TOMAS B. TADEO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ROMULO VISPERAS, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MANGALDAN, PANGASINAN, LEONCIO MAICON AND EMILIA ACOSTA, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

An appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, rendered on October 16, 1962 in its Civil Case
No. D-1367, dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed by herein petitioner.

The facts of this case are not disputed.  Petitioner Tomas B. Tadeo
was charged with estafa in a criminal complaint filed on April 30, 1957 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan, where­in
it was alleged that on or about
March 27, 1948 petitioner willfully and feloniously, with deceit and intent to defraud, made
complainants Leoncio Maicon
and Emilia Acosta – herein respondents and appellees – sign a document which he represented to
complainants as the deed of partition that they had asked him to prepare, but
complainants later found the deed to be that of a sale of their land in favor
of petitioner’s brother-in-law Francisco Bongato for
the sum of P400.00, and that on April 11,
1948 petitioner, in conspiracy with his brother-in-law, sold the same property
to Nicolas Perez for P700.00,
thereby fraudulently depriving complainants of their land to their damage and
prejudice.

After conducting the first stage of the preliminary
investigation, respondent Justice of the Peace Romulo
M. Visperas found probable cause that petitioner
had committed the crime of which he was charged, and so said Justice of the
Peace issued a warrant for his ar­rest. 
Petitioner was arrested, but he was later released upon his having
posted the requisite bond.

Subsequently, respondent Justice of the Peace set the case for
the second stage of the preliminary investigation.  But at the scheduled hearing petitioner,
instead of presenting evidence in his favor, moved for the reinvestigation of
the case, alleging that the criminal complaint was inherently defective
in that it is therein alleged that complainants suffered moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000.00 when under the law the
determination of the penalty for estafa is only the
actual damage suffered by the offended party, and the fact was that the land in
question had an area of only one-half hectare and was later sold for
P700.00.  The motion for reinvesti­gation was denied by respondent
Justice of the Peace.  On the day when the
second stage of the preliminary investigation was again set, petitioner verbally prayed the court that he be given
ten days within which to file a
motion to quash.  Respondent Justice of
the Peace, after discussing with counsel for petitioner the grounds upon which
the motion to quash would be
based, considered the move as a
di­latory tactic and forthwith denied the motion to file a motion to
quash.  When petitioner’s motion to file
a motion to quash was denied,
petitioner manifested that he would introduce evidence in his behalf at the next
hearing, scheduled for September 7 and 12, 1962.  However, before the date of the
hearing, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, alleging that
respondent Justice of the Peace committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
both his motion for reinvestigation and
his motion to file a motion to quash.  On
October 16, 1962, the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered a decision dismissing the petition for cer­tiorari, and ordered the
respondent Justice of the Peace to
continue with the proceedings in the criminal case against the petitioner.  From said
decision petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals,
but the lower court ordered that
the appeal be forwarded to this Court because only questions of law are involved.

We do not find merit in this appeal.

In contending that respondent Justice of the Peace committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion for reinvestigation and his
motion to file a motion to
quash, petitioner claims:  (1) that the
penalty of the crime of estafa is based only on the
value of the fraud, without including the damages that the offended party may
have suffered; (2) that in the instant case the value of the land which
complainants were alleged to have been fraudulently deprived was P400.00, or at
most P700.00, and not the exaggerated sum of P2,000.00 – it being al­leged in
the criminal complaint that complainants had been damaged and prejudiced “in
the sum of P2,000.00 the actual current value (market) of the property at the time
of the sale, plus moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 x x x“; (3) that using as basis the sum of P400.00 or
P700.00, the penalty imposable would be such that the criminal action had
already prescribed, since the crime was alleged to have been committed on March
27, 1948 while the criminal complaint was filed only on April 30, 1957.  It is
the stand of petitioner that when respondent Justice of the Peace denied
his motion for reinvestigation and his motion to file a motion to quash, he was
thereby deprived of his right
to due process because he was not given opportunity to be heard and to bring
out all his defenses.

Petitioner’s
stand cannot be sustained.  When
pe­titioner asked for reinvestigation he was practically asking the respondent Justice
of the Peace to reopen the preliminary
examination that he had previously conducted – which was the first stage of the
preliminary investiga­tion when he had ascertained that a crime had been com­mitted
and that there was probable cause that the accused (petitioner herein)
committed it.  It was on the basis of his
finding in that preliminary examination that respondent Justice of the Peace
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner. 
It is apparent that the purpose of the petitioner in asking for
reinvestigation wag to have the complainants and their witnesses recalled in
order that he could cross-examine them and perhaps elicit from them a statement
of the actual value of the property involved so he could have a basis for
setting up the defense of prescription. 
It is the settled rule, however, that it is not a matter of right for
the accused to confront the witnesses against him during the preliminary examination
prior the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 
The accused cannot as a matter of right ask that the complainant and his
witnesses be made to repeat in his presence what they had said in the
preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest.^[1]
It is discretionary
for respondent Justice of the Peace to grant petitioner the privilege of
cross-examining the witnesses against him in that preliminary examination which
is known as
the first stage of the preliminary investigation under Section 6 of Rule
108 of the old Rules of Court.^[2]
It was after the
petitioner was arrested – as in fact he had filed the requisite bond – during
the second stage of the preliminary investigation pursuant to Section 11 of
Rule 108 of the old Rules of Court when petitioner was precise­ly afforded the
opportunity to present evidence in his favor.^[3]
If in that second stage of the preliminary investigation the petitioner could show,
by his evidence, that the crime of which he was charged had already prescribed,
it was within the power of respondent Justice of the Peace to dismiss the
complaint against him.  He did not even
have to file a motion to quash.  All that
he had to do was to call the attention of respondent Justice of the Peace that
as shown by his evidence the proceedings against him should not continue
because the crime of which he was charged had already prescribed.

The petitioner claims that if the reinvestigation that he asked
was granted and he could show that the value of the land involved in the
criminal complaint for estafa was at most P700.00,
the crime of which he was charged had already prescribed.  This claim of petitioner has no merit.  Even granting that the value of the property
is only P400.00 still the penalty imposable for the crime of estafa under Paragraph 3, Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional
in its minimum period.  Article 90 of the
same Code provides that “Those (crimes) punishable by a correctional
penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those punishable by
arresto mayor, which
shall prescribe in five years.” When the penalty fixed by law is a
compound one, the higher penalty is made the basis in determining whether the
crime has prescribed or not.  Inasmuch as
in the instant case the imposable penalty of the crime of which peti­tioner is
charged – even if the value of the land involved is only P400.00 – is a
compound one, that is, arresto mayor in
its maximum
period to prision correccional
in its
minimum period, the higher penalty being correccional, the crime prescribes in ten years.^[4] It appearing that
the crime was allegedly committed by petitioner on March 27, 1948 and the complaint was filed on April 30, 1957, the crime had not
yet prescribed because from March 27, 1948 to April 30, 1957, only 9 years 1 month and 3 days had elapsed.

We agree with the
observation of the court a quo that what petitioner should have done was to proceed with the
second stage of the preliminary investigation when he would have the
opportunity to demonstrate the falsity of the charge against him by presenting
his own evidence, and that what petitioner had done as revealed by the record
was only to delay the case.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Dequito v. Arellano, 81 Phil., 128; Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil., 640; Lozada
v. Hernandez, et al., 92 Phil., 1051; Abrera
v. Muñoz, et al., L-14743, May 25, 1960.

^[2]
Now Section 6 of Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court.

^[3]
Now Section 10 of Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court.

^[4]
People v. Cruz, L-15132, May
25, 1960.