JOSE MANANGOL BARTOLOME, ANTONIO BARTOLOME, AND ADALAIDA BARTOLOME, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. JUSTO BARTOLOME, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Plaintiffs seek, by writ of error, the review of an order of the
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the complaint in this case.

Its factual background is this: On November 25, 1953, Flaviana Fajardo and Justo Bartolome executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition stating that they are the widow and the only
legitimate son, respectively, of Venancio Bartolome, who died intestate in Manila on August 4, 1948,
and adjudica­ting unto themselves, in equal shares, three (3) houses, located
in the district of Sampaloc, City of Manila,
belonging to said deceased.

Less than two (2) years later, or on July 8, 1955, Jose Manangol Bartolome filed, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 26785 of said court, alleging that he is a legitimate son of the
deceased Venancio Bartolome
and the aforementioned Flaviana Fajardo,
and praying that he (Jose Manangol Bartolome) be appointed administrator of the estate of said
deceased; that said deed of extrajudicial partition between Flaviana
Fajardo and Justo Bartolome be declared of no force and effect; and that the
estate of the deceased be settled and distributed in accordance with law.  After appropriate proceedings, decision was
rendered therein dismissing said petition, upon the ground that Jose Manangol Bartolome was, not a
legitimate son of Flaviana Fajardo
and Venancio Bartolome, but
an illegitimate offspring of the latter and one Sotera
(Emilia) Pangilinan.  On appeal, taken by Jose Manangol
Bartolome, this decision was, on March 30, 1959,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19361-R.

Soon thereafter, or on May
24, 1959, Flaviana Fajardo
died in Manila.  On December
23, 1959, the Court of First Instance thereof approved in said
Special Proceeding No. 26785, the project of partition of the estate of Venancio Bartolome, deceased,
between the estate of Flaviana Fajardo,
deceased, and Justo Bartolome,
in equal shares.  Presently, or on January 5, 1960, the latter executed
an affidavit adjudicating unto himself the estates of Flaviana
Fajardo and Venancio Bartolome, consisting of cash amounting to P5,896.52 and
the aforementioned three (3) houses. 
Thereupon, or on January 21,
1960, said Court issued an order declaring the aforementioned
Special Proceeding closed and relieving the administrator therein appointed
from further responsibility, as such, Justo Bartolome having acknowledged receipt from him of the
properties constituting the estates of his aforementioned parents.

Over three (3) years later, or on November 4, 1963, said Jose Manangol Bartolome and Antonio
and Adalaida, both surnamed Bartolome
– hereinafter referred to collectively as plaintiffs – commenced the present
action, in the same Court, against Justo Bartolome – hereinafter referred to as the defendant –
alleging that plaintiffs Antonio and Adalaida Bartolome are the children of Venancio
Bartolome and Francisca Untalan;
that said plaintiffs had enjoyed the status of children of said Venancio Bartolome, by direct
acts of the latter and by admissions, made, in judicial proceedings, by the
late Flaviana Fajardo and
defendant, Justo Bartolome;
that said plaintiffs and Jose Manangol Bartolome used to believe that Venancio
Bartolome and Flaviana Fajardo were married; that plaintiffs Antonio and Adalaida Bartolome, accordingly,
thought that they were illegitimate children of Venancio
Bartolome; that, sometime in 1962, plaintiffs found
that the marriage of Venancio Bartolome
and Flaviana Fajardo does
not appear in the indices of marriages, from 1900 to 1904, of the Civil
Registrar for the City of Manila; and that defendant Justo
Bartolome, acting in conspiracy with Flaviana Fajardo, had
deliberately and fraudulently deprived the plaintiffs of their lawful share in
the estate of Venancio Bartolome,
as his acknowledged natural children, by misrepresenting that he was married to
Flaviana Fajardo, and
concealing his competence to contract mar­riage at the time of the conception
and birth of said plaintiffs.

The latter prayed, therefore, that judgment be rendered declaring
that they and the defendant are
acknowledged natural children of Venancio Bartolome and that the order of distribution of his estate
in Special Proceeding No. 26785 and the adjudication of said estate, made by
the defendant in his favor, is of no force and effect, apart from adjudicating
to the plaintiffs their respective shares in the estate aforementioned and
ordering the defendant to convey to each of the plaintiffs herein one-fourth of
said estate.

As above indicated, the lower court ordered this case dismissed,
upon the ground: a) that the complaint states no cause of action; b) that said
court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof; and c) that said
cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of limitations of action.  Hence, plaintiffs’ appeal, which is untenable
for:

1) The complaint does not show that Venancio
Bartolome and Flaviana Fajardo were not married. 
The lack of reference to their marriage in the indices of marriages, for
the years 1900 to 1904, of the Office of the Civil Registrar for Manila,
does not establish plaintiffs’ claim, for said couple may have been married at
some other time or at some other place. 
Besides, having concededly lived together as husband and wife for many
years, they are presumed to be legally married, unless and until the contrary
is satisfactorily proven.^[1]
The allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint, even if proven, are inadequate to
offset this presumption.

2) The alleged continuous possession by plaintiffs of the status
of acknowledged natural children of Venancio Bartolome does not suffice to support their claim for a
share of his estate, as such acknowledged natural children, because:

                       a) The very complaint
shows that, up to 1962, plaintiffs thought that their father was married to Flaviana Fajardo; that the
general impression, therefore, was that he could not have married Francisca Untalan – the mother of plaintiffs Antonio and Adalaida Bartolome – at the time
of their (plaintiffs’) conception and birth (on January 17, 1926 and December
16, 1928); that they (plaintiffs), accordingly, believed they were illegitimate
(not natural) children; and that this – status of illegiti­mate children – was,
therefore, the status the possession of which they enjoyed.

                       b) Continuous possession of the status of
a natural child which is not the status plaintiffs had possessed
– does not automatically confer the legal status of an acknowledged natural
child.1 Under the Civil Code of Spain
– which was the law applicable at the time of the death of Venancio,
in 1948 – it was, at best, a ground for compulsory recognition of said status,
which must precede an action for adjudication of their share as alleged heirs
of the deceased.2 Indeed, under the provisions of
said Code, a natural child, who is not acknowledged as such, has no successional rights to the estate of his natural father.3

                      c)
Pursuant to Article 137 of the Civil Code of Spain, an action for compulsory
recognition of a natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed pa­rents, except:

                    
“1.  If the father or mother died
during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may commence the
action within the four years next following the attainment of its majority.

                    
“2.  If, after the death of the
father or mother, some document, before unknown, should be discovered in which
the child is expressly acknowledged.

              “In this
case the action must be commenced within the six months next following the
discovery of such document.”

The case at bar does not come under any of these exceptions,
except as regards plaintiff Adalaida Bartolome, who became of age on December 16, 1949.1 However, she did not bring this action until November 4, 1963, or long after the
expiration of the period prescribed in said Article 137, or that (2 years)
provided in Section 45 of Act No. 190,2 or in
Art. 285 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.3

3) The Court of First Instance of Manila has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases for acknowledgment of natural children.  Pursuant to Section 38-A, par. (6) of
Republic Act No. 1401, such jurisdiction, in the City of Manila,
is vested exclusively in the Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations. As we ruled in B. Paterno vs. J. T.
Paterno:1

“x x x by
the creation of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, with its ex­clusive
jurisdiction over cases involving paternity and acknowledgment, recognition of
children and recovery of hereditary shares can no longer be properly
joined as causes of action, since each
lies within the jurisdiction of a different tribunal.”

4) As regards plaintiff Jose
Manangol Bartolome,
his claim as an alleged acknowledged natural child of Venancio
Bartolome is, moreover, barred by the decision in
Case No. 26785 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, declaring that he is
the illegitimate son of Venancio Bartolome
and “one Sotera (Emilia)
Pañgilinan“. 
It should be noted that this decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA. No. L-19361-R.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed, with costs against plaintiffs-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 5 (66), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

1 Article 131, old Civil Code;
Art. 283, Civil Code of the Philippines.

2 Briz vs.
Briz, 43 Phil., 763, 767.

3 “Under Art. 840 of the old
Civil Code, the natural children entitled to inherit are those legally acknowledged.  In the case of Briz
vs. Briz, 43 Phil., 763, the following
pronouncement was made – ‘the actual attainment of the status of a legally
acknowledged natural child is a condition precedent to the realization
of any rights which may pertain to such child in the character of heir.  In the case before us, assuming that
plaintiff has been in the continuous possession of the status of natural child,
she is entitled to enforce legal recognition; but this does not in itself
make her a legally recognized natural child.  It being a fact, conclusive in this instance,
that there is no requisite acknowledgment, the respondent’s right to inherit
cannot be sustained.'” (Underscoring ours.) Magallanes
v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil., 795, 798.

1 Jose Manangol
Bartolome and Antonio Bartolome
were born, respectively, on June 19,
1916 and January 17, 1926,
whereas Venancio Bartolome
had died on August 4, 1948.

2 Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil., 135; Serrano vs. Serrano, 22 Phil.,
10; Suarez vs. Suarez, 43 Phil., 903; Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil., 730, 744; Gabrinao
vs. Latorre, L-5825, Feb. 27, 1953; and
Mendoza vs. Cayas, 98 Phil., 107, 110-111. Narag vs. Cecilio,
L-13353, Aug. 31, 1960; Paulino vs. Paulino,
L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961;
Noble vs. Noble, L-17742, Dec.
17, 1966.

3 Four (4) years.

1 L-23060, June 30, 1967.