G.R. No. L-36566. November 07, 1979
URBANO JAVIER AND LEONILA ALBIELA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., HON. ANDRES REYES, HON. LUIS REYES, LIM CHUA, TAN TIAN ON ALIAS TAN TIAN UNA AND TAN SIOK TA…
SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari filed on April
12, 1973, of the decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 46801-R,
entitled “Lim Chua, et al., plaintiffs-appellees versus Urbano Javier, et
al., defendants-appellants”, which upheld the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon in Civil Case 6253 ordering the reconveyance of the
landholdings subject matter of the case to herein private respondents,
plaintiffs-appellees below.
On April 24, 1973, We resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require the private respondents, plaintiffs-appellees below to
comment within ten (10) days from notice.[1]
On May 16, 1973 they filed their comment claiming that the petition raises no
important and substantial question of law as would warrant a review of the
appealed decision, since only questions of fact were raised in the Court of
Appeals, and that the decision itself “will show conclusively” that
it was based on the findings of fact of respondent Court.[2]
In a resolution of May 21, 1973, We gave due course to the petition.[3]
On September 29, 1973, petitioners, defendants-appellants below filed their
brief.[4]
Respondents’ brief having been filed out of time, We resolved on December 17,
1973 to expunge the said brief from the records, and to return the same to the
said parties.[5]
On January 10, 1974, the case was considered submitted for decision without
respondents’ brief.[6]
On January 26, 1974, respondents, through counsel, filed a petition for leave
to file the incorporated memorandum,[7]
but We resolved on February 8, 1974 to deny the same.[8]
The factual and procedural antecedents which gave rise to this
petition follow. On October 17, 1959,
respondents as plaintiffs, Lim Chua, Tan Tian On alias Tan Tian Una and
Tan Siok Tan alias Tan Shiok Tuan filed against herein petitioners, then
defendants-spouses, Urbano Javier and Leonila Albiela, with the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Quezon, Civil Case No. 6253, for the reconveyance
to the former of a parcel of land with improvements thereon, known as Lot 12
consisting of fifty (50) hectares, more or less, and an accounting and recovery
of the produce of the land from the time the latter, i.e., petitioners herein,
took possession of the same in 1945 up to the time possession is returned to
the former.[9]
Lot 12 is allegedly a portion of a big parcel of land designated as Lot 6,
Psu-5967, located in Quezon Province and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 16817 issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
Province in the name of herein respondents, which parcel of land is more
particularly described as follows:
“A parcel of land (Lot No. 6, Plan Psu-5967), with
improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio of Ayusan, Municipality of
Dolores. Bounded on the NE. by a creek
and properties of Vicente Gaurano, Dionisio Capino, Isidro Briones and Macario
G. Caranto; on the S. by property of Crispo Ella; on the SW. by properties of
Francisco Natividad, Rufino Flores, Isidro Bumiel and Margarita Valenzuela; on
the SW. by the property of Bernardo Marquez; and on the NW. by the Cabatang
River, properties of Marcos Gaurano, Luciano Santos and Juan Poloa, a creek and
property of Vicente Gaurano; containing an area of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY
NINE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-TWO SQUARE METERS (1,849,172), more or
less.”[10]
It was further alleged that on April 10,
1930, in Expediente No. 1509, G.L.R.O. Record No. 25133, and in Expediente
No. 1679, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26112 in which Cosme U. Castillo and Florentina
Arcoires were applicants, said Lot 12 was ordered excluded from Psu-16536,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 25133 and in Plan Psu-13449, G.L.R.O. Record No. 26112 for
the reason that the same was already awarded to herein respondents as owners in
Expediente No. 356, Record No. 14322.[11]
In an amended answer filed on November 11, 1959, defendants
below, now petitioners denied the material averments of the complaint and
pointed out that Lot 12 could never be a part of Lot 6, Plan Psu-5967, because
between the two lots there exists a big river more than fifty (50) meters wide
and more than twenty (20) meters deep known as the Guhit River which serves as
the natural boundary between the municipalities of Dolores and Candelaria of
Quezon Province; that Lot No. 6, Plan Psu-5967 is situated within the jurisdiction
of Dolores, Quezon while Lot No. 12 is situated within the jurisdiction of
Candelaria, Quezon.[12]
As special defenses, defendants-petitioners alleged inter alia: (1) that they acquired Lot No. 12 partly by
purchase and partly by inheritance and they, as well as their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in possession of the same adversely,
publicly, continuously, peacefully, and in the concept of owner against the
whole world since the Spanish time up to the present; (2) that they have title
to it granted by the Spanish government on March 11, 1888; (3) that the lot in
question had been adjudicated to defendants?petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (now Quezon)
in the decision dated January 14, 1930 rendered in Land Registration Cases Nos.
1509 and 1679; (4) that they have declared the land for tax purposes since 1906
paying taxes therefor; (5) that they have cleared the land and planted on it
numerous trees, like coconuts, coffee, bananas, mangoes, lanzones, oranges,
avocado, jack fruits and bamboos, without any interference from
plaintiffs-respondents or their predecessors-in-interest; (6) that
plaintiffs-respondents had never been the owners and possessors of Lot No. 12
or portion thereof, and if the same had been included in their title, i.e. TCT
No. 16817 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province, the registration and
issuance of the same in their favor had been secured thru fraud and deceit, by
making it appear in the application for registration and the notices of
publication that said Lot No. 6 belonged to them and is within the
jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon, which is not true since the same is within the
jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon, thus deceiving the whole world of the
proper location of the land subject of registration and publication; and (7)
that if plaintiffs-respondents have cause or causes of action the same have
already been barred by the statute of limitations.[13]
By way of counterclaim, defendants-petitioners claimed P5,000.00
for attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 for litigation expenses, and that in the
event that plaintiffs-respondents are declared the lawful owners of the lot in
question, they be reimbursed the amount of P150,000.00 for the reasonable value
of improvements they introduced thereon consisting of a house, camarin
made of strong materials and various fruit trees.[14]
On June 25, 1968 the court a quo rendered a
decision the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
“After a careful scrutiny and deliberation on the evidence
presented by the plaintiffs and the defendants and after a long search in the
archive of this court for the expediente of Case No. 1679, Record No. 26112,
Land Registration Case No. 1509 and Case No. 356 which involves said records,
the court has arrived at the ineludable (sic) conclusion that the property in
question, consisting of about sixty (60) hectares, more or less, and known as
Lot No. 12, Psu-13449, now Psu-16536-Amd. GLRO Record No. 27112, is included and comprised within Plan Psu-5967,
for Lot No. 6, GLRO Record No. 14232. That Lot No. 6 covering and which includes Lot No. 12, the property in
question, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16817 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon and issued in the name of the herein plaintiffs;
that the defendant Urbano Javier, since 1924, knew of the fact that the
property in question, Lot No. 12, plan Psu-13449, now Psu-16536-Amd, is a part
and parcel of Lot No. 6.
“This conclusion of the Court is supported by the records of
Case No. 1679 wherein the defendant Urbano Javier was one of the oppositors;
Case No. 356, and Land Registration Case No. 1509. From the records of Case No. 1679, the Chief Surveyor of the
General Land Registration Office filed with this Court on February 15, 1927 a
manifestation calling the attention of the Court to the fact that the land
described in plan Psu-13449, Record No. 26112 which refer to Lot No. 12 and
which is the property in question, is also included in plan Psu-5967 for Lot
No. 6. This Chief Surveyor of the
General Land Registration Office again on April 28, 1939 filed another
manifestation reiterating his previous manifestation of February 15, 1927 and
at the same time informing this court that Lot No. 6 of Plan Psu-5967 has
already been adjudicated to the herein plaintiffs as could be found in
Expediente 356, GLRO Record No. 14912 and that in said plan Psu-5967 for Lot
No. 6, is included Lot No. 12 (the property in question) of plan Psu-13449 and
in said manifestation of the Chief Surveyor of the General Land Registration
Office, he recommended to this Court the issuance of an order for the exclusion
from plan Psu-16536, GLRO Record No. 15113 and plan Psu-13449, GLRO Record No.
26112 involving Lot No. 12, from portion now in conflict with Lot No. 6 of Plan
Psu-395967 which was included and formerly decreed in Expediente 356, GLRO
Record No. 14232 in favor of the herein plaintiffs.
“From the indubitable document found in the record of the
court, one could readily see that the claim of the defendants to the effect
that Lot No. 12 which is the property in question, is not a part of Lot No. 6
is untenable. The defendants’
contention that the commissioner’s report, Exhibit “X”, and the
plotted area in conflict prepared by the court’s commissioner, should not be
admitted and given credit because the I.R. (Investigation Report) 268 wherein
the commissioner’s report was based was not presented finds no merit because
the commissioner’s report is confirmed by the manifestation of the Chief
Surveyor of the General Land Registration Office filed with this court dated
February 15, 1927 and April 18, 1939.
“With respect to the claim of the defendants that they
acquired the property by prescription, the same is without merit taking into
consideration that the defendant Urbano Javier knew that the property in
question is within Lot No. 6 and covered by a certificate of title in favor of
the plaintiffs since 1924 when he filed an opposition to the registration of
the land in question and, therefore, could not be said to have acted in good
faith for the purpose of applying the provision of the Civil Code in ordinary
prescription. Neither could the
defendants acquire the property by ordinary prescription because the defendant
has not possessed the property-for a period of thirty (30) years. Finally, the defendant could not acquire
the property in question for the simple reason that the same is titled in the
name of the plaintiffs and as such the law and jurisprudence says that no title
to registered land may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No. 496; Rodriguez Sr. vs.
Francisco, L-12039, June 30, 1961).
“VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and by
preponderance of evidence, the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants:
1. Declaring the
plaintiffs as the owners of the land in question;
2. Ordering the
defendants to surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiffs;
3. Ordering the
defendants to render an accounting of the fruits received by them from 1945 up
to the time they shall deliver possession to the plaintiffs;
4. To pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.”[15]
Appellants, now petitioners, appealed the above decision to
respondent Court of Appeals. On January
31, 1973 the said Court rendered a decision affirming that of the court a
quo, with the modification that the award of attorney’s fees be
disallowed on the ground that appellants, petitioners herein, did not act with
evident bad faith in occupying the land in question.[16]
Motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision having been denied,
appellants-petitioners resorted to this Court by way of this petition for review
by certiorari.
Petitioners aver in their brief before this Court that the Court
of Appeals erred –
(1) in holding that there was no fraud in the registration of Lot
No. 12, Plan Psu-16536-AMD-3;
(2) in holding that the cause of action of the private respondents
has not been barred by the Statute of Limitation or by laches;
(3) in not ordering the private respondents to reconvey the land in
question to the petitioners; and
(4) in not ordering private respondents to pay for the improvements
introduced by them on the land in question from 1945.[17]
We shall now consider and resolve the foregoing in seriatim.
1. Defendants-petitioners assail the registration of the land in
question (Lot No. 12, Plan Psu-16536-AMD-3) as having been secured through
fraud and misrepresentation, considering that in the Notice of Initial Hearing
in Land Registration Case No. 365, G.L.R.O. Record No. 14232, Lot No. 6, which,
as found by the lower court includes Lot No. 12, was made to appear as situated
in Barrio Ayusan, Municipality of Dolores only, when in fact it is also
situated in Barrio Masalocot, Municipality of Candelaria, both of the Province
of Quezon, thereby depriving the whole world, including the petitioners,
defendants below, of their opportunity to oppose the registration thereof. In this connection, respondent Court of
Appeals explicitly found that “after going over the records, the pleadings
and the evidence adduced, We found no trace of fraud and misrepresentation in
the procurement of the transfer certificate of title”.[18]
Fraud as a legal basis for review of a decree means actual or positive fraud as
distinguished from constructive or legal fraud.[19]
Since the existence or attendance of actual or positive fraud is a question of
fact, and respondent Court having ruled out the same, We have no basis to
sustain defendants-petitioners’ contention that it attended the procurement of
the title, The lot in question, Lot No.
12, Plan Psu-16536-AMD was also found to be “part and parcel of Lot No.
6” for which TCT No. 1681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon was issued on
July 9, 1941 in the name of plaintiffs, now respondents.[20]
This factual finding stands in the absence of weighty considerations to warrant
its reversal. As held in Evangelista
& Co., et al. v. Abad Santos[21]”
(I)t is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence
all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that
might have been committed by the lower court.” Moreover, the factual
conclusion in the case at bar, as in Evangelista & Co., et al. v. Abad
Santos, has been arrived at after weighing both the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented. Finally, the decree of registration has long become final, absent a
showing that the same was questioned within one (1) year after the entry
thereof was made. Under Section 38 of
the Land Registration Act, as amended, the person allegedly deprived of the
land by a decree of registration obtained by fraud should file in the competent
Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after the entry
of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest. Thus, granting that there was
actual or positive fraud in securing the title, defendants-petitioners are now
barred from questioning the same.
2. Petitioners next contend that respondents’ cause of action has
already been barred by the statute of limitations or by laches since they never
asserted their right over the land in question while petitioners, defendants
below, were in continuous, public and peaceful possession thereof during the
period from December 29, 1927 when the Original Certificate of Title was issued
up to October 17, 1959 when the complaint was filed, and, therefore, the land
in question should be reconveyed to them.
In a similar case[22]
for recovery of possession of registered land, the defendant set up the defense
of prescription and title in himself through “open, continuous, exclusive
and public and notorious possession under claim of ownership, adverse to the entire
world x x x from time immemorial” and that the registration of the land in
dispute was obtained through “fraud or error and without knowledge (of) or
notice either personal or thru publication to defendant and/or
predecessors-in-interest.” This Court there held, citing Soroñgon v.
Makalintal,[23]
thus:
“As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff’s Torrens
Certificate of Title and was registered in 1914, the decree of registration
can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice to
defendant, as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and
entry of the decree. Neither could the
decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest
in, the land prior to the registration proceedings.”
Defendants’, now petitioners’, position is untenable, the
established rule being that one cannot acquire title to a registered land by
prescription or adverse possession. Thus, in the same case of Tuason v. Bolaños, supra, this
Court reiterated this principle when it held:
“x x x Nor could title to that land in derogation of that of
plaintiff, the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. (Section 46, Act No.
496). Adverse, notorious and continuous
possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective
against a Torrens title. (Valiente vs.
Judge of CFI of Tarlac, etc., 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, p. 43) and it is likewise
settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of registration does
not prescribe. (Francisco vs. Cruz, 43
Off. Gaz., 5105, 5109-5110) A recent decision of this Court on this point is
that rendered in the case of Jose Alcantara, et al. vs. Mariano, et al., 92
Phil. 796. x x x”
Hence, defendants–petitioners’ claim that plaintiffs-respondents’
cause of action has prescribed is without merit.
On the defense of laches, petitioners rely on the authority of Mejia
de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277 (1956). There is no parallelism between the case at bar and that cited by
petitioners. In the Mejia de Lucas
case, which was an action for reconveyance, the land was acquired by
Domingo Mejia by means of free patent. Eleven (11) days after the issuance of the patent and before that of the
certificate of title, Domingo Mejia sold the land to Zacarias Ciscar who
immediately took possession and enjoyed the fruits thereof. Upon the latter’s death the land was
included in the distribution of his estate and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez who
in turn sold the same to Andres Gamponia, the defendant. The time during which the land in question
was successively held in possession by Ciscar, Sanchez and Gamponia covered a
period of 37 years. Meanwhile, Domingo
Mejia died leaving his brother, Pedro Mejia, as his only surviving kin. When the latter also died, he was survived
by his daughter Corcordia Mejia de Lucas, the plaintiff therein.
On the foregoing facts, this Court upheld the equitable defense
of laches in this wise:
“Upon a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances,
we are constrained to find, however, that while no legal defense to the action
lies, an equitable one lies in favor of the defendant and that is, the
equitable defense of laches. No (sic,
should be We) hold that the defense of prescription or adverse
possession in derogation of the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia
does not lie, but that of the equitable defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, We hold that while
defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of his and
his predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years, the original owner’s
right to recover back the possession of the property and the title thereto from
the defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by patentee’s inaction
and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.”[24]
It can be readily seen that in the above-cited case the land in
question came into the possession of the defendant-appellant Gamponia after a
series of transfers from Domingo Mejia, the original owner and
plaintiff-appellee’s (Mejia de Lucas’) predecessor-in-interest to three other
persons and their successors-in-interest, whose rights and obligation would
have been affected by a contrary decision. Said the Court:
“x x x All of these transfer(s) from Zacarias Ciscar to his
heirs, to Roque Sanchez and to defendant Andres Gamponia, acts which covered a
period of 37 years, would all have to be undone and the respective rights and
obligations of the parties affected adjusted, unless the defense is sustained.”[25]
This circumstance obtaining in the Mejia de Lucas case is
not present in the case at bar. Here,
there are no intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or
prejudiced by a decision directing the return of Lot No. 12 to
plaintiffs-respondents. Hence, the
equitable defense of laches will not also apply as against the registered
owners in this case.
3. The third assigned error does not raise an issue, and is merely
a consequence of the first and second assigned errors. In the light of our resolution therein as
shown in the foregoing, the same is without merit.
4. As regards the 4th and last issue, We agree with respondent
Court of Appeals’ finding that petitioners did not act with evident bad faith
in occupying the land in question. This
being likewise a question of fact, and there being substantial evidence in the
records to support the finding, We reiterate the established principle applied
in Evangelista v. Abad Santos, et al., supra, and a host of other
cases cited, that as a rule the same should not be disturbed.
As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the
fruits received before their possession was legally interrupted[26]
upon receipt judicial summons[27]
in connection with the filing of the complaint for reconveyance on October 17,
1959.[28]
However, the records do not show when the summons were received by the
defendants-spouses, Javier. In the
absence of such proof, and in the interest of justice, We hold that possession
in good faith was legally interrupted on November 11, 1959, when their amended
answer was filed,*
— which is less than a month from the date the summons was apparently
received. For the difference of a few
days or about two (2) weeks in reckoning the starting date of possession in bad
faith will not materially affect the prevailing party’s entitlement to the
fruits of the holding since the same will be reckoned seasonally. Petitioners should also be refunded the
necessary and useful expenses, with the right to retain the land until
reimbursed of the same, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code. Under the said provision, respondents have
the option to refund the amount of useful expenses or to pay the increase in
value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof. In this connection, petitioners have placed
the market value of improvements on the property consisting of various fruit
trees, bamboos, a house and camarin made of strong materials, at
P150,000.00[29] and this amount does not appear to be
disputed. The average share of the
owner was likewise compromised at sixty (60) cavans per year,[30]
at an average price of seven pesos (P7.00) per cavan[31]
as of the date of the hearing on September 23, 1960.
In view of Article 544 of the Civil Code, supra,
petitioners shall be accountable for the fruits of subject property only after
1959, not from 1945.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that petitioners render an accounting of the
entire produce of the holding from November 11, 1959, which, with respect to
palay crop had been fixed at sixty (60) cavans a year at seven pesos (P7.00)
per cavan as of September 23, 1960, up to the time the subject land is actually
reconveyed to private respondents. The
value of necessary and useful expenses due petitioners in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) having been proved and not
controverted, no further proof is required.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of origin
for the determination of the value of the entire produce, in addition to the
palay crop, to which private respondents are entitled from November 11, 1959 to
the time possession of subject property is delivered to them by petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, and
Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., no part.
[1]
Rollo, p. 39.
[2]
Id., p. 40.
[3]
Id., p. 41.
[4]
Id., p. 44.
[5]
Id., p. 54.
[6]
Id., p. 56.
[7]
Id., p. 62.
[8]
Id., p. 71.
[9]
Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3.
[10]
Folder of Exhibits, p. 1, Exh. “A”.
[11]
Record on Appeal, pp. 3-4.
[12]
Id., pp. 8-9.
[13]
Id., pp. 7-9.
[14]
Id., pp. 9-11.
[15]
Id., pp. 18-22; See also rollo, pp. 22, 25 and 26
(C.A. decision).
[16]
Rollo, p. 30 (C.A. Decision).
[17]
See Brief for Defendants-Petitioners, pp. 2, 3, 13 to 22.
[18]
Rollo, p. 26 (C.A. Decision).
[19]
Grey Alva, et al. v. Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 (1910).
[20]
See Rollo, p. 25 (C.A. Decision); See also Exh. “B”,
Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
[21]
L-31684, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 416. See also De Gala-Sison vs. Manalo, L-18181, July 31, 1963, 8 SCRA
595; Goduco vs. Court of Appeals, L-17647, June 16, 1965, 14 SCRA 282;
Ramos, et al. vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the P.I. et
al., L-22533, Feb. 9, 1967, 19 SCRA 289; Lucero vs. Loot,
L-16995, Oct. 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Ramirez Telephone Corp. vs. Bank of
America, L-22614, Aug. 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 191; Chan vs. Court of Appeals,
L-27488, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 737; and Mendoza vs. CA, L-36637, July
14, 1978, 84 SCRA 67.
[22]
Tuason vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106 (1954), reiterated in Bolaños vs.
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., L-25894, January 30, 1971.
[23]
80 Phil. 259 (1948).
[24]
Op. Cit., at p. 280.
[25]
Id., at p. 281.
[26]
Civil Code Act 544.
[27]
Civil Code, Art. 1123.
[28]
See note 9, supra.
*
The date the original answer was filed is not also reflected in the records;
Cf. Tacas vs. Tabon, 53 Phil. 356, 362, 363.
[29]
Test of Urbano Javier, T.S.N., of Jan. 14, 1965, p. 207; See also counterclaim,
Record on Appeal, p. 10.
[30]
T.S.N. of Sept. 23, 1960, p. 5; See also Stipulation of Facts, Id.,
p. 8.
[31]
Ibid.