit his father-in-law; that on that date he had an attack of
asthma, and was laid up for four days. Oil August 13 he never went out.
He said he did not know Rafael Calavia; that the first time he knew
Calavia was when they were in Aparri. He denied knowledge of, much less
participation, the killing of Father Guevara.

The defendants presented witnesses directly to impeach Calavia’s
testimony—to show that this witness had been maltreated by the military
police and that he was in another place at the time lie said he saw
Father Guevara killed.

Jose P. Amorin, Captain and Intelligence Officer, MPC, Cagayan,
was put on the stand for the defense. The gist of his testimony is
that he conducted an investigation of Father Guevara’s death and found
that Calavia and De la Cruz had been “third-degreed.” On
cross-examination, he testified that he was a Methodist; that the
accused were of the same religion as he professed; that Eliezer
Tolentino’s father is a pastor and Lozada’s father supervising teacher;
that he did not know whether Elizaga’s father was a protestant; that he
did not know, when he made an investigation, that a complaint had
already been filed with the justice of the peace; that all he knew was
that an investigation had been conducted.

Alfredo Llaga testified that on the 13 th day of August, in the
morning, he was taken to the house of Jama, a Chinaman, in Calaoagan
Bassit. Among the persons who arrested him was Sgt. Pascua, the only
one he knew. He was asked by the soldiers who passed by his house in
Tabiki Isaac de la Cruz and Jose Mandac were taken with the witness. He
saw Rafael Calavia at Jama’s house when they were already eating in the
evening. He recognized Calavia’s feature because there was a light.
Calavia’s face was swollen and he was suffering great pains. He said
Isaac de la Cruz asked Calavia, “Why are you implicating us, you cannot
prevent this suffering we are having? To which Calavia answered,
“Brother, you are not the only one who was maltreated, I even got the
worst.”

Jose Mandac testified that oh August 30, 1947, a soldier searched
his house and after-ward took him with Isaac de la Cruz and Alfredo
Llaga to Jama’s store, where he was asked if he had seen the iffen who
killed Father Guevara, and was beaten when he said he did not see
anybody; that he did not see De la Cruz maltreated but he heard his
cries; that he saw Rafael Calavia in the evening very weak and with a
swollen face.

Santos Tobias testified that Attorney Alberto Antonio’s wife was
his wife’s sister; that on August 13, Urdillos and Calavia came to his
home to get their money for the cogon they had gathered for Antonio,
who lived in his house but who had gone to Tuguegarao; that he went to
Antonio’s wife, who had had a miscarriage, and received from her P20
with the request that he “please do the favor to give the money” to
Calavia, which he did; that from his house Calavia and Urdillos went
south; that it was about 5 o’clock in the afternoon.

Eustaquio Urdillos testified that on August 13, in the afternoon,
he went to another place, the store of Atty. Antonio in Company with
one Calavia, “to collect, I supposed, for pulling cogon;” that Antonio
was not at home and they found only Santos Tobias; that Calavia was
paid P20.00, after which they bought several bottles of tuba and returned to their respective homes.

The Governments case must stand or fall on the testimony of Rafael
Calavia, the only supposed eye-witness to the crime who gave evidence
for the prosecution. The trial Judge who saw this witness testify and
observed his conduct and demeanor was convinced by his narration.

Judged by the record alone, we are satisfied that Calavia was a
truthful witness. We had no motive to invent facts against the
accused. That he had kept silent about the crime and had even denied to
the authorities having personal knowledge of it would only show his
indifference and his reluctance to become instrumental in the
prosecution and conviction of the defendants.

We are not impressed by the contention that Calavia was forced
through violence and intimidation to testify for the prosecution. It is
common practice for law enforcement officers to wring confession from a
suspect by torture, but no right-minded man would by this means compel,
with any hope or success, an unwilling witness to tell the court what
he did not know or what he did not want to say. As the saying goes,
although the simile is not exactly parallel, you could lead a horse to
the water but you could not make him drink. A man could be forced to
make an extra-judicial statement against a defendant but there would be
no assurance that he would stick to that statement in court, which is what counts. An extrajudicial statement alone would be useless. The
most obvious futility of compelling a witness to testify against his
will was that once he was before the court no amount of intimidation
could keep him from going back on his promise. And the betrayal need
not be open as was De la Cruz; to exaggerate or to add fantastic
details to the story would be fatal.

Nor was the witness merely to recite stereotyped passages as if
declaiming. He was to convince a discerning if not skeptical court
experienced in evaluating the truth. Above all, he was to meet a
barrage of questions and cross-questions from hostile; attorneys. Yet in
this case, Calavia, except for a few seeming contradictions, gave
straightforward testimony, reciting complicated details, and
successfully stood his ground against-rigid and thorough
cross-examinations.

Anyhow, Calavia in rebuttal denied that he had been maltreated. He
said it was Captain Amorin who spoke to him lengthily in an effort to
make him change his statement against the accused. He said on
cross-examination, in rebuttal, that Amorin “investigated” him in the
house” of the mayor after they came from the house of Lozada. He said
he was “investigated” from 8 o’clock in the evening until, early the
following morning surrounded by the defendants and their relatives. He
denied that in the store or house of Chinaman Jama he saw Alfredo Llaga
or Jose Mandac. He said that only Isaac de la Cruz was with him.

It is significant that only Isaac de la Cruz and Rafael Calavia
made sworn statements. If the military police obtained statements
through violence from De la Cruz and Calavia, it is strange that
Alfredo Llaga and Jose Mandac, who claimed to have been manhandled
also, do not appear to have incriminated any of the defendants. They do
not appear to be made of sterner stuff.

There are signs of truth in Alfredo Llaga’s, Jose Mandac’s and
Isaac de la Cruz’s statements that they were rounded up and urged,
perhaps with threats, promises and intimidation, to tell who killed
Father Guevara; but there are as many signs of falsehoods and
extravagant exaggerations in their story of torture, especially as
regards Calavia. At any rate, Calavia’s testimony has to be weighed
partly, yes, by what had happened to him but largely by the probability
and the details of his story and the way he told it. In both respects
Calavia, we think, passed the test successfully.

The appellants rely heavily on several alleged contradictions in
Calavia’s testimony. It is said that it was about the same hour he was
supposed to have witnessed the crime that Calavia said he went to
collect from his employer the price of the cogon grass which he had
gathered. The truth is there was no contradiction, only
misinterpretation or misunderstanding of Calavia’s testimony. Upon
further cross-examination, this witness declared that it was one week
after the death of Father Guevara that he came to get his money from
the man who had hired him. And this clarification has the merit of
having been made with- out any thought of adjusting it to any previous
testimony. It was his spontaneous answer to an innocuous and direct
question as to when he called upon his employer to get his money.

Another supposed discrepancy is between Calavia’s statement in
Exhibit 1, in which he affirmed that the deceased had been assaulted at
the bank of Domon river, and his testimony in court that the assault
occurred at the edge of Tabiki river. But the record clearly shows that
the river or creek where the incident took place is inter-changeably
called Domon or Tabiki. It appears that one is tributary of the other.

The last discrepancy cited is between Calavia’s statement in the
same affidavit and his testimony at the trial regarding the length of
time he had known Father Guevara and the clothes the latter was
wearing. As to the priest’s apparrel, the confusion could very well
have been due to another misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Having
used the generic term “bado”, shirt, in his testimony before the court,
Calavia very likely used the same word before the police officers who
wrote Exhibit 1, and that word was understood to mean “sotana” by the
translator, for the obvious reason that a Catholic priests, except on
very rare occasions, do not wear shirts. Calavia denied having said
“sotana” in his extrajudicial declaration, a denial which is plausible
in view of the fact that “sotana” is a term not known to or used by
people who have little or no schoolings.

The discrepancy as to the time Calavia had known the deceased is of
very slight or no:importance. By its nature, the witness’ answers
could have been based on a mere guess and uttered without reflection.
Under the circumstances it is not strange that such answers, given on
widely-separated dates, should be at variance with each other.
Moreover, the discrepancy was harmless as it was innocent. The time had
no bearing on the questions at issue and the witness had no need to lie
about it. It made no difference whether Calavia had known the priest
five months or three years or had not seen him at all before.

The trial court did not believe the defendant’s evidence on their alibi. In quoting the following passage from U. S. vs.
Lozada, 21 Phil. 287, the court by inference adopts it as its reason
for rejecting this defense; “where the case offers a conclusive proof
of the commission of the crime and the guilt of the accused through the
testimony of a witness and circumstantial evidence, the accused cannot
be held to be innocent simply because counsel sets up an ingenuous
defense of an alibi, and alleges but failed to prove that the
eye-witness of the crime who testified for the prosecution could not
have been present at the place of the occurrence.”

We do not think the trial Judge erred in giving no credence to the
defendants’ and their witnesses’ testimony. These witnesses were in one
way or another bound to the accused Toy ties of friendship or family
relation. There is nothing by which the truth or falsity of their
testimony can be checked other than its inherent credibility. At the
best, their statements are far from convincing; at the worst they sound
positively untrue in many particulars.

There is one aspect which to! our mind is important but has escaped
the attention of the parties. We refer to the lack of fixed guide by
which the witnesses could assure that the 13th day of August and the
hour of 5 or 6 were the date and the part of day when Elizaga had his
hair trimmed and Eliezer Tolentino had an attack of asthma. The
witnesses could not make use of Father Guevara’s death as basis of
recollection because the defendants were arrested or implicated for the
first time several weeks afterward.

In behalf of Lozada, three supposed school registers, identified by
Florencio Castillo, were introduced—Exhibits 10, 11 and 12. In Exhibit
10, kept by Angel Mandac as instructor, Felipe Lozada’s name is No. 6
in the list of first year students. This exhibit purports to show that
in the month of August Lozada was never absent from class. Captain
Amorin initialed on September1 5, 1947, the line corresponding to this
accused.

Commenting on this record, the trial Judge said:

“* * * It is surprising to note that the way the
instructor marked this book is different in every month; like that of
July those present were marked with the letter “p”; (for the month of
August, present is marked with the sign of check; and for the month of September, the letter “t” and “b” marks are visible.

“The initialling by Captain Amorin of the register for the morning
session calls the attention of the Court as to why witness Isaac de la
Cruz was again investigated in the way he was investigated as it was
stated above on September 5, 1947, two days after having already been
investigated by Captain Torrijos making these two activities
reirivestigating and initialling to be of suspicious character.

“The
explanation given for the school register Exhibit 10 noted some twenty
days after the death of Father Guevara was to assure that’ the same is
not changed, but there was no explanation why the two other registers
Exhibit 11 and 12 were not also initialled by Captain. Amorin. Twenty
days makes, enough time for anybody to change his register.”

Exhibit 11 was, according to Castillo, kept by himself. It purports
to be the register of cadets, and to show that Felipe Lozada Jr. was a
member of the third platoon and was present on all the school days in
the month of August, 1947. Castillo testified that he was acting
principal of Northern Philippine Academy on August 13. In Exhibit 12,
supposed to have been kept by Eugenio L. Fernandez, Felipe Lozada
appears to have been marked present on August 13.

Exhibits 10 and 12 were riot admitted in evidence on the ground
that the teachers who were supposed to have kept them did not testify.
At any rate, these two registers even if authentic would not prove or
disprove Lozada’s alibi, for these teachers’ classes were dismissed at
four o’clock. Furthermore, Exhibit 2 is of very doubtful genuineness,
to say the least.

As to Exhibit 11, the lower court found that it, as well as Exhibit
12, is “very new as if the same had never been used,” in marked
contrast to Exhibit 10 “which is pretty well worn out.” Our own:
examination of Exhibits 11 and 12 confirms the trial court’s belief
that they were not in use in August, 1947.

Calavia testified that sometime after the crime in question was
committed, he moved to Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, for fear of the accused,
and that in Solano he stayed with the brother of the deceased priest.
It would also appear that shortly before and throughout the trial he was
with the deceased’s mother in Aparri apparently being taken care of by her. The appellants would impeach Calavia’s veracity because of this
association between him and Father Guevara’s relatives.

We do not take the solicitude shown by Father Guevara’s mother and
brother toward this witness as sufficient cause for suspicion of their
and Calavia1s intentions and good faith. It is natural and common for a
party to a case to attend to the needs and comforts of his witnesses,
specially if these have no independent means of defraying their own
expenses or are lukewarm. In this particular case there was the
additional consideration that there was the menacing risk that Calavia
might be weaned to the opposite side precisely because of this witness’
uncertain attitude. Isaac de la Cruz’ shift gave reality and
justification for the fear. It should be noted that defendants belong
to prominent and influential families in Gattaran, as counsel for the
defense emphasize in another connection;; that Father Guevara’s family
was stranger to that town, and that, as a matter of fact, the
defendants and their relatives, with the aid of a military officer had
been doing their best to dissuade Calavia from becoming a prosecution
witness.

On the immediate cause of Father Guevara’s death, the evidence, as
the Solicitor General points out, is inconclusive. The Solicitor
General has made a critical and impartial analysis of the proofs in the
light of the facts revealed by the doctors who examined or performed an
autopsy on the deceased’s body. His analysis and conclusions, with
which we agree, are as follows.

“It must be admitted that neither of the two
autopsies satisfactorily establishes the true cause of death.. The
first autopsy was only partial, and rather superficial at that. The
doctors performing the autopsy limited themselves to looking for
external signs of violence and to examining the bone structure to
determine the presence of fractures. The abdomen was not opened for an
examination of the internal organs, specially the heart, to determine
whether the drowning was post mortem or ante mortem (see De
los Jingeles, Legal Medicine [1934] PP. 386-388.) The face was livid
(p. 54, t. s. n.), which is a manifestation of asphyxia by drowning (De
los Angeles, op. cit., p. 383). On the other hand, it does not appear
that the doctors found the characteristic corrugated skin (goose
flesh), which is also another external sign of death from drowning (De
los Angeles; op. cit., p. 383.) And there was no report of fine froth
on the mouth of the cadaver (Gonzales, Vance and Helpern, Legal
Medicine & Toxicology, [1940], p. 281.) The presence of congestion
in the face is not conclusive of the application of violence, for
apparently the neck and face became swollen in cases of drowning (see De los Angeles, op. cit., figures 113 and 114, opposite, p. 384)

“The fact that the second autopsy was per formed only three weeks
later, when the cadaver was already in an advanced stage of
decomposition (p. 60, t.s.n.), necessarily made the results
inconclusive (see Gonzales, etc.,op. cit., p. 282). The
putrefaction of the internal organs prevented their examination.
Post-mortem changes make it difficult to differentiate post-mortem
lesions from ante-mortem ones (Gonzales, etc., op. cit., p. 283.) For
proof of violence, little reliance can be placed on the finding of the
two doctors signing the majority report at the second autopsy that
there was congestion of the two cheeks, for, as already pointed out,
congestion of the face and neck is not unusual in drowning cases.
Furthermore, according to the president of the third sanitary division,
testifying on she first autopsy, there was no disintegration of the
epidermis and when the face was incised on both sides, no signs of
violence were found (pp. 57, 59, ts.n.) In this connection, it should
also be stated that bruises and slight congestions found on the bodies
of drowned persons are sometimes caused by the grating of the body
against the mud or sand or other articles in the water (see De
los Jingeles, op. cit., pp. 383, 385-386). Still less can the tear in
the scrotum found at the second autopsy be entitled to any importance
because no such tear was found at the first autopsy (pp. 59» 61-62,
t.s.n.) and therefore it is not improbable that the tear, in view of
the advanced stage of decomposition, was caused by a mishandling of the
body, however slight.

“Actually, in. view of the
circumstances of the killing, the most careful autopsy performed after
the discovery of the body might still have failed to reveal anything
that would conclusively support the theory of the prosecution.
According to the lone eyewitness, the deceased received only one blow
in the face from the appellant Rico Elizaga and when the deceased fell
into the water the appellant Tolentino stepped on his stomach while the
appellant Felipe Lozada, Jr., choked him in the neck. These acts were
not sufficiently violent to have caused definite impressions on the
body. As we have seen, the congestion found on the face of the victim
is inconclusive of violence. A blow on the stomach hardly leaves any
mark because this part of the body is soft and yielding (Peterson,
Haines & Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxicology [2nd. ed.], Vol. I,
p. 288.) Imprints of the fingers on the neck in cases of throttling are
not always left (Gonzales, etc., op. cit., pi 269.) There could have
been therefore but little expectation of finding conclusive marks on
the body of the deceased, specially after it had been immersed in the
water for about twelve hours;. Nor would a finding that the cause of
death was laspliyxia by drowning, together with the absence of;
external signs of violence, be conclusive that no violence was in fact
used. Father Guevara was choked while he lay in the water. It is
entirely possible that the pressure on his neck, applied as it was by a
boy of only 16 years and 5 days (Exhibit 12, p. 122, folio of
exhibits), was insufficient to strangulate him, but enough to keep his
face under water and so drown him. Consequently, a conclusive
demonstration that Father Guevara died of asphyxia by drowning, not by
throttling, would not be necessarily incompatible with the version of
the eyewitness. Eventually, therefore, in view of the inconclusive
results of the two autopsies, the conviction of the appellants must
have to rest entirely on the testimony of Rafael Calavia who claimed to
have seen the assault and the robbery.”

The fact that the deceased may have died of drowning would not
absolve the defendants. Drowning can occur in a shallow river or in a
bathtub. Father Guevara’s head could have been pressed down under the
water or allowed to remain in the water while still breathing but too
weak to pull the victim was out of water. Calavia went off the scene
before the defendants left Father Guevara, and, nothing is known have
done after Calavia’s departure.

Accidental drowning is out of the question. The of what they may
river was low and the weather calm. The deceased was only 30, strong
and in the prime of health, without any known sickness, a point which
counsel stress in an endeavor to establish that the three accused
unarmed could not have overpowered a young and sturdy man. The fact
that only part of the body was in the water is another circumstance
which discards the possibility of fortuitous suffocation in water.
Granting then that the priest was drowned, there is no escaping the
conclusion that his drowning was caused by criminal hands.

In the light of the facts at hand one possible motive for the crime
was religious. The three accused were Protestants and Eliezer
Tolentino’s father a Protestant minister. Two of them, Elizaga dnd
Lozada, were attending Northern Philippine Academy, a Protestant
school, while Gattaran Institute, a Catholic and rival institution, was
patronized by Father Guevara. There is no proof regarding the attitude
towards each other of the people connected with those schools. But
militant hostility between Catholic and Protestant schools as well as
between religious leaders of different faith and their adherents is, in
the provinces, rather the rule than the exception.

The other possible motive was robbery. The loss of Father Guevara’s
bag containing money and other personal property might be cited to
sustain this charge. That the wrist watch and the chain which the
priest was wearing and the cigarette case in his shirt pocket were not
stolen would not in itself prove the contrary. Extreme fright born of
inexperience could be summoned as reason for the defendants’ flight
before they had cleaned the victim of all his personal belongings.
Still, considering the defendants’ social position, robbery may have
been only an incident conceived after the priest had been murdered.

The uncertainty as to the motives does not however lessen the
conviction that the defendants1 slew the deceased. It does not shake
Rafael Calaviai’s testimony. Its only effect is to change the
qualification of the crime from the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, as charged, to two separate, simple crimes of homicide and
theft. Giving the appellants the benefit of the doubt, we find them
guilty of the latter crimes independent of and unrelated to each other.

The evidence is too uncertain to justify conviction for murder.
There is not enough evidence to show that the killing was carried out
with treachery. Even if we assume that the commencement of the attack
caught the offended party unawares, an assumption which is purely
hypothetical, yet the initial assault does not appear to have
tended specially and directly to overcome his resistance and to
incapacitate him to put up a fight and defend himself against the
subsequent blows. The defendants were unarmed, one of them was a
youngster barely 16 years of age, and the party assaulted was still
young and strong.

This ratiocination also disposes of the charge of superior
strength. It is only necessary to make the additional remark that
superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in
strength. It is necessary to prove, besides, that the attackers
“cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from superiority of
strength.” (U.S. vs. Trumata, 49 Phil. 192; Albert’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, New Edition, p. 126.) Such proof is lacking.

The taking of the deceased’s bag constitutes either robbery or
theft, according as force was used in the taking, distinct from the
force employed in the killing, or the intent to carry away the bag’was
formed after the priest was killed. The evidence on this feature of the
case is also uncertain with the result that, again, we have to adopt
the theory which is more favorable to the defendants.

The value of the money and property stolen is undetermined. The
testimony on the amount of the cash is based on a guess, and the value
of the bag and its other contents was not given. We doubt that Father
Guevara carried P500 cash in a short,[missionary trip to rural
communities where he had no use for so much money. The fact that he
sent ahead through his helper to Father Carreon, his superior, the
proceeds of his collections can be cited as confirmation of the belief
that Father Guevara did not need or want to have much cash with him. We
fix the value of the bag and its contents at P100.00 in the absence of
a definite proof relative to their value.

The crimes were not attended by aggravating or mitigating
circumstances and the penalties will be imposed in their medium degree.
Felipe Lozada, Jr. was only 16 years and 5 days old on the date of the
perpetration of the crimes and is thus entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. (People vs. Eugenio Garcia y Madrigal, G. R. No. L-2873, 47 Off. Gaz., 4188, 4191.)

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced
as follows: For the crime of homicide, Eliezir Tolentino and Uldarico
Elizaga are sentenced to from six years and one day of prision mayor to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, and Felipe Lozada, Jr. to from two years, two months and one day of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, all with the accessories of law; and for the crime of theft, Tolentino and Elizaga are sentenced to six months of arresto mayor and Lozada to one month of arresto menor.
The three appellants will further be sentenced to pay the heir’s of the
deceased an indemnification of P6,000 for the crime of homicide and
P100 for the crime of theft, with the corresponding of theft, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in the case in the event of
insolvency. With these modifications, the conviction of the appellants
is affirmed with proportionate shares of the costs of appeal.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

TUASON, J.:

I hereby certify that Mr. Justice Padilla concurs in this decision

MORAN, C. J., dissenting: )

I have serious doubts as to appellants’ guilt. The only evidence
against them is the single testimony of Rafael Calavia which is not
satisfactory. This witness kept silent about the crime and had even
denied to the authorities having personal knowledge about it. Although
there are no serious contradictions in his testimony, yet there is
nothing in it that is persuasive.

Upon the other hand, the alibi presented by, at least, appellant Lozada is supported by strong evidence.

He is a young student of 16 years of age and his presence at the
Northern Philippine Academy from 4 to 6 o’clock in the afternoon of
August 13, is strongly proven not only by witnesses, one of them being
a high school teacher (Florencio Castillo), but also by the school
registers, which on their face appear to be genuine.

I cannot find in the majority decision or in the argument of counsel or
in the decision appealed from or in the evidence of record, anything
that can dispel my doubts as to appellants’ guilt.


R E S O L U T I O N

July 20, 1950

TUASON, J.:

This case was thoroughly discussed, and the testimony
was carefully reviewed and the exhibits, specially the supposed school
registers, examinde. No important detail of the evidence escaped our
attention or was overlooked in reaching a decision. We do not believe
it necessary therefore to enter into a new discussion of any of these
matters. This resolution will be confined to straightening a few
misconceptions regarding the meaning and effects of some of our
findings and pronouncement.

When we said that one possible motive for the crime was
religious, no disparagement to any religion or religious belief was
intended. In pointing to differences of religion between the deceased
and the accused ad the possible motive, we endeavored to show that
robbery was not necessarily in the mind of the accused when they
committed the crime, as the lower court had found. The result of the
possible existence of a motive other than robbery was the reversal of
the trial court’s opinion that the accused were guilty or robbery with
homicide, which is one of the gravest and most heinous crimes knows to
law. Our surmises, which were evolved out of facts lighten the
defendants’ responsibility and save them from the stigma of a almost
dishonorable offense. Reasonable speculations are justified when
indulged in the interest of accused because they are entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt, and the appellants in this case should be
the last ones to object when we cast for and brought out a theory that
changed for the better the legal qualification of the killing and
considerably reduced the penalty imposed on them.

Uncertainly as to the motive, however, does not operate
to entitle the appellants to absolute acquittal. Proof as to motives is
important or essential when the evidence on the commission of the crime
is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. It is otherwise, as this
Court has repeatedly held, when there is direct testimony of
eye-witnesses whose credibility is found to be beyond question. Motive
is a subjuctive matter which cannot always be proved. A murder
committed for a price may fail to exhibit any motive when the
connection between the murderer and the inductor is not discovered. Yet
no thinking men would plead for the murderer’s acquittal on that ground
in the face of positive testimony by credible eye-witnesses.

Similarly, the uncertainly as to the immediate cause of
death is unimportant in the face of Calavia’s evidence that the accused
attacked the deceased who was later found dead at the place of the
assault. One set of expert witnesses said the priest died form
strangulation and another set said form drowning. One or the other
theory is possible but not certain, as we have stated, but neither is
inconsistent with the hypothesis of guilt, neither destroys or weakens
Calavia’s statements. If Father Guevara’s death was caused be
strangulation, the defendants chocked him; if he died from drowning,
his head must have been submerged in water purposely or otherwise when
he was still alive but too weak from beating to pull out of it. For
accidental drowning, as we have carefully pointed out, was out of the
question, and so was the idea that others were the aggressors.

As to the money contained in the bag Antonio Abad
tetified that it was P500. The trial court accepted this testimony
entirely. While agreeing with the court that the bad contained cash and
that the bag was carried away by the defendants, we thought that the
amount was exaggerated, intentionally or through honest mistake, and
for the benefit again of the defendants, we fixed it at what we deem
the lowest possible amount for lack of surer basis.

The motion for reconsideration are therefore denied.

Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.