G.R. No. L-24985. March 27, 1969
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. BERTITO D. DADIVAS, AS ACTING REFEREE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VII, BACOLOD SUB-REGIONAL OFFICE, BACOLOD …
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Victorias
Milling Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental dismissing its petition for prohibition
and, preliminary injunction to restrain Bertito D. Dadivas, as Acting Referee of the Bacolod
Sub-Regional Office, Regional Office No. VII of the
Department of Labor, from further proceeding with the hearing of Workmen’s
Compensation. Commission
Case No. 6385, involving a claim for compensation of Rufino
Pineda, as petitioner’s former laborer.
The record shows that Pineda’s claim was filed, with the aforementioned
Sub-Regional Office, on October 18,
1961; that it is alleged in said claim that Pineda was petitioner’s
piece worker, with a daily wage of P4.00; and that he was discharged from the
service in November, 1952, because of pulmonary tuberculosis contracted in the
course of his employment. Petitioner
moved to dismiss the claim, upon the ground that it had been filed long after
the expiration of the period of two (2) months prescribed therefor
in Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, or about nine years from the
date of Pineda’s alleged sickness. This
motion having been denied by respondent Dadivas, as
Acting Referee of said office, petitioner instituted the present action, for
prohibition and preliminary injunction, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to restrain Dadivas
from proceeding with the hearing of said claim of Pineda for lack of jurisdiction
to hear and decide the same, on account of its aforesaid late filing. Dadivas, in turn,
moved to dismiss the action, alleging that appeal, not prohibition, is the
proper remedy to review his order complained of and that the alleged late
filing of Pineda’s claim did not affect the jurisdiction to hear and decide the
same. Allowed by the lower court to
intervene as respondent, Pineda filed an answer in intervention, alleging
therein, inter alia, that the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over his claim and that
petitioner had failed to seasonably controvert the same. In due course, thereafter, the lower court issued an order, dated June 23, 1965, sustaining the contention of Dadivas and dismissing the case without costs. Hence, this appeal.
The main question for determination in this case is whether or
not the Workmen’s Compensation Commission has jurisdiction to hear and decide
Pineda’s claim for compensation, despite the fact that it had been filed more
than two (2) months after the date of the illness on which it is based. In this connection, Section 24 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act provides:
“Notice of the injury and claim for
compensation. – No
compensation proceeding under this Act shall prosper unless the employer has
been given notice of the injury or sickness as soon as possible after the same
was received or contracted, and unless a claim for compensation was made not
later than two months after the date of the injury or sickness, or in case of
death, not later than three months after death, regardless of whether or not
compensation was claimed by the employee himself. Such notice may be given and such claim made
by any person considering himself entitled to the compensation or by any other
person in his behalf. In case medical,
surgical, and hospital services and supplies have been furnished voluntarily by
the employer, notice of the injury or sickness within the time limit above
mentioned shall not be necessary, and if the employer has voluntarily made the
compensation payments, the claim for compensation to be made within the time
limits above established shall no longer be necessary.”
Inasmuch as the filing of a claim for compensation within said
period of two (2) months is essential for it to “prosper”, it is
clear that compliance with said requirement is essential to the success of the
claimant, or to the rendition of a decision favorable to him, not to the
jurisdiction to entertain his claim, for there could be no possibility of
passing upon the merits thereof in the absence of authority, to hear and decide
the same. In a long list of cases,[1]
we have adhered to the view that the late filing of a claim for compensation
is not jurisdictional, but, merely, a matter of defense. Suffice for us to quote from Manila Railroad
v. Manalang[2]:
“x x petitioner would argue that the
present claim is barred by Section 24 of the statute, since it was filed later
than two months after the date of sickness.
Anent this point, we agree with respondent Commission that the failure
of the company to file a contraversion of a claim
that may be filed, within the time fixed by Section 45 of the statute, is a bar
to questioning the late filing of the claim.
Said provision states in pertinent part:
‘In case the employer decides to controvert the right to
compensation, he shall, either on or before the fourteenth day of disability or
within ten days after he has knowledge of the alleged accident, file a notice
with the Commissioner, on a form prescribed by him, that compensation is not
being paid, giving the name of the claimant, name of the employer, date of the
accident, and the reason why compensation is not being paid. Failure on the part of the employer or ‘the
insurance carrier to comply with this requirement shall constitute a renunciation
of his right to controvert the claim unless he submits reasonable grounds for
the failure to make the necessary reports, on the basis of which grounds the
Commissioner may reinstate his right to controvert the claim.’
“Petitioner maintains that the filing of the claim within the
aforesaid period of two months is a condition precedent, of jurisdictional
import, and, hence, cannot be waived.
Such a view is no longer prevailing.
“According to Horovitz:
‘The defense of notice and claim may be waived. Both claim and notice, while originally
considered conditions precedent to an award, have yielded to a more reasonable
interpretation, and are now considered defenses by employers or insurers or
state funds and subject to the same infirmities as other defenses. If not seasonably raised by the payer of
compensation they are deemed waived, or, what amounts to the same thing, the
court will consider that the excuses or substitutes for late claim and notice
have been complied with, and hence the employer’s or insurer’s or state fund’s
defense of claim and notice fails completely.1
“So, also, Larson states that: ‘The majority rule is that
strict compliance with notice and claim requirements may be waived by the
employer or insurer’.2
“Conformably to the recent trend of jurisprudence, this Court
has in fact ruled that timeliness of notice or claim under Section 24 of the
Act is not jurisdictional.3 Failure of the employer, as in this
case, to file a timely controversion under Section 45
of the law, bars all defenses available to the employer, including the defense
based on the employee’s failure to file the claim in due time.4”
Indeed, it is alleged in Pineda’s claim, that petitioner had been
notified of his illness; that he was hospitalized for 16 days; and that he had
been given medical attention by petitioner herein, through one Dr. Ricardo Jara, thereby suggesting that petitioner knew of Pineda’s
illness. Upon the other hand, in his
answer, as intervenor in this case, Pineda affirms
that petitioner’s report or notice indicating its intent to controvert said
claim was filed on June 24, 1960. In other words, the records of the present
case indicate that petitioner had filed neither the report of injury nor the
notice of controversion within the periods prescribed
in sections 37 and 45 of Act No. 3428.
Pursuant to said section 45, petitioner may be deemed, therefore, to
have renounced the right to controvert the claim in question, if the
aforementioned allegations are duly proven.
In other words, petitioner’s right to a dismissal of said claim is not
indubitable, so that no error was committed, either by respondent Dadivas, in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, or by
the lower court, in dismissing the present action.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner, Victorias
Milling Co., Inc.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1] Alcoresa v. Johnston, 64 Phil. 846; Victorias Milling Co. v. Compensation Commissioner,
L-10533, May 13, 1957; Tan Lim Te v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commissioner, L-12324, Aug. 30, 1958; Bureau of Public Works v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-8994, Nov. 28, 1958; Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. De Leon, L-9449, July 24,
1959; Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. Hon. Cesario de
Leon, L-9521, Nov. 28, 1959; Century Ins. Co. v. Fuentes,
L-16039, Aug. 31, 1961; Fuentes v. Binarnira,
L-14965, Aug. 31, 1961; Republic v. Workmen’s Compensation Comm. ,
L-17813, April 30, 1963; Manila Railroad Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Comm., L-18388, June 28, 1963; Pangasinan Trans. Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-16490, Jan. 30, 1964; Nat. Dev. Co. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-19863, April 29, 1964; Manila Railroad v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-18264, May 26, 1964; Manila Railroad v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-19773, May 30, 1964; Peter Paul Phil. Corp. v.
Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-19612, July 30, 1964; A. L. Ammen
Trans. Co. v. Workmen’ s Compensation Comm., L-20219, Sept. 28, 1964;
Nat. Dev. Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Comm., L-18922, Nov 27,
1964; Nat. Dev. Co. v. Workmen’ s Compensation Comm., L-2056)
March 31, 1965; Manila Railroad v. Manalang,
L-20845, Nov. 29, 1965.
[2] Supra.
1
Horovitz on Workmen’s Compensation, pp. 254-255.
2
2 Larson, Law of Workmen’s Compensation, p.
284.
3
Century Insurance Co. v. Fuentes, supra.
4
National Development Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, supra.