ROSAURO PARAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. FERNANDO A. CRUZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CALOOCAN CITY, THE CITY FISCAL OF CALOOCAN CITY AND ELPO (EL POR VENIR RUBBER PRODUCTS…

Paragas versus Cruz

The Case

This is a case about a lawyer punished for contempt of court. Rosauro Paragas asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its dismissal of his petition for certiorari. His counsel, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, filed a motion for reconsideration containing language the Court found insulting and threatening. The Court treated the matter as a direct contempt and disciplined the lawyer. The case matters because it fixes the standard of respect an attorney owes the courts, and because it holds that a lawyer's disclaimer of bad intent will not save him when the words themselves are contemptuous.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court had earlier dismissed Paragas's petition for certiorari. Atty. Sebastian, as counsel for Paragas, filed a motion for reconsideration of that dismissal. The Court found certain expressions in the motion derogatory to its dignity. By a resolution, the Court quoted the statements and required Atty. Sebastian to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel responded with an explanatory memorandum. The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and proceeded to resolve the contempt charge against him.

Facts

Paragas's petition for certiorari had been dismissed by the Supreme Court. Seeking reconsideration, his counsel filed a written motion. In that motion, counsel argued that the dismissal violated Section 14 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and violated a right in the Bill of Rights, calling it a culpable violation and a ground for impeachment. He also wrote that when laws and rules are violated, victims sometimes resort to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen, and that the country does not want the killings of Verzosa and Reyes repeated in the premises of the Supreme Court and of the City Hall of Manila.

The Court considered these expressions derogatory to its dignity. It required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. In his explanatory memorandum, counsel said he never threatened to file impeachment proceedings, that impeaching the highest Justices was a herculean task for exceptional men, and that he had neither the time, the means, nor the strength for it. He explained that his reference to armed force was a statement of fact and of his wish, recalling persons who went to the mountains when not allowed to take their seats in the House of Representatives. He said the thought of Verzosa and Reyes crossed his mind because their shooting must have resulted from dissatisfaction with their actuations in office, and that he was against repeating such abominable acts.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory. It held the expressions plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and read the reference to the recent killing of two employees as a covert threat upon the members of the Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the disrespectful and threatening language in a motion for reconsideration filed in court constitutes direct contempt.
• Whether or not counsel's disclaimer of any offensive intent exonerates him from liability for contempt.

Applicable Provisions

The Court applied the rule on direct contempt, which punishes contempt committed in the presence of the court or in a pleading filed with it. The decision does not quote the text of the rule, but it treats language in a pleading as constitutive of direct contempt.

The Court also invoked the duty of counsel toward the courts, as stated in its own jurisprudence:

Counsel should conduct himself towards judges who try his cases with their courtesy that all have a right to expect. As an officer of the Court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.

This duty bears on the case because the guilty party was a member of the bar, which the Court found made the case more deplorable.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the expressions in the motion for reconsideration were plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and that the reference to the recent killing of two employees was a covert threat upon the members of the Court. It ruled that such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in court are constitutive of direct contempt, a point it said had been repeatedly decided. The Court stressed that what made the case more deplorable was that the guilty party was a member of the bar.

On the second issue, the Court held that counsel's disavowal of any offensive intent was of no avail. It stated the rule that defamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers, and quoted with approval:

A mere disclaimer of any intentional disrespect by appellant is no ground for exoneration. His intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the languages by him employed. He can not escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning.

The Court also quoted its ruling that an attorney may defend his client with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but may never do so by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.

Doctrine

First, disrespectful and threatening language contained in a pleading filed in court constitutes direct contempt. Second, a lawyer's disclaimer of offensive intent does not exonerate him, because intent is determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed, and defamatory words are taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers. Third, counsel owes the courts courtesy and respect, and as an officer of the court must help build, not destroy, the esteem and regard essential to the proper administration of justice. These rules tie directly to the Court's quoted statement of counsel's sworn and moral duty toward the courts.

Disposition

Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian was found guilty of direct contempt and sentenced to pay a fine of 200 pesos within ten days from notice, or, in case of default, to suffer imprisonment not exceeding ten days, with a warning that a subsequent repetition would be more drastically dealt with.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a disclaimer of intentional disrespect is no ground for exoneration, because intent is determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed. Examiners use this case in legal ethics and contempt questions, especially where a lawyer's pleading contains insulting or threatening words against a court.