JUDICIAL INTEGRITY BOARD, COMPLAINANT, VS. PRESIDING JUDGE OSCAR D. TOMARONG, BRANCH 28, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LILOY, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, RESPONDENT.

Judicial Integrity Board versus Tomarong

The Case

This is a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Judicial Integrity Board against Presiding Judge Oscar D. Tomarong of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. The Board initiated the case on its own initiative after a regional trial court found the judge guilty of murdering a fellow judge. The Board asked the Supreme Court to dismiss him from the service and to disbar him. The case matters because it settles a question every bar candidate must know: a judge may be disciplined for committing a crime involving moral turpitude even while his criminal conviction is still on appeal, because the administrative case requires only substantial evidence and not a final judgment of conviction.

Procedural History

The case began in the Regional Trial Court, which rendered judgment in the criminal case against Judge Tomarong and his co-accused, finding him guilty of murder as a principal by inducement and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. That conviction is on appeal before the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Acting Executive Director of the Judicial Integrity Board obtained a copy of the judgment and recommended that the Board take cognizance of it on its own initiative, treating his memorandum as a formal complaint. The Board approved the recommendation and required Judge Tomarong to file a comment. He was served personally at the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but he never filed any pleading. The Office of the Executive Director then recommended dismissal from the service and disbarment, and the Board adopted that recommendation in its own report to the Supreme Court. The Court directed the Board, the Office of the Administrative Services, and the Office of the Court Administrator to confirm the status of the judge's pending application for optional retirement, and all three reported that it had not taken effect. The case thus reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter, decided in July 2025.

Facts

Judge Tomarong presided over one branch of the Regional Trial Court in Liloy, while Judge Reymar L. Lacaya presided over Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan. In March 2019, the Supreme Court issued an administrative circular that swapped their stations. Judge Lacaya took over the Liloy branch, and Judge Tomarong moved to Sindangan.

On the afternoon of May 9, 2019, Judge Lacaya conducted hearings, left the court building, and walked toward his vehicle parked at the back. Gunshots were heard, and he was later found dead beside his vehicle from gunshot wounds. Juliber Cabating, a job order utility worker at the public works compound where the court was also located and the judge's personal errand boy, testified for the prosecution as a state witness. He said Judge Tomarong ordered him to look for killers for Judge Lacaya and for a certain Pia Arances, and that the judge complained he had had enough of Judge Lacaya. Cabating said he could not refuse because he feared losing his employment. He testified that the judge paid fifty thousand pesos for the death of Arances and two hundred fifty thousand pesos for the murder of Judge Lacaya. After the killings, the judge called him and suggested it would be better if Cabating went to jail instead of him. Cabating surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation and later confirmed his extrajudicial confession in open court.

The trial court convicted Judge Tomarong of murder as a principal by inducement, relying on Cabating's testimony, corroborated by other witnesses, by closed circuit television footage, and by an eyewitness who saw two men fleeing the scene. Against this, the judge offered only bare denial. The Judicial Integrity Board then took up the matter as an administrative complaint.

Issues

• Whether or not Judge Tomarong may be held administratively liable for committing a crime involving moral turpitude even though his criminal conviction is still on appeal and not yet final.
• Whether or not substantial evidence exists to show that he committed the crime of murder as a principal by inducement.
• Whether or not he should be dismissed from the service and disbarred.

Applicable Provisions

Section 14 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, lists serious charges and provides:

SECTION 14. Serious Charges. — Serious charges include: (a) Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel; (b) Bribery, direct and indirect, and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019); (c) Serious dishonesty; (d) Gross neglect of duty in the performance or non-performance of official functions; (e) Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order; (f) Commission of a crime involving moral turpitude; (g) Falsification of official documents, including making untruthful statements in the certificates of service; (h) Borrowing money or property from lawyers and/or litigants in a case pending before the court; (i) Gross immorality; (j) Gross ignorance of the law or procedure; (k) Partisan political activities; (l) Grave abuse of authority, and/or prejudicial conduct that gravely besmirches or taints the reputation of the service; (m) Sexual harassment; (n) Gross insubordination; and (o) Possession and/or use of illegal drugs or substances.

This provision supplies the very offense charged, and its use of the word commission rather than conviction is the textual key to the entire ruling.

Section 1 of the same Rule, on how proceedings are instituted, provides:

SECTION 1. How Instituted. — (1) Motu Proprio Against those who are not Members of the Supreme Court. — Proceedings for the discipline of the Presiding Justices and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Shari'ah High Court, and Judges of the first and second level courts, including the Shari'ah District or Circuit Courts, as well as the officials, employees, and personnel of said courts and the Supreme Court, including the Office of the Court Administrator, the Judicial Integrity Board, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and all other offices created pursuant to law under the Supreme Court's supervision may be instituted, motu proprio, by either the Supreme Court with the Judicial Integrity Board, or by the Judicial Integrity Board itself on the basis of records, documents; or newspaper or media reports; or other papers duly referred or endorsed to it for appropriate action; or on account of any criminal action filed in, or a judgment of conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan or by the regular or special courts, a copy of which shall be immediately furnished to the Supreme Court and the Judicial Integrity Board.

This provision authorizes the Board to act on its own initiative on the basis of a judgment of conviction rendered by a regular court, which is exactly what happened here.

Section 17 of the same Rule, on sanctions, provides:

SECTION 17. Sanctions. — (1) If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: (a) Dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Supreme Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (b) Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than six (6) months but not exceeding one (1) year; or (c) A fine of more than 100,000 pesos but not exceeding 200,000 pesos.

This provision fixes the menu of penalties for a serious charge and explains why dismissal, rather than a fine, was imposed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the finality of the criminal conviction is not a requisite before a judge may be found liable for committing a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court pointed to the deliberate change in the text of the Rule, which now speaks of commission rather than conviction, because the older word tended to imply that a final conviction was required. In an administrative case, the Court explained, its task is not to review the correctness of the criminal judgment but only to determine whether substantial evidence exists to hold the respondent administratively liable. The Court added that the mere institution of a criminal action is sufficient basis to institute proceedings on its own initiative. It also noted that the judge's pending application for optional retirement did not shield him, since retirement does not preclude the continuation of a pending disciplinary proceeding.

On the second issue, the Court found substantial evidence that the judge hired killers to murder Judge Lacaya. It relied on Cabating's categorical testimony that the judge instructed him to look for killers and facilitated the payment, corroborated by another witness and by an eyewitness who identified the fleeing gunmen, and it rejected the judge's bare denial. The Court defined moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the performance of private and social duties owed to fellow man or to society, and held that murder, committed by a judge against a fellow judge, is unquestionably such a crime.

On the third issue, the Court held that the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude is a serious charge, and considering the gravity of the offense, it imposed dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and disbarment.

Doctrine

A judge may be disciplined for the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude even without a final conviction in the criminal case, because the administrative offense is commission and not conviction, and the quantum of proof is only substantial evidence. A criminal case and an administrative case are distinct and are disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to each. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the performance of private and social duties owed to fellow man or to society, and murder is a crime involving moral turpitude. Under Section 17 of Rule 140, a serious charge carries dismissal from service, forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from public office, and the same misconduct warrants disbarment under the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Tomarong guilty of committing a crime involving moral turpitude, dismissed him from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification from public office, and disbarred him as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Remember This

Memorize the line that commission, not conviction, is what Rule 140 punishes, so substantial evidence of the crime suffices even while the criminal appeal is pending. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between the quantum of proof in criminal and administrative cases, and the discipline of judges convicted of grave crimes.