THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE VILLAMORA ET AL., DEFENDANTS. JOSE VILLAMORA, FRANCISCO BARAUEL AND PEDRO RENTORIA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

This is a review of the decision of the court of first instance of
Albay holding the defendants Jose Villamora, Pedro Rentoria and
Francisco Barauel guilty of the murder of Gregorio Acuña. Originally
there were twenty-two defendants. For lack of sufficient evidence the
number was reduced to seven in the Court of First Instance. One escaped
before trial. Three were acquitted.

Reminiscent of the 1920 uprising in Intramuros in which
constabulary men sought revenge upon the police because of an outrage
committed by policemen against a constabulary soldier^[1], the facts of this case are these:

In the night of February 21, 1946, in the dancing hall Agua
Caliente of Legaspi, Albay, Gregorio Acuña, a local character known as
“Gallahad”, a boxer and a “tough guy”, summarily ejected three soldiers
and one Lieutenant Aquino of the Philippine Army from the dining salon.
The next day the incident was reported to the accused Lt. Jose
Villamora in the Camp Cerro Gordo of the Army in Albay, where there
were many soldiers and officers. Resenting this as an affront to the
corps, Lt. Villamora ordered the men then in camp to line up and
advising them of the insult, he invited and urged them to follow him to
chastise Acuña that the latter may understand how serious it is to
offend an officer of the Army. Pursuant to his exhortation about
seventy enlisted men (or fifty according to some witnesses) advanced to
the Agua Caliente Cabaret. Gregorio Acuña was not there. So the group
proceeded to Barrio Tulatula, Legaspi, where Acuña resided. Among the
group of soldiers were (in addition to Villamora), the accused Pedro
Rentoria, Francisco Barauel and one Jesus Buena who has escaped while
under detention.

When the expedition reached a Chinese store, Lieutenant Villamora
told the soldiers to go ahead and act accordingly. Upon reaching the
barrio, the men surrounded the house of Gregorio Acuña. Some threw
stones at it, others began tearing down the sawali walls, while others
attempted to enter the door. Awakened from sleep and aware of the
danger, Gregorio Acuña jumped from the house and made a run for safety.
He was pursued and overtaken near a brook. Francisco Barauel hit him on
the head with an iron bar. Others stoned him. Pedro Rentoria stabbed
him several times with a bayonet until he fell to the ground in a dying
condition. The party then left him shouting “Mabuhay si Teniente
Aquino”.

Captain Cipriano Elizaga-Que of the Military Police Command was
dispatched immediately to the scene after the Army authorities had
knowledge of the incident. The cadaver of Acuña presented no less than
twelve wounds, and his verdict was that death came from traumatic shock
with secondary internal hemorrhage.

The Military Police of the Philippine Army immediately took a hand.
Lt. Felix Icamen, Investigator and Intelligence Officer, began the
inquiry with the assistance of Lt. Jose T. Lajom. Major Demetrio Camua,
Provincial Provost Marshall, also intervened and questioned the accused
Lieutenant Villamora.

In the course of this investigation the three accused-appellants
voluntarily made certain statements contained in the affidavits
Exhibits C, D and E which were signed and sworn to by them before Luis
F. Baquizal, justice of the peace of the provincial capital.

In the said documents the accused admitted their participation
substantially as above related, although each tried (vainly) to
minimize his responsibility. For instance, Jose Villamora stated that
he only told his men “to box” Gregorio Acuña so that “he may realize
the insulting of the Army personnel” (Exhibit C). Francisco Barauel
claimed that he joined the men because they said they were going to
Albay for a walk; that after leaving Agua Caliente Cabaret, he came to
know that the purpose of the group was to club and cripple Acuña as
suggested by Lieutenant Villamora; that on the way he picked an iron
bar, just in case something happened; that when he saw Gregorio Acuña,
armed with a bolo fighting with Pedro Rentoria, he hit Acuña with the
iron bar even as Rentoria stabbed the victim. Pedro Rentoria, on the
other hand, admitting his membership in the punitive expedition, swore
that he struck only after Acuña, cornered by the soldiers, had first
slashed him with a bolo.

These affidavits must have told the true story—with the coloring
already noted. Two were executed on the same day the crime was
committed and the third on the next day. They were prepared by officers
of the same Camp Cerro Gordo (who could not be suspected of partiality
against their own comrades-in-arms). They were sworn to before the
justice of the peace of the provincial capital who affirmed in court
that the affiants, appearing before him, stated that they knew the
contents of the affidavits and that they voluntarily subscribed them.

The culpability of these appellants is therefore, in our opinion, beyond reasonable doubt.

The attorney de oficio for Villamora earnestly contends
that there is not enough evidence to convict said officer. But the
testimony of Victoriano Antonio who heard him say to the soldiers “Iros
a Tulatula, ustedes ya cuidado de lo que os he dicho” and Exhibit C is
enough to convict this appellant. We do not have to reckon with the
statements of the other accused Exhibits D and E for the purpose of
connecting him with the murderous assault.

The attorney for the appellants Barauel and Rentoria makes the following assignment of errors:

“1. The Court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant Francisco Barauel participated in the killing of Gregorio Acuña.

“2. The Court a quo erred in not finding that defendant-appellant Pedro Rentoria acted in self-defense in killing Gregorio Acuña.

“3. The Court a quo erred in qualifying the killing with evident premeditation.

“4. The Court a quo erred in holding that the killing was committed with abuse of superior strength.”

It is argued for appellant Francisco Barauel that inasmuch as there
was no conspiracy to kill Acuña, and inasmuch as Barauel only hit him
with an iron bar, the latter may not be held responsible for the death.
The answer is that there was conspiracy to punish Acuña, and because
of it, all the conspirators are responsible for whatever consequences
arose from the punishment. Death resulted: Therefore all were
criminally liable for it.

The assertion that Barauel struck Acuña “to prevent” the latter
“from hacking with a bolo Pedro Rentoria” can not excuse the offense
because the act was in pursuance of the general purpose to attack and
chastise Acuña. When three persons conspire to criminally assault X, it
would be absurd to uphold the plea that one of the assailants merely
hit X during the fight in order to prevent him from wounding his other
co-conspirators.

The same reasoning disposes of the second assignment of error to
the effect that Pedro Rentoria “stabbed Gregorio Acuña only with a view
to weakening him otherwise said Acuna would kill them with a bolo, the
deceased being husky and a boxer”.

The third assignment of error must be sustained. Evident
premeditation has not been sufficiently proven. The attack seems to
have been decided on the spur of the moment. And there was “no lapse of
a substantial interval of time clearly sufficient in a judicial sense
to afford a full opportunity for meditation and reflection; and
sufficient to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the
resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warnings”^[2].

There was treachery, however, because the group that attacked
Acuña and surrounded his house consisted of not less than nineteen
persons (Exhibit C) , and Acuña had absolutely no chance to defend his
life^[3]. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by this circumstance.

Hence the killing must be classified as murder.

The appealed judgment (as amended) sentenced appellants to life
imprisonment with the accessories and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P2,000. It is in accordance with law.
(Article 248, Revised Penal Code). Wherefore, it is affirmed, with
costs.

So ordered.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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^[1] People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64.

^[2] U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil., 530; People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil., 87, Albert Rev. Penal Code, New Edition, p. 122.

^[3] U. S. vs. Baul, 39 Phil., 846; U. S. vs. Estopia, 28 Phil., 97.

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MONTEMAYOR, J.:

That the appellants are guilty, I agree. However, under the
circumstances under which the crime was committed, I believe that the
defendants should be accorded the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation, or of having acted upon an impulse producing passion or
obfuscation, under Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, section 4 or
section 6 or section 10.

I am trying to put myself in the place of one of the appellants,—a
humble but discipline soldier, taught to look up to his officer for
leadership and to obey him. According to the facts related in the
majority decision, the deceased described as a boxer and a “tough guy,”
had summarily ejected from a dance hall a lieutenant and several fellow
soldiers. Thereafter another lieutenant called the soldiers of the
garrison, including the appellants to a meeting where he explained the
incident to them, calling their attention to the grave insult committed
against their organization and urging them to avenge the outrage and
vindicate their honor, at the same time offering to lead as in fact he
led them towards the house of the deceased. Of course the act as well
as the intention to take the lav into their own hands was all wrong.
But the feeling and passion that then dominated the soldiers specially
after the talk and the intervention of their officer should be
considered. In point of fact many of the soldiers responded to the call
and appeal of their lieutenant. That was the result of mass physcology
and an appeal to their sprit de corps. I believe that the law
on mitigating circumstances is applicable, and should be applied so as
to warrant the imposition of the penalty in its minimum degree, namely,
reclusion temporal in its maximum degree, instead of reclusion perpetua.