EVERLASTING PICTURES, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. F. A. FUENTES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLANTS.

On
October 24, 1958, Atty. Bienvenido Hernandez filed a complaint for
unpaid wages in behalf of Ruben M. David and Fernando Santos before
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor against Diomedes David
and spouses Bonifacio and Chita Ongpauco which was later amended
changing the party respondents to Everlasting Pictures, Inc. and
Godofredo Magat. In view of respondents’ failure to appear on the date
of hearing in spite of the notice served on them, complainants were
allowed to present their evidence ex parte after which the hearing
officer rendered decision on January 20, 1959 ordering respondents to
pay jointly and severally the amount of P300.00 to Ruben M. David and
P110.00 to Fernando Santos, with legal interest thereon from October
29, 1958 until fully paid.

On April 8, 1959, respondents
filed a petition for relief alleging that their failure to appear at
the hearing was due to accident, mistake and excusable negligence, but
the petition was denied. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued
by the regional administrator, and after the requisite notice of sale
wad made, the sheriff sold at public auction some personal properties
belonging to respondent Everlasting Pictures, Inc. and one Chita
Ongpauco applying the proceeds to the partial satisfaction of the
judgment. Contending that the sheriff is again taking steps to enforce
the decision by selling other properties of respondents and that the
hearing officer and/or the regional administrator had no valid
authority under Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to take cognizance of the
claim nor to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
decision, respondents filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila praying, among other things, that the regional administrator as
well as the sheriff be enjoined from further enforcing the decision
rendered against them and that damages be awarded in their favor.

On December 1, 1959, the court a quo
rendered decision on the pleadings, there being no dispute as to the
facts, holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is unconstitutional
thereby enjoining defendants from taking any further step leading to
the enforcement of the decision, but dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for
damages.

Dissatisfied with this decision, defendants appealed directly to this Court contending that the court a quo
erred in declaring unconstitutional Reorganization Plan No. 20-A on the
following grounds: (1) that said Plan has not taken away any power from
the ordinary courts of justice; (2) that the Plan was approved by
Congress in a lawful manner, and (3) the promulgation of said Plan does
not constitute undue delegation of power.

The questions raised are not new. Since this case was decided by the court a quo
and while the appeal taken by defendants from said decision was pending
consideration, several cases had been decided by this Court wherein
similar issues were raised and the proper interpretation was placed on
the validity of said Plan relative judicial powers, theretofore
exercised by the regional officer or by the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, one off such cases being Corominas, Jr. et al., vs.
Labor Standards Commission, et al., 112 Phil., 551; 59 Off. Gaz., (43)
7432 wherein this €outt made j the flowing pronouncements:

“A
cursory study of these provision of Republic Act No. 997 will show that
nowhere therein is there a grant of authority to the Government Survey
and Reorganization Commission to grant powers, duties and functions to
offices or entities to be created by it, which are not already granted
to the offices or officials of the Department of Labor. Section 4 above
quoted authorizes the elimination of overlapping services, activities
and functions, and the consolidation of agencies or instrumentalities
exercising said duties and functions. There is no grant of power to
allocate to the bodies and offices to be created or set up functions,
powers and duties not then already vested in the various offices and
officials of the Department of Labor. Section 3 limits the powers of
reorganization by the Commission to the offices, bureaus and
instrumentalities of the Executive Branch of the Government only; So
that it was not the intention of Congress in enacting Republic Act No.
997, to authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to
the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or
offices to be created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well
aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial powers are
vested only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may
establish. The Commission was not authorized to create courts of
justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer
said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under
the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have intended to
grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body,
as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate
or create courts of justice to any other agency of the Government.
(Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil., 439; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 94 Phil., 492; 50 Off. Gaz. (3) 1015; U. S. vs. Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed. 175 and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur. 921-992.)”

And
more recently this Court, speaking of the given to the: Workmen’s
Compensation Commission to issue a writ of execution by the rules
promulgated by it under. Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, faid down the
following ruling:

“It would appear
evident, therefore, that the powers given to the W.C.C. by the
Reorganization Acts, cannot validly include the power to amend Sec. 51
of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, heretofore quoted, for to do so
swould be diminish the jurisdiction and the judicial power and
functions vested by law on the courts of record, by virtue of said
section 5 to issue or order a writ of execution by the promulgation, of
a judgwient, which power or authority the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission never had, before the Reorganisation Acts had been passed.
Where the inquiry to be made-involves questions of law as well as
facts, where it affects a legal right, and where the decision may
result in the terminating or destroying that right, the powers to be
exercised and the duties to be discharged are essentially judicial (11
Am. Jur. 904); and being judicial, such powers are granted to or vested
upon a court or judicial tribunal (Rhode Island vs. Mass. 37
U.S. [12 Peters] 657, 738 Lied. [U.S.] 1233, 1266). And there is no
gainsaying the fact, that under this concept, an order for the
execution of a decision or award of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission is essentially a judicial power or function of the court.”
(Pastoral vs. The Commissoners of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., 112 Phil. 742.)

In
the light of the foregoing decisions, it is clear that respondent
regional administrator has no power to issue the writ of execution
requested by his corespondents to enforce the balance of the decision
rendered in their favor.

With regard to the claim that
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was approved by Congress in a lawful
manner, suffice it for us to quote hereunder what we said in the case
of Bill Miller, et al. vs. Atanacio A. Mardo, et al., 112 Phil, 792, (59 Off. Gaz., [14] 2307):

“It
is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted
the same.to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its
sessions without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said
reorganization plan. It is now contended that, independent of the
matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in
this opinion), said plan, nevertheless, became a law by non-action on
the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.

“Such
a procedure of enactment of law b y legislative inaction ft not
counteianced in this jurisdiction. * * * “A comparison between the
procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization
Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former
is in distinct contrast to the hitter. Under the first, consent or
approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by
‘concurrent resolution’. In either case, the contemplated procedure
violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate
action by each House of Congress. It is contrary to the settled and
well—understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses
are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the
determination of the one upon a proposed law is, to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other.’ (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).

“Furthermore, Section 6 (a)
of the Act would dispense with the ‘passage’ of any measure, as that
word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement of
presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the
effect suggested in counsel’s argument, would be a reversal of the
democratic processes required by the Constitution, for under it, the
President would propose the legislative action by submitting the plan,
rather than approve or disapprove the action taken by Congress. Such a
procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way,
if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to
eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive
who, under our Constitution, is already one of the strongest among
constitutional heads of state. To sanction such a procedure will be to
strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme of our
democracy.”

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J, B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.