ALEJANDRO V. RATILLA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE LAURO L. TAPUCAR AND FLORESITA JAMORA, RESPONDENTS.

On March 6, 1975
Alejandro V. Ratilla filed a collection suit in the
Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte, Butuan City Branch I against Floresita
Jamora.  He
prayed that Mrs. Jamora be ordered to pay him the sum
of P5,350 as the balance of the price of two freezers, plus interest, and the
additional sums of P2,000 as attorney’s fees, P3,000 as moral damages, P2,000
as exemplary damages, and P1, 000 as litigation expenses, or an aggregate claim
of P13,350.  (Civil
Case No. 1741).

Mrs. Jamora in her answer prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Ratilla’s
claim had been extinguished due to the surrender of one freezer to Ratilla and the destruction of the other freezer.  She interposed a counterclaim for p15,000 as actual damages, attorney’s fees and moral damages.

At the continuation of the pre-trial conference, the lower court
in its order of September 15, 1976
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.  It reasoned out that since the principal
claim of Ratilla amounted only to P5,350, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the inferior courts, and that the damages were included so that the case would come within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.

Ratilla’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the
lower court in its order of October 4, 1976.  On October
21, 1976 he sent to
this Court by registered mail his
petition for certiorari and mandamus.  He asked that the said orders of the trial
court be annulled.  The case is really an
appeal under Republic Act No. 5440.

Mrs. Jamora
averred in her answer to the petition that Ratilla’s
purpose in inflating his claim, by adding damages thereto, was to enable him to
file his collection complaint in Butuan City instead of in Bislig,
Surigao del Sur where she is a resident.  Mrs. Jamora further
alleged that Ratilla resorted to the same maneuver in
Civil Cases Nos. 1742 and 1743 which he filed against two other residents of Bislig.

The Judiciary Law
provides:

“SEC. 44.   Original
jurisdiction.- Courts of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction:

“xxx                           xxx                               xxx

“(c)    In all cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos;

“xxx                           xxx                               xxx

“SEC. 88.  Original jurisdiction in civil cases.- In
all civil actions x x x
arising in his municipality or city, and not exclusively cognizable by the Court
of First Instance, the municipal judge and the judge of a city court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
the value of the subject matter or amount of the demand does not exceed ten
thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs.  Where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same parties embodied in the same complaint, the amount of
the demand shall be the totality of the demand in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due to different parties, each separate
claim shall furnish the jurisdictional test. 
x x x.”

The issue is whether the
trial court erred in dismissing Ratilla’s collection
action against Mrs. Jamora.

We hold that the
dismissal is erroneous.  From section 83
of the Judiciary Law, it is clear that where there are several claims between
the same parties embodied in the same complaint the totality of the claims
supplies the jurisdictional test.  The
damages are included in the amount of the demand used as a basis for determining
the court’s jurisdiction.

Since the total demand in
Ratilla’s complaint exceeds P10,000,
the case falls within the
original, exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, Camiling, Tarlac, 99 Phil. 693;
Land Settlement and Dev. Corp. vs. Munsayac, 112
Phil. 359; Campos Rueda Corporation vs. Sta. Cruz
Timber Co., Inc. and Felix, 98 Phil. 627).

In Enerio
vs. Alampay, L-40010, May 2.6, 1975, 64 SCRA 142 the
plaintiffs filed an action in
the Court of First Instance to recover damages based on physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. 
The damages claimed consisted of
P978 as actual damages, P10,000 as moral damages, P15,000 as exemplary damages
and P3,000 as attorney’s fees or the total sum of P28,978.

The trial court dismissed
the action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.  It held that only plaintiffs’ claim for
actual damages in the sum of P978 should be considered in determining the
court’s jurisdiction.  It assumed that
moral and exemplary damages were claimed in order to circumvent the provisions or the Judiciary Law regarding the
jurisdiction of inferior courts.

That order of dismissal was reversed by this Court.  It was ruled that, as the total demand
amounts to P23,978, the case falls within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.  (See Reyes vs. Yatco and Villanueva, 100 Phil. 964).

In the instant case, Mrs. Jamora
herself included moral damages in her counterclaim.  She did not plead the defense of lack of
jurisdiction.  She raised that issue only
during the pre-trial.  And in the promissory note signed by her at Butuan City, she even agreed that the venue of
the collection suit is the City
of Manila (See sec. 1[b] [2], Rule
4, Rules of Court).

Of course, lack of
jurisdiction cannot be waived.  That
defense can be raised at any stage of the proceeding.  It is possible that Ratilla,
to suit his purpose, included the claims for moral and exemplary damages so
that he could evade the rule on venue in inferior courts.

But to prejudge the merits of Ratilla’s
claim for damages, by dismissing his complaint, and to require him to refile the case in the municipal court of Bislig would not conduce to the expeditious administration
of justice.  The pragmatic solution,
which is sanctioned by the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
of the complaint and not by the amount ultimately proven and awarded by the
trial court (Dionisio vs. Sioson-Puerto,
L-39452, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 471), is to direct the lower court to try
the case on the merits if no amicable settlement is reached by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s order of dismissal is set
aside.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, and
Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., concurs in a separate opinion.