G.R. No. L-6088. February 25, 1954
CATALINA DE LOS SANTOS, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JULIO SARABILLO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MIDSAYAP,…
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
situated in the municipality of Midsayap, Province of Cotabato, was
granted to Julio Sarabillo and on March 17,1939, Original Certificate
of Title No. RP-269 (1674) was issued in his favor.
On December 31, 1940, Julio Sarabillo sold two hectares of said land
to the Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap for the sum of P800 to be
dedicated to educational and charitable purposes. It was expressly
agreed upon that the sale was subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
In December, 1947, a request for said approval was submitted in
behalf of the Roman Catholic Church by Rev. Fr. Gerard Mongeau stating
therein that the land would be used solely for educational and
charitable purposes. The sale was approved on March 26, 1949, and on
March 29, 1950, the deed of sale was registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Cotabato. No new title was issued
in favor of the Roman Catholic Church although the deed was annotated
on the back of the title issued to the homesteader.
In the meantime, Julio Sarabillo died and intestate proceedings were
instituted for the settlement of his estate and Catalina de los Santos
was appointed administratrix of the estate. And having found in the
course of her administration that the sale of the land to the Roman
Catholic Church was made in violation of section 118 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the administratrix instituted the present action in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato praying that the sale be declared
null and void and of no legal effect.
In their answer defendants claim that the sale is legal and valid it
having been executed for educational and charitable purposes and
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. They
further claim that, even if it be declared null and void, its immediate
effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but the
reversion of the property to the State as ordained by law. Defendants
also set up as a defense the doctrine of pari delicto.
As a preliminary step, the court, upon petition of counsel for
defendants, directed the clerk of court, assisted by a representative
of both parties, to appraise the value of the improvements existing on
the controverted land and to submit to the court a report of his
findings. This was done, the clerk of court reporting that the value of
the improvements was P601.
After the parties had submitted the case on the pleadings, in
addition to the report of the clerk of court as to the value of the
improvements existing on the land, the court rendered decision
declaring the sale null and void and ordering the plaintiff to
reimburse to the defendants the sum of P800 which was paid as purchase
price, plus the additional sum of P601 as value of the improvements,
both sums to bear interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the
complaint, and ordering defendants to vacate the land in question.
Dissatisfied with this decision, the case was taken to the Court of
Appeals but it was later certified to this Court on the ground that the
appeal merely involves questions of law.
It appears that the patent covering the tract of land which includes
the portion now disputed in this appeal was issued to the late Julio
Sarabillo on December 9, 1938, and the sale of the portion of two
hectares to the Roman Catholic Church took place on December 31, 1940.
This shows that the sale was made before the expiration of the period
of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent and as such
is null and void it being in contravention of section 118 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The fact that it was expressly stipulated in
the deed of sale that it was subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the approval was sought and
obtained on March 26, 1949, or more than ten years after the date of
the issuance of the patent, or the fact that the deed of sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds only on March 29,
1950; and was annotated on the back of the title on that date, cannot
have the effect of validating the sale for the reason that the approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources does not have any
valid curative effect. That approval is merely a formality which the
law requires if the sale is effected after the term of five years but
before the expiration of a period of 25 years for the purpose of
testing the validity of the sale on constitutional grounds. But, as was
ruled by this Court, the absence of such formality will not render the
transaction null and void (Evangelista vs. Montaño,[1]
G. R. No. L-5567). What is important is the period within which the
sale is executed. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the
patent is mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval
is granted beyond the expiration of that period, because the purpose of
the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is “to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land
which the State has gratuitously given to him.” [Pascua vs. Talens,[2] 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9, (Supplement) 413.]
The claim that the sale can be validated because it was made with
the avowed aim that the property would be dedicated solely to
educational and charitable purposes is likewise unmeritorious even
considering the law invoked by counsel for appellants in favor of its
validity. It is true that under section 121, Commonwealth Act No. 141,
a corporation, association, or partnership may acquire any land granted
as homestead if the sale is done with the consent of the grantee and
the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
is solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or
charitable purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no
limitation therein as to the time within which such acquisition may be
made. But this provision should be interpreted as a mere authority
granted to a corporation, association or partnership to acquire a
portion of the public land and not as an unbridled license to acquire
without restriction for such would be giving an advantage to an entity
over an individual which finds no legal justification. It is our
opinion that the authority granted by section 121 should be interpreted
as subject to the condition prescribed in section 118, namely, that the
acquisition should be after the period of five years from the date of
the issuance of the patent.
But appellants now contend that even if it be declared that the sale
made to them by the homesteader is null and void yet its immediate
effect would be not the return of the land to appellee but rather its
reversion to the State wherein the Government is the interested party.
(Section 124 of the Public Land Act). Appellants further claim that the
present action cannot be maintained by the appellee under the principle
of pari delicto.
The principles thus invoked by appellants are correct and cannot be
disputed. They are recognized not only by our law but by our
jurisprudence. Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides that
any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of any of
its provisions shall, be null and void and shall produce the effect of
annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the reversion of
the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has been
applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a
transaction have proven to be guilty of having effected the transaction
with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. (Bough & Bough vs.
Cantiveros & Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun,[1] G. R. No. L-1411; Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, et al.,[2] G. R. No. L-2207; Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Peng,[3] G. R. No. L-4068; Talento, et al. vs. Makiki, et al.,[4]
G. R. No. L-3529.) But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked
considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the
Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known here
and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It
recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or
application runs counter to and avowed fundamental policy or to public
interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, “This doctrine is
subject to one important limitation, namely, “whenever public policy is
considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against
the transaction.” (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun, supra.)
The case under consideration comes within the exception above
adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a transaction which was
done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the principle of pari delicto would
apply to her because her predecessor-in-interest has carried out the
sale with the presumed knowledge of its illegality (8 Manresa 4th ed.,
pp. 717-718), but because the subject of the transaction is a piece of
public land, public policy requires that she, as heir, be not prevented
from re-acquiring it because it was given by law to her family for her
home and cultivation. This is the policy on which our homestead law is
predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra). This right cannot be
waived. “It is not within the competence of any citizen to barter away
what public policy by law seeks to preserve” (Gonzalo Puyat & Sons,
Inc. vs. Pantaleon de las Ama, et al., 74 Phil., 3). We are,
therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can maintain the present
action it being in furtherance of this fundamental aim of our homestead
law.
As regards the contention that because the immediate effect of the
nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property to the State
appellee is not the proper party to institute it but the State itself,
that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose, to decide.
That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the homestead, or
his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the parties is
the better entitled to the possession of the land while the government
does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead. Upon
annulment of the sale, the purchaser’s claim is reduced to the purchase
price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the
purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such
is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain in possession
of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they
should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee
during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the
State. (See Castro vs. Orpiano,[*] G. R. No. L-4094, November 29, 1951.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs in the result.
[1] 93 Phil., 275. [2] 880 Phil., 792.
[1] 93 Phil., 827.
[2] 88 Phil.,103.
[3] 93 Phil., 861.
[4] 93 Phil., 855.
[*] 90 Phil., 491.