BENITO CODILLA, ET AL., PETITIONERS VS. JOSE L. MARTINEZ, ETC., ET AL.; RESPONDENTS.

Codilla versus Martinez

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus filed by Benito Codilla and his fellow municipal policemen of Tagum, Davao, against Acting Mayor Jose L. Martinez, incumbent Mayor Hermenegildo C. Baloyo, and the policemen appointed in their places. The petitioners claim that their separation from the service was illegal because, as civil service employees, they could not be removed except for cause, and they pray for reinstatement, back salaries, damages, and attorney's fees. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must know: the acts of a de facto officer are valid, and Republic Act 557 protects only policemen who are civil service eligibles, not those holding temporary appointments.

Procedural History

The petitioners filed their petition for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of Davao on February 15, 1956. On the strength of a stipulation of facts and additional evidence, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petition, holding that the separation of the petitioners from the service was made in accordance with law. The petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court, which decided the case on November 23, 1960.

Facts

On January 24, 1956, Mayor Hermenegildo C. Baloyo of Tagum, Davao, left for Negros Occidental to attend to a sick brother. He designated the vice-mayor to act in his place effective January 25, 1956, until further advice. The vice-mayor then fell sick of lung trouble and designated the ranking councilor, Macario Bermudez, as acting mayor effective the same date. Councilor Bermudez was himself not in good health, and so he designated the third ranking councilor, Jose L. Martinez, to act as mayor effective on the same date.

Martinez accepted the designation and assumed office on January 25, 1956. His first official act was to separate the petitioners from the service as policemen of the municipality. The petitioners protested, invoking their right to continue in office under Republic Act 557, but Martinez appointed Eduardo M. Duaso municipal policeman in lieu of Benito Codilla, and Juanito Redoble vice Perfecto Melendres. Both appointments were approved or authorized by the Commissioner of Civil Service, and both appointees immediately qualified by taking their oaths of office. Policarpio Lagura was also appointed vice Leonardo Castor by incumbent Mayor Baloyo, who had in the meantime returned to office.

The respondents defended on the ground that the petitioners' appointments were made under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code in a temporary capacity, because they were not civil service eligibles, and so were valid only for three months. They also argued that even if Acting Mayor Martinez had no authority to terminate the employment, his action was validated when Mayor Baloyo endorsed and ratified it by his subsequent official actuation.

Issues

• Whether or not the designation of Jose L. Martinez as acting mayor, made by the ranking municipal councilor rather than by the provincial governor with the consent of the provincial board, was valid.
• Whether or not the official acts of Martinez as acting mayor are valid, given that his designation was irregular.
• Whether or not the termination of the petitioners' employment as municipal policemen was contrary to law, they being non-eligibles holding temporary appointments.

Applicable Provisions

Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code, under which the petitioners' temporary appointments were made, provides:

Section 682. Appointment of officers and employees. The President of the Philippines, the head of department, the Chief of Constabulary, the Director of Prisons, the municipal board or city council, and the municipal mayor shall appoint such officers and employees of the government as may be provided by law, and shall fix the compensation thereof, subject to the provisions of this Code.

The respondents invoke this provision to show that the petitioners' appointments were temporary and valid only for three months.

Republic Act 557, which the petitioners invoke, provides:

Section 1. The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding, any officer or employee of the government or any of its political subdivisions or instrumentalities who is now holding a position in the classified civil service, or who may hereafter be appointed to any position in the classified civil service, shall not be removed from his office or position except for cause as provided by law.

The Court holds that this guarantee of tenure extends only to eligibles, and does not cover non-eligibles holding temporary appointments.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court did not declare the designation of Martinez entirely void. Although his designation was irregular, he acted under color of authority, and so he was at most a de facto officer, not a usurper. The Court agreed with the trial court that all the elements constituting a de facto office were present.

On the second issue, the Court held that the acts of a de facto officer are valid and binding if made within the scope of the authority vested by law in the office. The Court quoted with approval the definition:

An officer de facto is to be distinguished from an officer de jure, and is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no right or title to the office he assumes to hold. He is distinguished from a mere usurper or intruder by the fact that the former holds by some color of right or title while the latter intrudes upon the office and assumes to exercise its functions without either the legal title or color of right to such office.

The Court added that the official acts of Martinez were subsequently endorsed and ratified by the incumbent mayor when he returned to office, and this ratification cured any legal infirmity the acts may have suffered because of the irregular designation.

On the third issue, the Court held that the termination was lawful. The petitioners held only temporary appointments because they were not civil service eligibles, and their status as employees was wholly dependent upon the grace of the ruling power. The Court ruled:

A temporary appointment is similar to one made in acting capacity, the essence of which lies in its temporary character and its terminability at the pleasure of the appointing power.

The Court also reiterated that the replacement of non-eligibles by non-eligibles is lawful under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioners could not invoke Republic Act 557 because that Act guarantees the tenure of office only of policemen who are eligibles, and non-eligibles do not come under its protection. The Court expressed sympathy for the petitioners but said its hand was stayed by the inexorable provisions of the law.

Doctrine

First, an officer who holds office under color of right or title, though without legal title, is a de facto officer, and his official acts within the scope of the authority vested by law in the office are valid and binding. Second, the irregular designation of an acting officer may be cured by the subsequent ratification of the lawful incumbent. Third, a temporary appointment is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, and the replacement of non-eligibles by non-eligibles is lawful under Section 682 of the Revised Administrative Code. Fourth, Republic Act 557 guarantees security of tenure only to policemen who are civil service eligibles; non-eligibles holding temporary appointments do not come under its protection.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court dismissing the petition, without pronouncement as to costs. The respondents won.

Remember This

Memorize the line that a temporary appointment is terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power, and that Republic Act 557 shields only eligibles. Examiners use this case to test the de facto officer doctrine and the limited reach of the security of tenure of non-eligible policemen.