G. R. No. L-1527. February 27, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EMILIANA GO ET AL., DEFENDANTS. EMILIANA GO (ALIAS EMILIANA G. PORCIUNCULA, ALIAS MAAY), ANAS-TACIO BORJA Y GUILLERA (…
REYES, J.:
1946, Pedro Porciuncula, a tobacco merchant, was shot to death at his
office in his house on Ramon Fernandez Street, City of Manila, where he
and his wife and children were then living. He received four gunshot
wounds: one through the head, another through the chest, and two
through the right arm.
Questioned by the police, the
deceased man’s wife, Emiliana Go, gave the information that her husband
had been shot by two unknown persons, and while professing ignorance of
the killer’s true motive, she made the hint that, because her husband
had three queridas, one of them might have been “instrumental” in having him killed.
The crime was solved with the arrest of four suspects: Anastacio Borja,
Juan Susaya, Ricardo Quilaquil, and Erlinda Carson. The four gave
signed statements admitting their participation in a conspiracy to kill
the deceased and at the same time implicating his widow. Also
implicated were three others, who, though not captured, were identified
as Felipe Tumandao, Filemon Salcedo, and Marciano Peras. The police was
also able to recover the written instrument by which the widow gave
formal approval to the conspiracy. The police found the original copy
of the document in the army cot of Filemon Salcedo in the house of Juan
Susaya on Galicia Street, Sampaloc, Manila, a carbon copy thereof in
another part of the same house, and still another copy in the trunk of
Anastacio Borja at his residence on Lepanto Street. Referred to in the
record as the “murder contract,” the instrument reads as follows:
“April 3, 1946
“To whom it may concern:
“I, Emiliana Go y Porciuncula, 25 years, married, of 2508 R. Fernandez,
Tondo, Manila with my own consent have agreed with Felix Lopez
regarding the shooting of my husband (Pedro Porciuncula, 31 years,
married, of the same address) for the following reasons:“1. He is living with another woman.
“2. He always torture me when he comes home from the house of his woman.
“3. I can’t withstand his treatment to me. “Felix and I, have written the following agreement:
“1. That I will give Felix Lopez P10,000 on installment basis.
“2. That I gave him P6,000 cash.
“3. That after the killing of my husband, I will completely give him the rest of the amount.
“4. That I will answer everything for him.
“5. That if something may happen to him, do not do something, instead look for me.
“6. In other words, I will take all the responsibility, in case something may happen to him.
“Witnesses:
“JUANITO SUSAYA “ANASTACIO BORJA “Thumbmark: (Here two thumbmarks)
Confronted
with the above document, Emiliana Go and Anastacio Borja admitted their
signatures and thumbmarks thereon, while Juan Susaya, on his part,
said that the document was signed and thumbmarked for him by his
common-law wife in his presence. Erlinda Carson confessed to having
typed the document from a draft signed by Emiliana Go, Anastacio Borja,
and Juan Susaya, and she also divulged that the Felix Lopez therein
mentioned was no other than her common-law husband, Filemon Salcedo,
who, not wishing his name to appear in the contract, had asked to be
designated by another name.
On the strength of the facts thus
revealed and of other proofs unearthed by the police, an information
was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, charging Emiliana
Go alias Maay, with parricide and her co-defendants Anastacio Borja
(alias Tating), Juan Susaya, Ricardo Quilaquil, Erlinda Carson, Filemon
Salcedo (alias Felix Lopez), Felipe Tumandao, and Marciano Peras, with
murder, the information alleging—
“That on or about the 11th day of April, 1946, and for some time prior
thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said Emiliana Go alias
Emiliana G. Porciuncula alias Mrs. Porciuncula alias Maay did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloneously and directly induce her
co-accused, the said Anastacio Borja y Guillera alias Tating, Juan
Susaya y Corbil, Ricardo Quilaquil y Bordaje, Erlinda Carson y Ador,
Filemon Salcedo alias Felix Lopez, Felipe Tumandao and Marciana Peras,
to kill Pedro Porciuncula, her own husband, by paying them in advance a
big amount of money and promising to pay them an additional large sum
after the killing; and that on or about said day, April 11, 1946; in
said city, the said Anastacio Borja y Guillera alias Tating, Juan
Susaya y Corbil, Ricardo Quilaquil y Bordaje, Erlinda Carson y Ador,
Filemon Salcedo alias Felix Lopez, Felipe Tumandao and Marciano Peras,
with intent to kill in consideration of the price and promise of an
additional price or reward as above set forth, during night time
purposely sought, with evident premeditation and treachery in that the
attack was sudden and unexpected, conspiring with the, said Emiliana Go
alias Emiliana G. Porciuncula alias Mrs. Porciuncula alias Maay and
with one another and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault the said Pedro
Porciuncula by shooting him repeatedly with firearms, thereby
inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his instantaneous death.”
With the defendants Salcedo, Tumandao, and Peras still at large, the
case came up for trial with respect to the other accused, all of whom
pleaded not guilty, with the exception of Erlinda Carson, who had to be
discharged from the information so that she could be used as a state
witness. Emiliana Go moved for a separate trial, but the motion was
denied, and she was tried jointly with Anastacio Borja, Juan Susaya,
and Hicardo Quilaquil. She, however, had her own separate counsel, who
conducted her defense independently of the others.
The evidence shows that Emiliana Go’s married life with the deceased Pedro Porciuncula was far from being a happy one. Embittered as it already was by their petty quarrels and his illicit affairs with other women, it was made well-nigh unbearable by his frequent outbursts of temper in the course of which he would lay hands on his wife and give her a good thrashing. Unable to endure her misery any longer, Emiliana in her desperation decided to eliminate her husband, and to that end she appealed to her cousin Anastacio Borja to look for someone who would do the job. Sympathizing with his relative and making common cause with her, Borja contracted Juan Susaya and the latter’s housemate Filemon Salcedo (whom he knew to be a hold-upper) and introduced the two to Emiliana in her house in Gagalangin. After several days’ negotiation an understanding was reached, with Emiliana agreeing to pay P10,000 for the killing of her husband and to assume all responsibility therefor. The agreement was reduced to writing, typed by Salcedo’s common-law wife, Erlinda Carson, and then signed and thumbmarked by Emiliana and Borja and also by Susaya’s common-law wife with his name and in his presence.
To carry out the planned assassination of Pedro Porciuncula, Salcedo
first recruited Ricardo Quilaquil, took him along to Emiliana to ask
for transportation expenses, and then, with him and Susaya and one
Pedro Castillo, set out in a jeep in the early morning of April 11,
1946, Ixmnd for the house of the intended victim. But on the way they happened to be stopped and searched by a police patrol at the
corner of Tayuman and Juan Luna Streets, and Quilaquil and Castillo
were arrested, Quilaquil for carrying a .45—caliber pistol and Castillo
for carrying a balisong. Quilaquil remained in confinement until the
afternoon of the following day.
Temporarily thwarted but still bent on performing his end of the
bargain, Salcedo recruited two new companions (Marciano Peras and
Felipe Tumandao) and in the evening of the same day (April 11) went
with them on a jeep to the residence of the deceased. There Salcedo and
Peras left Tumandao in the vehicle as guard, entered the house through
the back door and, with Emiliana to guide them, went into the room
where the deceased was, shot him to death and then fled.
With the murder accomplished, Salcedo sent Erlinda to Emiliana’s house
to collect from her the price agreed upon. Knowing that Erlinda was in
the conspiracy, Emiliana confided to her how the murderers had entered
through the kitchen door and been led by her to the room of the
deceased, and after showing her the bullet marks and blood stains
therein she took her to her own room and handed her the sum of P2,150,
explaining that it was all the cash she had but promising to pay the
balance on May 10. The money was divided between Salcedo, Susaya,
Quilaquil, and five others.
The evidence further shows that previous to the murder of her husband,
Emiliana had been making threats to have him killed. Thus Rodolfo
Penaflor, who was bookkeeper and secretary of the deceased and lived
with the spouses, testified that he often heard Emiliana utter such
threats. And according to Telesfora Porciuncula, sister-in-law of the
deceased, Emiliana complained to her shortly before the murder that the
deceased had quarreled with her and that for that reason she was going
home to her province, but warning that he would yet have “his day” for
she would have him killed before she left. Brigido Porciuncula, brother of the deceased, also testified that when, after Emiliana’s
arrest, he visited her in jail and informed her that he had seen the
murder contract, and then asked her why she went through with it, she
broke into tears and said: “Forgive me for what I have committed.”
Testifying in her own defense, Emiliana denied having had anything to
do with the murder of her husband. She admitted signing the murder
contract, but alleged that she did so without reading it and without
knowing its contents, Filemon Salcedo having assured her that it was
merely a contract for the services of a lawyer who was to work for her
separation from her husband. She denied having given or promised to
give money to any of her co-defendants and even denied having known
some of them. She, however, gave to understand that she was not happy
with her husband, her life with him having been made miserable by his
infidelity and by their frequent quarrels in the course of which he
would beat her up even to the extent of crippling her and causing her
to spit blood. She said that on one occasion he threw a pair of shoes
at her, thereby inflicting upon her lower lip a laceration which had to
be sutured in the hospital. She claimed that she still cherished his
memory, but she also made it plain that life with him had become so
unbearable that she conceived the idea of separating from him. And then
she admitted that although Erlinda Carson had told her of SaJcedo’s
complicity in the murder of her husband four or five days after it took
place, yet she made no mention of it to the police, this despite the
fact that she sometimes went to the detective bureau to find out who
had killed her husband.
The other appellants, namely, Anastacio Borja, Ricardo Quilaquil, and
Juan Susaya, all denied participation in the murder plot and claimed
that their confessions had been extracted from them through force and
violence.
Borja did admit signing the murder contract, but claimed that he did so
only after Salcedo had maltreated him and threatened him with death. He
would make it appear that the said contract was not a murder plot, that
it was signed by him after the killing, and that Salcedo informed him
that he was merely going to use it to blackmail Emiliana. He said that
he did not know the contents of the document and that although he had a
copy of it he never read it. He admitted having introduced Salcedo to
Emiliana, claiming, however, that the incident was purely accidental,
for while talking to Emiliana on that occasion he happened to see
Salcedo pass by. But he also admitted that although he had learned from
Salcedo that Porciuncula had been the victim of a foul play he neither
informed Emiliana about it nor reported it to the police. It appears
that Borja was a first year high school student.
Ricardo Quilaquil on his part testified that he did not know the
deceased Pedro Porciuncula or his widow Emiliana Go and came to know
Anastacio Borja only in Bilibid. He said that he could not have taken
part in the killing because at the time it happened he was in jail,
having been detained for illegal possession of a firearm from the
afternoon of April 10 up to the following day. But he admitted that
among his companions in the jeep when he was arrested on that occasion
were Filemon Salcedo, Juan Susaya, and Pedro Castillo, though
explaining that he was then on his way to Navotas to sell his firearm.
The defendant Juan Susaya also put up an alibi, saying that from 8
o’clock in the morning of the day in question he was in an army camp
where he was working as a cook. He admitted that Filemon Salcedo and
his wife were living in his house, and referring to the incident when
with Salcedo and Quilaquil he was detained by the police in the
afternoon of April 10, he said that he happened to be with Salcedo then
because on his way to the camp he was invited by Salcedo to ride with
him in the jeep and he accepted the invitation because he had nothing
else to do. He denied having entered into any plot to murder Pedro
Porciuncula or having received any money in that connection.
On the foregoing evidence the trial court found Emiliana Go guilty of
parricide and her co-defendants Anastacio Borja, Juan Susaya, and
Ricardo Quilaquil guilty of murder, sentencing all of them to suffer
each the penalty of reclusion perpetua, jointly and severally to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay
one-eighth of the costs. The three defendants last named were declared
entitled to be credited with one-half of the preventive imprisonment
undergone by them. From this sentence the defendants have appealed,
with defendant Emiliana Go presenting a separate brief.
Taking up first the appeal of Emiliana Go, we find that this defendant
contends in the first place that the trial court erred in not granting
her a separate trial. As a matter of law the granting of a separate
trial when two or more defendants are jointly charged with an offense
is discretionary with the trial court (Sec. 8, Rule 115). But it is
claimed that judicial discretion was abused in this case when Emiliana
Go was denied separate trial because her defense was antagonistic to
that of her co-defendants, some of whom had made confessions
implicating her in the crime. We find, however, that defendants did not
as a matter of fact put an antagonistic defenses, and there is no
reason to believe that Emiliana Go has suffered substantial prejudice
from the fact that she was tried jointly with her co-defendants.
It is contended that because of the denial of a separate trial for
Emiliana Go, evidence that was competent only against her
co-defendants, consisting of their extrajudicial confessions, helped
in convincing the trial court that she conspired with them to kill her
husband. But it would appear from the record that the trial judge had
been forwarned about the incompetency of said evidence as against
Emiliana and that he obviously took heed of it in his order denying the
petition for separate trial. And in any event, while those confessions
were not admissible as against Emiliana Go as proof of a specific fact,
they could nevertheless, because of their materiality, be taken into
consideration as a circumstance in judging the testimony of one of the
conspirators, Erlinda Carson (People vs. Badilla, 48 Phil., 718).
Said this court in that case:
“* * * The general rule is that extrajudicial declarations of a
co-conspirator made before the formation of the conspiracy or after the
accomplishment of its object, are inadmissible in evidence against the
other co-conspirators, on the ground that the accused in a criminal
case has the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him and to cross-examine them. It has however, been held that
where extrajudicial confessions had been made by several persons
charged with a conspiracy and there could have been no collusion with
reference to the several confessions, the fact that the statements are
in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the testimony of
an accomplice. It was so held in the case of United States vs.
Lancaster (44 Fed. 896), where three persons were jointly charged with
a conspiracy, one of whom made a voluntary confession, another was
permitted to become a witness for the Government under implied pardon
and testified, and the third made a declaration during the pendency of
the criminal enterprise, the court saying among other things that ‘* *
* while the testimony of the two accomplices could not corroborate each
other, and while the confession of Clemens cannot be considered as
evidence against the other prisoners, yet the unanimity of statements
of the three, made without the opportunity of conference, is a fact
which tends to corroborate the three statements so made. * * *.’
“In other words while an extrajudicial declaration of a co-conspirator
may not be directly introduced in evidence against another
co-conspirator as proof of specific facts, it may nevertheless under
certain conditions be taken into consideration as a circumstance in
judging the credibility of the testimony of an accomplice.” (People vs.
Badilla, 48 Phil., 718, 725-726.)
We find, moreover, that independently of the above confessions there is
ample proof on record upon which the conviction of Emiliana Go could be
based. In the first place, there is the murder contract itself, which
Emiliana Go admits to have signed and which speaks for itself. Her
explanation that she never read it is too improbable to be believed. Then there is the testimony of Erlinda Carson that when she visited Emiliana after the murder, the latter described
to her how the murder was committed and how she had guided Salcedo to
her husband’s room, even showing her the bullet marks and blood stains
therein; and that Emiliana gave her P2,150 as part payment of the price
agreed upon for the killing, which sum she later delivered to the
triggerman Filemon Salcedo. There is also the testimony of Rodolfo
Penaflor that he often heard Emiliana making threats to have her
husband killed. And significant is the fact that when Brigido
Porciuncula, brother of the deceased, visited her in jail and asked her
why she went through with the contract to have her husband killed, she
broke into tears and asked forgiveness for what she had done. In
addition, there is the existence of a strong motive on her part for
getting rid of her husband, discernible from her own account of her
unhappy married life. And her admission that, though she had
information that Salcedo was the one who killed her husband, she said
nothing about it to the police, clearly belies her protestation that
she was innocent of the whole affair.
The rest of the assignments of error of this appellant deals with the
findings of fact of the trial court and in the final analysis their
resolution hinges on the credibility of the witnesses. But after
carefully going over the record we find nothing that would justify the
conclusion that the trial court has not made a correct appreciation of
their testimony.
The declaration of the state witness Erlinda Carson is assailed on the
ground that it conflicts in some of its details with her extrajudicial
confession. But while contradictions do exist between her two
declarations the same may have been due merely to her imperfect memory
in matters of detail and, as the Solicitor General suggests, also to
“the lengthy cross-examination to which she was subjected by a renowned
and justly feared criminal lawyer.” But the contradictions in
important parts have been satisfactorily explained by her and on the whole her statements agree as to the main and ultimate facts.
Turning now to the appeal of Anastacio Borja, Juan Susaya, and Ricardo
Quilaquil, we find that the case against them is even stronger. For
aside from the testimony of Erlinda Carson and the murder contract we
have their extrajudicial statements admitting their participation in
the conspiracy to kill the deceased. It is immaterial that these
appellants took no direct part in the execution of the criminal act or
lent no cooperation in its commission by another act without which the
crime could not have been accomplished. Once conspiracy is proved, each
and every one of the co-conspirators must answer for the acts of the
others, provided such acts are the result of the common plan or
purpose. (People vs. Maasin, 64 Phil., 757.) It does not appear that
these appellants had withdrawn from the conspiracy or ever made any
attempt not to have it carried out. On the contrary, the acceptance by
all of them, with the exception of Anastacio Borja, of a share in the
price paid for the murder after this had been consummated, as appears
in their confessions, would belie any claim that they ever desisted
from the unlawful enterprise. As to Borja, it would appear that this
defendant received money from Emiliana before the murder; but we have
his admission that, though he had learned from Salcedo who the murderer
was, yet he did nothing to have the authorities informed about it. This
denotes continued interest in the success of the conspiracy of which he
was, according to one of his co-defendants, the real “master mind.”
After going over the record, it is our conclusion that the trial court
was justified in finding the appellants guilty as charged, and as the
sentence imposed is in accordance with law, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
Moran, C. J., Pards, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Montemayor, JJ., concur.