THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. JUAN ACOSTA, LUCIANO DE LEON, AND DOMINGO PIMENTEL, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

On appeal, by the People, from the
“order” of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte, dismissing its Criminal Case No. 3993 upon motion of the accused, after
the presentation of evidence by the prosecution.  It
poses but one legal question:  Whether
or not such appeal – if allowed – would place
the accused in double jeopardy.

The proceedings that
transpired in the court below are not
disputed.

The accused – Juan Acosta, Luciano de
Leon and Dominador Clemente
– were prosecuted for estafa before the court a
quo, under an Information
that substantially alleged as follows: 
that the said accused, acting in conspiracy with one another, thru
fraudulent pretenses, obtained from Pedro M. Miguel, a lady’s ring valued at
P16,500.00; that accused issued a check for $5,000.00 in payment thereof; and
that said check later turned out to be counterfeit, to the damage and prejudice
of said Pedro M. Miguel in the amount of P16,500.00.

At the trial, the
prosecution presented as its first witness, Pedro M. Miguel, the complainant,
who declared as follows:

That on December 24, 1961, Juan Acosta, Luciano
de Leon and Domingo Pimental approached complainant,
telling the latter they were interested in buying jewelry; the complainant
showed a ring and told the accused that it belongs to Banang
Jaramillo, who en­trusted it to him to be sold on commission basis for the
price of P17,000.00; the buyers agreed to buy the ring; as payment of the ring,
Acosta, de Leon and Pimentel gave complainant a $5,000.00 dollar check drawn
against the Banker Trust Company of New York, by Companion Life Insurance Co.
payable to the order of accused Dominador Clemente; the accused assured the complainant that the
check was good, and relying on that assurance, complainant accepted the check
after it was endorsed by Dominador Clemente; after receiving
the check, complainant gave the ring to the accused; when the check was
presented to the Bank for encash­ment, it was dishonored because it was fake
and count­erfeit.  The prosecution also
presented Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F and
G which were all admitted in evidence.

After the prosecution had rested the case, the respective counsel
for the accused moved to dismiss the case. 
They contended that in view of Pedro M. Miguel’s admission that the ring
belonged to Banang Jaramillo, it was the latter who
suffered damage and not the complainant, and, therefore, one of the essen­tial
elements of estafa – damage – is absent, rendering
the information defective and the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to
convict the accused of the offense charged.

The assistant provincial
fiscal vehemently op­posed the motion to dismiss, contending that the owner of the ring need not be the complainant, be­cause in a prosecution for estafa, the complaint may be filed at the instance of the one
who has been swindled, whether or not he is the owner of the thing subject of
the deceit or breach of faith.

In spite of the fiscal’s opposition,
the lower court dismissed the case, holding that while the information
mentioned Pedro M. Miguel as the offended party, it appeared from the evidence
that he was merely an agent of Banang Jaramillo who
was the owner of the ring subject of the estafa.  The trial court observed that inasmuch as in estafa,
the value of the articles swind­led is not only the basis of the penalty but
also the amount of indemnity to the offended party, therefore, it becomes
necessary to know the real offended party, and to pay Pedro Miguel an indemnity
now will run counter to the evidence adduced, and it would go against the
wordings of the information.  The trial
court fur­ther opined that to amend the information at that stage of the
proceedings will violate the accused’s constitu­tional
right against double jeopardy.

From the order of dismissal, the assistant provincial fiscal has
appealed directly to Us.  The Soli­citor General, however, has moved
for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it would place the accused
in double jeopardy.  We agree with the
Solicitor General.  It cannot be seriously questioned that the
trial court had grieviously erred in his conclusion
and application of the law, and in dismissing outright the case.  Admittedly, Miguel was merely an agent, but
as such, he had both the physical and juridical posses­sion of the thing
received in agency, and could vest title to the buyer of the subject matter of the transaction. 
Miguel was bound to account for the proceeds thereof and failure on his
part to do so, will render him liable for such value
to the owner.  His posses­sion of the jewelry, therefore, was essentially
that of his principal; and any prejudice he suffered by reason of the fraud
perpetrated upon him would, like­wise, be suffered by his principal. 
This is elemen­tary, for authorities have invariably held that “the crime of estafa is committed, although the victim was not the owner
of the property, but the holder or broker simply, when it appears that the real
owner was prejudiced by the disappearance of the property.” (U. S. v. Almazan, 20 Phil. 225; U.S. v. Sotelo, 28
Phil. 147, 156-157.)

But then, the erroneous
dismissal of the case, notwithstanding, the error cannot now be remedied by the instant appeal because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy.  The accused, in the case at
bar, had been charged under a valid information, before a competent court which
had jurisdiction over both the subject-matter and the person of the accused;
they had stood trial under a plea of “not guilty”, and the
prosecution, after the presentation of its evidence, had rested its case; the
trial court had thereafter dismissed the case and, that dismissal is on the
merits which amounted to an acquittal of said accused.  Un­doubtedly, to entertain the instant appeal
would place the accused in double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE AND UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this appeal should be, as it is
hereby, dismissed, with costs de officio.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar,
J., did not take part.