ANTONIO BUENAVENTURA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. GERONIMA HALILI UY, SYLVIA TE, FELY TE, HELEN TE, REGINO TE, BENJAMIN TE, LUIS TE, BELEN TE LIM, MANUEL LIM, VIRGINIA TE DUY, CHAR…

This is an appeal from the Order of the Court of First Instance of
Davao in Civil Case No. 5076^[1] entitled “Antonio Buenaventura,
Plaintiff vs. Geronima Halili Uy, et al., Defendants,” which dismissed a
complaint for forcible entry and detainer, on appeal
before it, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Davao City:  (a) to entertain the original
complaint which was unverified and filed beyond the reglementary period required under Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court and (b) to order the amendment of said complaint by subsequently
filing a verified amended complaint.

The undisputed facts of this case as
found by the
City
Court
of
Davao
City are as
follows:

Plaintiff-appellant Antonio Buenaventura by virtue of a written
contract of lease, leased unto the defendant-appellee
Geronima Halili Uy and her husband a portion consisting of 144 square meters
of his residential lot located at Bolton Street, Davao
City, where the latter constructed their residential house.  The
consideration is P50.00 a month for a period of twenty five (25) years. 
The appellees however, occupied an area of 279
square meters or 135 square meters in excess of the leased premises. 
Upon discovery of this unauthorized occupancy, appellant notified appellees to remove the additional construction on the
excess portion.  However, appellees
agreed to pay an additional rent of P30.00 a month for the area in question and
appellant allowed them to occupy the same until the time he would need the
premises.  Sometime later, this need arose and appellant thru
counsel demanded that appellees vacate the excess
portion.  Upon refusal to vacate, an action was filed for “forcible
entry and detainer“, before the City Court of
Davao
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 603-A, entitled “Antonio Buenaventura vs.
Geronima Halili Uy, et al” (Record on Appeal, pp.
5-11).

Defendants filed a Motion To Dismiss on
the grounds of:  (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the complaint not having been verified and the supposed forcible entry
having taken place almost seventeen (17) years ago and (b) lack of cause of
action (Ibid., pp. 14-22).

The City Court allowed counsel for plaintiff to amend his
complaint and the defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied
(Ibid., pp.
23-24).

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint duly
verified with its caption changed to “Ejectment” but
the ultimate facts remained materially the same as those in the original
complaint (Ibid., pp. 24-31; Brief for the
Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 3).

From the evidence presented the City Court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff; the dispositive
portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants, sentencing the defendants:

(1)    To vacate the
excess portion in question and to restore the possession thereof to the
plaintiff;

(2)    To pay the
plaintiff the agreed monthly rental at the rate of P30 a month from June, 1965
until they vacate the premises; and

(3)    To pay the
costs.

Defendants’ counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees not having
been substantiated, is hereby dismissed.” (Record on
Appeal, pp. 40-45)

On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Davao sustained the position of counsel for the defendant
and dismissed the case, (Ibid., pp. 69-73) and denied the
motion for reconsideration of said Order filed by the plaintiff
(Ibid.., pp. 129-130).

Hence this
appeal.

In his brief appellant raised the following
assignment of errors:

1.   
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
INASMUCH AS THE ACTION WAS NOT BROUGHT WITHIN THE ONE YEAR  PERIOD
PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 1, RULE 70, OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE CITY COURT HAD
NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT;

2.   
THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ABSENCE OF
VERIFICATION OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT;

3.   
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
SINCE THE CITY COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE COMPLAINT IT HAD
NECESSARILY NO JURISDICTION TO ORDER ITS AMENDMENT; and

4.   
THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.

The main issue in this case which in effect combines the four
errors assigned is whether or not the suit instituted by the herein
plaintiff-appellant is a forcible entry or an unlawful detainer case.

The Supreme Court in Dikit
v. Ycasiano (89 Phil. 46-49 [1951]) clearly laid down some distinctions
between the two actions, as follows:  (1) As to possession: 
the possession of the intruder or person who deprives another of the
possession of a land or building in forcible entry is illegal from the beginning
because his entry into or taking possession thereof is made against the will or
without the consent of the former possessor; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the detainer is originally legal or lawful, but it becomes
illegal after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession of the land or building by virtue of a contract; (2) As to demand to
vacate:  in forcible entry, no previous demand to vacate is
required by law before the filing of the action; while in an action for unlawful
detainer by a landlord against his tenant, such demand
is required.

Coming back to the case at bar, there is no question that
the action filed by herein plaintiff-appellant is not one of forcible entry but
of unlawful detainer.  For it is clear
that when appellant asked appellees to vacate the
excess portion of the land (which excess had been the subject of the additional
lease agreement) because of his need for the premises, and the appellees refused, their continued possession of the excess
became unlawful — the filing of the complaint within the one-year
statutory period makes the case fall under the jurisdiction of the City
Court.

Likewise, it is settled that the requirement regarding
verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional requisite. 
It is simply intended to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter
of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. 
Thus, the court may order the correction of the pleading if not verified,
(Oshita v. Republic, 19 SCRA 700 [1967]).  The defect was
merely formal.  It did not affect the validity and efficacy of the
pleading, much less the jurisdiction of the court (Gadit v. Feliciano, Sr., 69 SCRA 388, 389
[1976]).

In the case at bar the City Court correctly denied the motion to
dismiss and allowed the amendment of the complaint by the verification of the
same.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Order of the Court of
First Instance of Davao is hereby SET ASIDE, and the
decision of the City
Court of
Davao
City is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes,
JJ., concur.