DANIEL U. CUARESMA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LETICIA MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 140, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, MARGIE CUARESMA, RESPONDENTS.
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Cuaresma versus Morales
The Case
This is Cuaresma versus Morales, a petition for certiorari filed by Daniel Cuaresma against Judge Leticia Morales, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 140 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and against his wife Margie Cuaresma. Daniel had sued for the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of his wife's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, but the trial court dismissed his action. What reaches the Supreme Court is not the merits of that failed annulment suit, but the procedural wreckage that followed: two motions for reconsideration that were defective or forbidden, and a petition for certiorari used to rescue a lost appeal. The case matters because it is the Court's cleanest teaching on the mandatory notice of hearing, on the second motion for reconsideration as a prohibited pleading, and on certiorari as no substitute for a lapsed appeal.
Procedural History
Daniel Cuaresma filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, based on the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Margie. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Daniel moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the motion in its order dated February 10, 2005, holding that the motion did not comply with Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court and was therefore a pro forma motion, a useless piece of paper. Daniel then filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the trial court likewise denied in its order dated March 8, 2005, this time on the ground that it was filed out of time and that the decision had already become final. From these two orders, Daniel went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, asking that they be annulled for grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
Daniel Cuaresma sought to have his marriage to Margie Cuaresma declared void on the ground of her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City heard the case and, in a decision dated November 30, 2004, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Daniel filed a motion for reconsideration, but its notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court, asking that the motion be resolved immediately upon receipt. It named no date, no time, and no place of hearing, and it was not directed to the adverse party. The trial court refused to act on it, ruling that a motion with a fatally defective notice is a useless piece of paper that does not toll any period.
Daniel then filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied as filed out of time, the decision having become final. He received the February 10, 2005 order on February 23, 2005, but instead of filing a notice of appeal within fifteen days, he filed the second motion and then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issues
- Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration on a technicality.
- Whether or not the first motion for reconsideration, whose notice of hearing was addressed to the Clerk of Court, was fatally defective and therefore pro forma.
- Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading that did not toll the period to appeal.
- Whether or not certiorari may be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Applicable Provisions
Section 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion.
This is the provision the first motion for reconsideration violated, because its notice went to the Clerk of Court and stated no time or place of hearing.
Section 5 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court provides:
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
This is the provision that made the petitioner's second motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading.
Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as quoted in the decision, provides:
The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
This is the period the petitioner allowed to lapse, so that the dismissal of his complaint became final and executory.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion. The denial rested on a technicality, but that technicality is commanded by the Rules themselves. The Court stressed that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon.
On the second issue, the Court found the first motion for reconsideration fatally defective. Its notice was addressed to the Clerk of Court for consideration and resolution immediately upon receipt, and it contained no date or time for hearing and was not directed to the parties concerned. A notice of hearing addressed to the clerk and not to the parties is no notice at all, and the filing of such a motion does not toll the running of the period to appeal.
On the third issue, the Court held that the second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading under Section 5 of Rule 37. Since the petitioner received the February 10, 2005 order on February 23, 2005, he should have filed his notice of appeal within fifteen days under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 41. The procedural lapse did not toll the prescriptive period, and the decision of November 30, 2004 became final and executory.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that having lost the right to appeal, the petitioner was proscribed from filing the petition for certiorari. Certiorari lies only where there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and it cannot be availed of as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, especially where the loss was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. The Court therefore saw no reason to delve into the merits of the dismissal, a final judgment being the law of the case.
Doctrine
First, the notice of hearing is mandatory. A motion that does not comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 is a worthless piece of paper, and its filing does not toll the period to appeal. A notice addressed to the clerk of court and not to the parties is no notice at all.
Second, a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is prohibited, and it does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal under Section 3 of Rule 41.
Third, certiorari under Rule 65 cannot substitute for a lost or lapsed appeal, most especially where the loss resulted from the party's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. Once a decision becomes final and executory, it can no longer be attacked or modified, even by the Court, save for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, or a void judgment.
Disposition
The petition was denied, and the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140, dated February 10, 2005 and March 8, 2005, were affirmed.
Remember This
Memorize the line: a motion with a defective notice of hearing is a worthless piece of paper that tolls nothing, and a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory notice of hearing, the ban on second motions for reconsideration, and the rule that certiorari is no substitute for a lost appeal.