CHACON ENTERPRISES, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS (NOW INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT), FLORENTINO GALASINO, FRANCISCO GALLARDO, PORFERIO CABACUNGAN, BERNARDINO BAJULO, ET …

This is a petition
to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 50336-R and
CA-G.R. No. 50337-R which reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Misamis Oriental, Branch III, in Civil Cases Nos. 3171
and 3218.

The background facts as
stated in the decision of respondent court are as follows:

“The evidence discloses that on March 31, 1932, Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease
Agreement by the Director of Forestry to construct and maintain a fishpond over a mangrove swamp with an area of 15 hectares, situated in Barrio Lapasan, Municipality of Cagayan, Oriental Misamis, bounded on the ‘North by Bitanag Creek;
on the South by cultivated land; and on the East and West by Bitanag Creek and cultivated land’ (Exhibits D, 9-BL).

“Ramon Chacon
developed the area into a fishpond, clearing its shrubby growths and enclosing
the same with perimetric dikes.  Upon his death in 1947, his heirs, who
succeeded him in the possession thereof, were issued a transfer ordinary fishpond permit dated March
29, 1951 (Exhibits
8-CH, 8-A-CH).  Prior thereto, or on March 3,
1951, the said heirs
entered into a partnership agreement, under the name Chacon Enterprises, for the
purpose of acquiring title over the above-described fishpond (Exhibits 1,
14-BL).  On July 19, 1951, the partnership applied for the purchase
not only of the said 15-hectare fishpond but also of the adjoining eastern
portion thereof with an area of about four hectares.  The sales application alleged, among other
things, that the area applied for had no indication of settlement, occupation
or improvement, except the dikes and concrete gates owned by the heirs of Ramon
Chacon (Exhibits 5, 11-BL and 11-A-BL). 
The sales
application was thereafter referred to Perfecto Laput,
Junior Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands, for inspection and report.  The report
he submitted, dated July 24,
1951, stated in effect that the 15-hectare fishpond, originally
covered by the lease agreement in favor of Ramon Chacon and by the transfer
ordinary fishpond permit in favor of his heirs, was developed and divided into blocks with permanent
dikes and concrete gates (Exhibits 6, 12-BL). 
As the
Bureau of Fisheries interposed no objection to the sales application of the
Chacon Enterprises (see Exhibits H, 13-BL, and 13-A-BL), the Bureau of Lands, on March 24, 1955, issued an Order
Award in favor of said partnership over an area of 19 hectares, 11 ares and 14 centares, bounded as follows:  ‘N – Bitanag
Creek; E – private properties; S – private properties; W – Titang Creek’ (Exhibit 7-CH); and on September 24, 1956, Chacon Enterprises was issued Original Certificate
of Title No. P-47 (Exhibit 2-CH).

“Sometime in 1968, Chacon Enterprises filed in the City Court
of Cagayan de Oro an ejectment suit against Florentino
Galasino, Francisco Gallardo, Porfirio
Cabacungan, Bernardino Bajulo,
Rosita Pacardo, Josefa Pacardo and Isidro Pabuwalan, who
were then in actual possession of an area
43,792 square meters of the eastern portion of the land covered by the aforesaid certificate of
title.  After due trial, the said court
on December 19, 1968, dismissed the action holding that:

‘From the evidence submitted during the trial of this case and in
the ocular inspection made by
this Court, It has been clearly shown
that the defendants’ houses constructed in the premises are already very old and in a dilapidated condition.  This shows that defendants were staying and
living in the premises for more than one year already.’ (pp. 6-7, Record on
Appeal).

“On January 8, 1969, Chacon Enterprises commenced Civil Case
No. 3171 against the defendants Florentino Galasino, et al., to recover the possession of the said eastern
portion, alleging that the latter, under claim of ownership, have succeeded in
occupying certain portions of its registered land without the consent of the
plaintiff; and that they refused to vacate the same, despite repeated demands.

“In their answer, the defendants assert absolute ownership
over the said portion, stating that they inherited the same from Santiago Ebora, their deceased predecessor-in-interest, who had been
in continuous, public and exclusive possession, as owner thereof, since time
immemorial; that since the latter’s demise, they have possessed the same
continuously, openly and exclusively as owners thereof; that they have planted
coconuts thereon, which are now fruit-bearing, in addition to those planted by
their said predecessor-in-interest; and that the plaintiffs’ certificate of
title over the said land is null and void.

“On April 10, 1969,
Florentino Galasino, et
al., instituted Civil Case No. 3218
against Chacon Enterprises for annulment of Certificate of Title No. P-47
and/or reconveyance of the eastern portion of the appellee’s titled land, outside of the circumferential dike
of the fishpond.

“At the pre-trial, the parties agreed that the land in
litigation has an area of 43,792 square meters and that the metes and bounds
thereof are indicated with red lines in the sketch plan attached to the Commissioner’s
report (pp. 94-95, Record on Appeal).

“After joint trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, decreeing:

‘1. In Civil Case
No. 3218, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint with cost, and dissolving the writ
of preliminary injunction issued on August 5, 1969.

‘2. In Civil Case
No. 3171, ordering the defendants and all those who have occupied and
constructed houses on the area in question upon agreement with or with the
permission of defendants, to vacate the areas in question and to surrender
possession thereof to plaintiffs immediately upon the finality of this decision; declaring the writ of preliminary injunction
issued on March 31, 1969 permanent; and ordering the defendants to pay the cost
of this suit.’

“From the aforequoted judgment, Galasino, et al., appealed to this Court on twelve (12)
assignments of error, which boil down to the basic issue of who, as between the appellee Chacon Enterprises and the appellants, has/have a
better right and title over the disputed area of 43,792 square meters.”^[1]

Respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of
First Instance, holding that the certi­ficate of title in the name of Chacon
Enterprises (OCT P-47) was null and void insofar as it covered the portion in
litigation, and rendered judgment on December 10, 1976 as follows:

“(1) Dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 3171 and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein; and

“(2) In Civil
Case No. 3218, declaring the appellants owners of the disputed property and
ordering the appellee to reconvey
the same to the appellants.”^[2]

Chacon Enterprises filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the grounds that the action filed by private respondents was
barred by prescription and/or laches, and that the
preponderance of evidence was clearly in its favor. 
Respondent appellate court, however, denied said Motion in an extended Resolution promulgated on June 16, 1977,
holding that the action instituted by therein appellants, now private
respondents, “albeit denominated as one for reconveyance
is in essence an action to quiet
title,” which is imprescriptible.^[3]

Assailing
the foregoing judgment and resolution of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
Chacon Enterprises now comes to this Tribunal contending in its Brief that
respondent court erred:

1.     
In failing to apply prevailing Supreme Court
doctrines on the prescriptibility of actions for
annulment of title and/or reconveyance;

2.     
In holding that fraudulent misrepresentation
tainted the procurement of the questioned title (OCT No. P-47) of the
petitioner;

3.      In
denominating the cause of action of private respondents in Civil Case No. 3218 (CA-G.R. No.
50337-R) as an action to quiet title when in fact it was for annulment of title
and/or reconveyance;

4.      In
holding that the petitioner had included in its application to purchase 19
hectares of land from the government “the adjoining eastern portion
thereof, with an area of about four hectares;

5.     
In holding that the private respondents had
established their possession of the land in litigation “since time
immemorial” or that the evidence tilts in favor of the private
respondents.

We shall take up the first and third assignments of error
together.  Anent the issue of
prescription, petitioner calls attention to the fact that more than twelve (12) years had elapsed from the
date its title was transcribed into the registration book of the Office of the
Register of Deeds on September 24, 1956 up to the time private respondents
filed Civil Case No. 3218 for
annulment and/or reconveyance in the Court of First
Instance on April 10, 1969.  Citing the
case of De la Cerna, et al. vs. De la Cerna, et al. (L-28838, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 514),
petitioner contends that if private respondents anchor their action exclusively
on the alleged fraud, their cause of action would have prescribed after four (4) years
from
September 24, 1956, or
on September 25, 1960.  On the other hand, if the
supposed right of private respondents
is based on implied or constructive trust, prescription would set in after ten
(10) years from registration of its title, in accordance with the ruling of
this Court in Carantes vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-33360,
April 25, 1977, 76 SCRA 514).  In either
case, petitioner concludes, the action brought by private respon­dents shall have been barred by
prescription.

Private respondents counter that while their complaint in Civil Case No. 3218 was
for “annulment of title and/or reconveyance,” their real cause of action was
for quieting of title, and that prescription does not lie in actions for
quieting of title, in effect reiterating the holding of respondent Court of
Appeals in its Resolution of June 16, 1977 denying herein petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration.

We find the cases cited
by petitioner to be inapplicable, and hold in favor of private
respondents.  This Tribunal has declared
it a well-settled rule that “it is not the caption of the pleading, but
the allegations thereof that determines the nature of the action; that even
without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be
granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence
introduced so warrant.”^[4]
Although private respondents’ complaint in
Civil Case No. 3218 was captioned or denominated one for “Annulment
of Title and/or Reconveyance,” the averments therein
of lawful ownership and actual possession by therein plaintiffs since time immemorial of the parcel of land in
question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, residing and
planting coconuts thereon and enjoying the fruits thereof, and that therein
defendant secured a certificate of title over said property through fraud,
misrepresentation and deceit, constitute a cause of action for quieting of
title or removal of a cloud over such title, and sufficiently informed the defendant, now herein petitioner, of the
nature of the plaintiffs’ claim and enabled it to prepare for its defense.

In point is the case of Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana^[5]
wherein this Court held that “(a) ctually the
action for conveyance was one
to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud case upon appellee’s
ownership x x
x.”^[6] As to the prescriptibility of actions to quiet title, the Court had
this to say:

“x x x it is an established
rule of American jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art.
480 of the New Civil Code) that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L. R. A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

“The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his
title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not
barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the
land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while
the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the
adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain d determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or
to assert any superior equity in his favor. 
He may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right.  But the rule that
the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to an action to remove a
cloud from title can only be invoked by a complaint when he is in
possession.  One who claim property which
is in the possession of another
must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period.” (44 Am. Jur., p. 47).”^[7]

The Sapto ruling was cited in
the later case of Gallar vs. Husain, et al.
(L-20954, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 186).  In
Gallar, while the suit filed in the lower
court was one to compel therein defendants to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiff, this
Court said that the action “seeks to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast
on appellee’s ownership” and “as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible.” More recently, the Sapto case
was again reiterated in Faja vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-45045, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 441)
wherein We stated thus:  “There is settled jurisprudence that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may
wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason
for the rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of
the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by one who is in
possession.”

That herein private respondents were indeed in actual and
physical possession of the land in dispute at the time they filed Civil Case
No. 3218 against petitioner on April 10, 1969 can be deduced from the fact that
the latter had earlier filed an ejectment suit in
1968 and an action to recover possession (Civil Case No. 3171) on January 9,
1969, against private respondents over the same property.  As correctly pointed out by private
respondents, the filing of the said cases is tantamount to an
admission on the part of petitioner that it was not in material possession of the land in question.  Parenthetically, it may also be added that
the 1968 ejectment suit was dismissed after trial by the City Court of Cagayan de Oro with a finding that herein private respondents had
been “staying and living in the
premises for more than one year already.”

Basically, the cases above-cited, viz:  Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, supra, Gallar vs. Husain, et
al., supra, and Faja vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra are squarely
on all fours with the petition at bar, all the parcels of land involved being
titled under the Torrens System and the
claimants thereto in actual occupation and possession of the properties.  Thus, in the Sapto case, the land in question with TCT No. T-5701 (O–28) was sold
in 1931 but the action for reconveyance was filed October 19, 1954, or after 23
years.  In the Gallar
case, the land identified as Lot No.
766 of the cadastral survey of Cabatuan, Iloilo, and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 4521 of
the Register
of Deeds of Iloilo was sold on January 9, 1919 under pacto de retro while the action to
compel reconveyance was filed October
10, 1960 or after 41 years.  And in the Faja case, the land was titled December
12, 1940 under OCT
No. 23257
and reconstituted in 1950 under OCT No. RO-1496, identified as Lot No. 4010 of the cadastral survey of Dumalag, Capiz, while the
complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed on April 15, 1975, whereas defendant had been in actual
possession of the land through inheritance since 1945, or for a period of 30
years and was served the copy of the complaint only in 1975 and thus, her
counterclaim for the cancellation of the certificate of title and in lieu
thereof, a transfer certificate of title be issued to her was filed well within
the statutory period.

Neither can petitioners successfully invoke the equitable doctrine
of laches against herein private respon­dents.  In Perez,
et al. vs. Ong Chua, et al.,^[8]
We had occasion to stress the
four elements of laches, namely:  (1) conduct
on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge
or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the
suit is not held to be barred.^[9]
The second requisite is absent in the case at bar.  While OCT No. P-47 was issued to petitioner
in 1956, nothing in the facts as found by the Court of Appeals indicates that
private respondents knew of petitioner’s title prior to 1968 when a suit for ejectment was filed against them, which action was
eventually dismissed because the old and dilapidated condition of their houses
showed that they had been staying and living in the premises for more than one
year already.  Instead, records will show
that private respondents lost no time in asserting their rights by filing, in April of the
following year, a case contesting the validity of the title obtained by petitioner.  In other words, there was no long inaction or
inexcusable neglect on the part of
private respondents which would bar them from seeking to enforce their rights.^[10]

This brings Us to the fifth error assigned by petitioner, which
has reference to the finding of respondent court that private respondents had
established their possession of the subject property “since time
immemorial.” Again, We hold in favor of private respondents.  In the first place, the issue raised is
factual, and therefore beyond Our power to review.  It has been held in a long string of cases
that as a general
rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are deemed final, conclusive,
and binding on this Court.^[11]
Secondly, it appears that the disputed finding or respondent court is duly supported by the evidence.  The Decision under review states:

“x x
x The appellants’ evidence has amply shown
that since time immemorial, their predecessor Santiago Ebora
had been in possession of the disputed area which adjoins the eastern boundary
of the appellee’s 15-hectare fishpond; that Santiago Ebora had built his house, planted coconut trees and nipa palms thereon;
that he had converted a portion thereof into a salt bed; and that after his demise in 1920, his children and grandchildren
succeeded to the possession of the land in question erecting their houses and
planting coconut trees thereon.

“The record reveals that on February 28, 1969, the trial court appointed a commissioner
to conduct an inspection and relocation survey of the property involved; and
the report submitted by the said Commissioner to the Court shows that the appellants’ houses had been ‘built for so many
years’ on the land in question; and that ‘on the North-East x x x 8 coconuts can be found, approximately 2 to 6
years old,’ that ‘on the South-East and
South-West portion x x x 28
coconuts can be found x x x ranging from 20-30
years old x x
x, and that on the North-West portion x x x,
2 coconut trees about 30-40 years old can be found x x x’ (Commissioner’s Report dated March
15, 1969, p. 27, Original Record). 
Needless to state, these findings of the Commissioner strongly
corroborate the anterior possession of the appellants and their ancestor,
Santiago Ebora.

x x x

“x x
x the evidence is incontrovertible that the
possession of appellants and their predecessor-in-interest Santiago Ebora, which dates back long before the death of the latter
in 1920, has been continuous, peaceful, adverse and in the concept of
owners.”^[12]

Petitioner next makes capital of the fact that private respondents failed to produce any tax
declaration or tax receipt to substantiate their claim.  While the documents mentioned constitute
evidence of great weight to prove
ownership, the same are not indispensable proof of title to real
property.  Testimonial as well as other evidence may be sufficient, as in the instant case.

We likewise affirm the finding of the respondent court that
petitioner committed fraudulent misrepresentation in the procurement of OCT
P-47, thus giving grounds for the cancellation of said title under Section 91
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. 
It is not controverted that in its sales
application dated July 19, 1951 which was eventually made the basis of the
questioned Torrens title, petitioner stated that “the area applied for had
no indication of settlement, occupation or improvement, except the dikes and
concrete gates owned by the heirs of Ramon Chacon” (see statement of facts by the Court of Appeals, supra).  The falsity of this self-serving assertion
is patent in the light of
evidence correctly considered and
relied upon by respondent appellate court to show, as mentioned earlier, that private
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession
of the disputed 4-hectare portion of the land applied for since time
immemorial, and that coconut trees of up to 40 years old had been found in the
subject premises in 1969 by the Commissioner appointed by the trial court to conduct an ocular
inspection.  In addition, the Court of
Appeals took into account the report filed by the Director of Lands with
the Court of First Instance after conducting his own ocular survey of the controverted land upon orders of the trial court, which stated that “misrepresentation of facts
(was) glaringly committed by the erstwhile applicant, now patentee, Chacon
Enterprises x x x.”^[13] Suffice it to say that the findings of the
trial court Commissioner and the Director of Lands are entitled to great
respect by the courts.

In view of the foregoing,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, is clearly
applicable.  It provides as follows:

“Sec.
91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued
on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering,
changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the
application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title,
or permit granted.  It shall be
the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time
and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for
the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the
application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and
preserved in good faith, and for the purposes of such investigation, the
Director of Lands is hereby empowered
to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory
process from the courts.  In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and
illegal modification of essential facts shall be presumed if the grantee or
possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by
the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or
fail to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the
basis of such presumption, an order of cancel­lation may issue without further
proceedings.” (Underscoring supplied.)

We find no merit in the contention of petitioner that the foregoing
provision applies only to cases where the land covered by the questioned title
is still under the supervision of the Director of Lands.  Section 91 is unconditional.  It presupposes that a concession, title or
permit has already been granted on the basis of an application previously filed,
thus it contemplates or covers a situation such as that obtaining in the case
at bar wherein a title has already been granted pursuant to a sales
application.  The subject provision is clearly
intended to ensure that applicants under the Public Land Act, whether for
homestead, sale, lease or free patent, or for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title, state only the truth in their respective
applications, especially with regard to material facts.  For this purpose, the last two sentences of Section 91 provide
for the procedure by which the government, through the Director of Lands, may
discover or determine the truth of the essential facts set forth in the
application, and whether such facts continue to exist and are maintained and preserved
in good faith.  In this connection, it is important
to note that Section 90(g) of the same Act specifically requires the applicant
to state under oath “whether the land (applied for) is not
occupied, improved, or cultivated
either entirely or partially, and there are no indications of it having ever
been occupied, improved, or cultivated x x x.”
Section 111 of the law
further provides that “(a)ll persons receiving
title to lands under the provisions of this Act shall hold such lands subject
to the provisions hereof x x x.”

The remaining error assigned by petitioner again involves a
question of fact which We are not disposed to discuss at length.  It raises the issue as to the location of the litigated property, that is, whether
it is on
the western part of the 19-hectare parcel of land applied for and titled
in the name of petitioner and, therefore, had allegedly always been part of Ramon
Chacon’s fishpond, or on the “adjoining eastern portion” as found by
respon­dent Court of Appeals.  We have no
doubt that the exact location of the disputed area had already been established
in the trial court.  We note from the decision of said
court that upon joint petition of the parties, commissioners
representing herein petitioner and private respondents were appointed, inter
alia, “to determine and delineate the
area presently occupied by the defendants and some other persons in relation to
the technical description of OCT
P-47.”^[14] After conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners
thus chosen submitted a report with an accompanying sketch plan which obviously showed
the location of the parcel of land in litigation in relation to adjoining
properties.  Again, We quote from
the decision of the Court of Appeals that “(a)t the pre-trial, the parties
agreed that the land in litigation has an area
of 43,792 square meters and that
the metes and bounds thereof are indicated with red lines in the sketch plan
attached to the Commissioner’s report (pp. 94-95, Record on Appeal).^[15] Petitioner does not even allege that at any
time thereafter, it questioned the aforesaid sketch plan.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment
appealed from is hereby affirmed
in toto.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., and
Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., in the result.

De Castro, J., on leave.

Escolin, J., no part.

^[1] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp.
1-6; Rollo, pp. 43-48; Third Division, Escolin, J., ponente, Vasquez and de la Fuente, JJ., concurring.

^[2] Ibid.,
p. 13; Rollo, p. 55.

^[3] Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 16,
1977; Rollo, pp. 78-80.

^[4] Ras vs. Sua,
L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 153,
158-159, citing People vs. Matondo, February
24, 1961; Cajefe vs. Fernandez, October 19,
1960; Rosales vs. Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Yanez
de Baranueva vs. Fuster,
29 Phil. 606; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil.
844.

^[5] 103 Phil. 683.

^[6]
Ibid., p. 686.

^[7] Ibid.,
pp. 686-687; underscoring
supplied.

^[8] L-36850, September
23, 1982, 116 SCRA
732, citing Go Chi Gun, et al. vs. Co Cho, et
al., 96 Phil. 622.

^[9] Ibid., p. 737.

^[10] Sotto vs. Teves,
et al., L-38018, October 31, 1978, 86 SCRA 154, 183, citing Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29; Municipality of Carcar vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, et al., L-31628, December 27, 1982, 119 SCRA 392, 395-396.

^[11] See Borlas vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 114 SCRA 254, 257; Magpantay
vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 116
SCRA 236, 239; Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-45645, June 28, 1983

^[12] Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 7–8
and 11; Rollo, pp. 49-50 and 53.

^[13] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 8; Rollo, p.
50.

^[14] Record on Appeal in the Court of Appeals, pp. 137-138; Rollo,
p. 82.

^[15]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 47-48.