MANUEL B. RUIZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. J. M. TUASON AND CO., INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Manuel B. Ruiz brought an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila praying (a)
that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the sheriff of Quezon City be
enjoined from executing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
Q-3492 against Sixto M. Cacho but which is being enforced against him
by ejecting him from the property in question and demolishing the house
erected thereon, and (b) that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. be
ordered to execute a final deed of sale in his favor of a parcel of
land with an area of 420 sq. m. upon payment by him of the purchase
price at the rate of P7.00 per sq. m. and to consider the sum of
P855.00 already paid by him to defendant Florencio Deudor as partial
payment thereof.

Florencio Deudor, one of the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that (1) the venue of action is improperly laid, (2)
plaintiff has no cause of action against said defendant; and (3)
plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, has prescribed. Defendant J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., in turn filed a motion for bill of particulars.

Disregarding plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss and
while the motion for bill of particulars was pending consideration, the
court a quo, on March 11, 1961, issued an order dismissing the case on
the ground that, the property in question being situated in Quezon
City, and the action being one affecting real property or involving
title thereto, the venue of action is improperly laid. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, plaintiff interposed the present
appeal.

The case having been dismissed on the basis of a mere motion to
dismiss, the only facts that may be considered for the purpose of this
appeal are those alleged in the complaint. The pertinent facts may be
stated as follows:

“That * * * defendant Florencio Deudor was * * *
the absolute owner and possessor of a piece of land situated in Barrio
Tatalon, Quezon City, Philippines, containing an area of * * * 210,000
square meters, covered by a possessory information title in the name of
his deceased father, Telesforo Deudor, * * *.

“That * * *
said Florencio Deudor, in consideration of the sum of * * * P4,800.00,
* * * by way of absolute sale, sold, transferred and conveyed unto
Severino G. Navarro, Jose Dinglasan and Teofilo P. Bantug, * * * a
portion of land referred to in the next preceding paragraph, which
portion is more particularly described as follows, to wit:

(A parcel of land known as Lot No. 72 on subdivision Plan, Psu
___________ situated in the Barrio of Tatalon, Quezon City; Bounded on
the North by Lot No. 74; on the East by Lot No. 73; on the South by
Quezon Blvd., and on the West by Road;—Hunters ROTC Ave., * * *.

“That * * * after the sale aforestated * * * said vendee, Jose
Dinglasan, took possession of his portion of the land sold containing
an area, of 420 square meters, and built two houses of strong materials
thereon declared for purposes of taxation in his name, under Tax No.
11876 and Tax No. 11935, both of Quezon City, * * *.

“That
sometime in * * * 1950, Jose Dinglasan tried to make payments en the
balance of the purchase price of the land aforestated, but * * *
Florencio Deudor refused to accept said payment because there was then
pending an action (Civil Case No. Q-135) before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, involving the ownership of the
parcel of land referred to above, and of which the lot bought by Jose
Dinglasan is a part, * * *.

“That in Civil Case No. Q-135
above referred to, together with Civil Case Nos. Q-139, 174, 177 and
186 of the same Court, * * * after a * * * joint trial the parties
thereto, * * * on. March 16, 1953 , entered into a ‘Compromise
Agreement’, * * * paragraph 7 of which provides:

‘SEVENTH. That the sales of the property rights claimed by the DEUDORS,
are described in the lists submitted by them to the Owners which are
attached hereto marked Annexes “B” and “C” and made a part hereof.
Whatever amounts may have been collected by the DEUDORS on account
thereof, shall be deducted from the total sum of P1,201,063.00 to be
paid to them. It shall be the joint and solidary obligation of the
DEUDORS to make the buyers of the lots purportedly sold by them to
recognize the title of the Owners over the property purportedly bought
by them, and to make them sign, whenever possible, new contracts of
purchase for said property at the current prices and terms specified by
the Owners in their sales of lots to their subdivision known as “Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision.” The DEUDORS hereby advise the OWNERS that
the buyers listed in Annex “B” herein with the annotation “continue”
shall buy the lots respectively occupied by them and shall sign new
contracts, but the sums already paid by to the DEUDORS amounting to
P134,922.84 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be credited to
the buyers and shall be deducted from the sums to be paid to the
DEUDORS by the OWNERS. The DEUDORS also advise the OWNERS that the
buyers listed in Annex “C” herein with the annotation “Refund” have
decided not to continue with their former contracts of purchase with
the DEUDORS and the sums already paid by them to the DEUDORS totalling
P101,182.42 (subject to verification by the Court) shall be refunded to
them by the Owners and deducted from the sums that may be due the
DEUDORS from the OWNERS.’

“That in the list
of purchasers * * * the name of Jose Dinglasan appears in Number 13
thereof, who has paid the amount of P865.00 * * *.

“That our
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Lucina Evangelista vs. Deudor,
et al., 106 Phil., 17, promulgated on September 10, 1959, ruled and
held that, by the said Compromise Agreement, a sort of contractual
relation has existed between * * * J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., and
the purchasers of the land from the ‘Deudors’ as regards the sales of
their respective lots, and that J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. assumed
certain obligations in favor of said purchasers, among whom is Jose
Dinglasan, * * *.

“That * * * Jose Dinglasan sold,
transferred and conveyed unto the spouses Sixto M. Cacho and Julita de
Jesus, all his rights and interests over the portion of land of 420
square meters referred to above, including all the improvements
thereon, * * * who in turn sold, transferred and conveyed unto
appellant all their rights and interest in the portion of land of 420
square meters * * *.

“That immediately after said transfer,
* * * herein, plaintiff took possession of said portion of land and the
improvements thereon, in the concept of an owner thereof, * * *

“That the subject property corresponds to a portion of Lot No. 10,
Block No. 504 of the Subdivision plan of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
* * * located in Barrio Mataiahib, Tatalon, Quezon City and covered by
TCT No. 1267 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

“That
* * * plaintiff made a demand upon J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.,
through its agent and administrator Gregorio Araneta, Inc., to execute
a new contract in his favor of the subject property * * * at P7.00 per
square meter pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement but *
* * Tuason & Co., through its agent Gregorio Araneta, Inc., refused
to do so; * * * that plaintiff was and is always ready and willing to
pay * * * the price of the lot in question * * * at the rate of P7.00
per square meter.

“That * * * Tuason & Co., on November
20, 1958 , filed an action * * * against Sixto M. Cacho in the Court of
First instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch IV, docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-3492, wherein a judgment by default was rendered against Sixto
Cacho * * *.

“That * * * J. M. Tuason & Co, secured a
writ of execution of the aforementioned judgment by default against
said Sixto M. Cacho in said Civil Case No. Q-3492, dated May 20, 1959,
and armed with said writ, and with the aid of the defendant Sheriff of
Quezon City, now threatens, and is about, to eject herein plaintiff
from the property in question and demolish his houses therein,
including the house where he is now living * * *.

“That the
execution of the judgment against Sixto M. Cacho in Civil Case No.
Q-3492 will * * * cause irreparable injury * * * and injustice to the
plaintiff * * *.”

Appellant contends that the present action is transitory because it
is one for specific performance and its object is to compel J. T.
Tuason & Co., Inc. to execute a final deed of sale of the property
in question in favor of appellant founded upon compliance with the
compromise agreement wherein said company recognized the sale made by
Florencio Deudor of said property in favor of one Jose Dinglasan who,
in the same agreement, was recognized by the company as a purchaser who
had already made partial payment of the purchase price of the land.

This contention has no merit. Although appellant’s complaint is
entitled to be one for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked
that a deed of sale of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City be
issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering
said land be issued to him shows that the primary objective and nature
of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to
execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to
make a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last
analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action
must be commenced in the province where the property is situated
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides
that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. This contention finds support in the
following authorities:

“An action by which plaintiff seeks to have it
adjudged that he is the owner of an undivided third of mining;
property, and to have defendants directed to execute to him a
conveyance thereof, is within Code Civ. Proc. Section 392, providing
that actions for recovery of real property or of an interest therein,
or for the determination of such interest, must be tried in the country
in which the subject of the action is situated.” (McFarland vs. Martin, et al., 78 P. 239).

“Suit by purchaser for ascertainment of amount due on contract and for
vendors’ execution of deed on payment thereof hold suit for specific
performance, triable where land was situated.” (Kopke vs. Carlson, et al., 276 P. 606)

It should further be noted that among the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint is the prayer that defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
and the sheriff of Quezon City be enjoined from executing the writ of
execution issued by the court of first instance of said city in Civil
Case No. Q-3492 wherein said sheriff is allegedly trying to enforce
against appellant by ejecting him and demolishing the house he has on
the land- located in Quezon City, which claim necessarily involves a
determination of ownership and possession of said property as a
preliminary step to determining the validity of the writ of execution.
The complaint having been filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila it is apparent that venue is improperly laid. This is in
accordance with the, rule that if an action necessarily involves a
determination of an interest in land, the suit must be brought in the
place where the land is situated. The fact that an injunction is sought
as an ancillary to the principal action does not make the case
transitory or personal.

“The primary object of a suit for injunction is
determinative on the question of venue. If the suit necessarily
involves a determination of an interest in land, the suit must be
brought in the country where the land lies. * * * The fact that an
injunction is sought as relief ancillary to the main suit does not make
it transitory,” (92 CJ.S., pp.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzo.n, C. J., Padilla, Labrador , Concepcion , Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.