JUSTINA EQUIO, IN BEHALF OF HER SEVEN MINOR CHILDREN, AND PABLITA VALENCIA, IN BEHALF OF HER TWO MINOR CHILDREN, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL AND …

In his lifetime, Nicomedes Infante was married twice: first to
Pilar Alcazar and later, after her death, to Felisa Conjuico. His
children with Pilar were Narciso, Antonio, Abraham, Jorge and Porfirio;
Felisa gave him Jose, Filemon, Corazon, Arsenio and Aquiles.

Nicomedes and Pilar acquired during their marriage certain
lands known as Lots Nos. 862, 713, 4035, 4036 and 4037 of the Dumaguete,
Oriental Negros Cadastre. While married to Felisa, Nicomedes Infante
conveyed the said five lots^[1]
to Felix Barot, who subsequently obtained the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to three lots, the other two continuing to be
registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Nicomedes Infante
and Pilar Alcazar.

Two years after the death of Nicomedes Infante, i.e., in
October 1939, Felix Barot conveyed^[2]
to the children of Nicomedes and Pilar, namely Narciso, Antonio,
Abraham and Jorge (Porfirio’s whereabouts being unknown since 1934) the
above-mentioned five lots, by a duly notarized document. Afterwards,
Abraham and Jorge having died single, Justina Equio and Pablita
Valencia, representing their minor children with their deceased husbands
Narciso Infante and Antonio Infante, filed in the corresponding
Cadastral expedientes, a motion alleging they were the only heirs of the
four brothers Narciso, Antonio, Abraham and Jorge, who had purchased
the five lots from Felix Barot, and praying for the cancellation of the
original certificates of title of the conjugal partnership of Nicomedes
Infante and Pilar Alcazar, plus the transfer certificates of title in
the name of Felix Barot, and for the issuance thereafter of separate
transfer certificates of title in the names of their minor children.
That was in May, 1951.

Advised of the above petition, Nicomedes’ second wife and her
children voiced their opposition, claiming the lots were conjugal
properties of the first marriage, and that as legitimate wife and
children of Nicomedes Infante, they were also heirs not only of
Nicomedes but of the latter’s dead sons Abraham, Jorge and Porfirio.

After hearing both sides, the Hon. Juan O. Reyes, Judge,
promulgated an order dated Jan. 30, 1952, recognizing the oppositor’s
rights to participate in the realty, and directing the Register of Deeds
of Oriental Negros to cancel the certificates of title and to issue
transfer certificates of title to movants and oppositors, in proportions
which are immaterial to the litigation pending before us.

A motion for reconsideration filed by the movants was denied on
April 19, 1952. On July 20, 1952, movants’ new attorneys made a motion
to vacate the orders of Jan. 30, and April 19, all of 1952, asserting
lack of jurisdiction. Acting thereon, Judge Reyes ruled as follows:

“Without expressly deciding the question of jurisdiction,
this Court feels that it is now powerless to vacate said orders of
January 30 and April 19, 1952, because said orders had already become
final and executory. The second order amending the first order was
served upon all the parties, thru their attorneys including Attys.
Eleccion and Sindiong who were the attorneys of record of the original
petitioners, on April 21, 1952. The motion to vacate was only filed on
July 30, 1952, or more than 3 months from the date the attorneys of the
petitioners were duly notified of the last order of this court of April
19, 1952. WHEREFORE, said motion to vacate said orders is hereby
DENIED.”

Consequently petitioners instituted here the instant petition
grounded on their proposition that the lower court “transcended its
jurisdiction”: (a) in “ignoring” the transfer of said lots by Nicomedes
Infante to Felix Barot and (b) in impairing the “unqualified right” of
Felix Barot to transfer his registered rights over the three lots to
Narciso, Antonio, Abraham and Jorge.

It will be seen that the two grounds of this special civil
action for certiorari rest upon the allegation that the two deeds of
conveyance, one by Nicomedes Infante to Felix Barot and another by Felix
Barot to Narciso and his three brothers, were true and veritable
contracts of sale. But the answer asserts, that they merely
represented a mortgage in the form of “pacto de retro” and redemption
subsequently effected by Narciso Infante for the benefit of all the
heirs of Nicomedes Infante. This allegation of fact in the answer, not
having been traversed by petitioners must be accepted at its face value,
specially because as may be gathered in the challenged orders, “there
was no question of fact” and the issues in the court below
centered around the proportion of the shares to be awarded to the heirs
of the Infante brothers and their half-brothers, it being admitted that
all (including Felisa Conjuico) had rights to the said lots formerly
belonging to the conjugal partnership of Nicomedes Infante and Pilar
Alcazar. Now, even if the trial judge had made a mistake in the
mathematical apportionment^[3]
– a point not decided here – the mistake by itself could not, and did
not amount to excess of jurisdiction. It was mere error, if any,
corrigible by appeal in due time.^[4]

And this consideration brings out another reason why this
petition may not be granted: the petitioners had another remedy by
appeal ^[5]. The circumstance
that, at the beginning of this certiorari proceeding, the period for
such appeal had already lapsed, does not usually modify the principle^[6]. Otherwise parties who thru
negligence or other circumstances failed to appeal on time will resort
to these special remedies to accomplish the revision of executory
judicial decisions.

In connection with the second ground of their petition,
petitioners assert that the court ignored the unqualified privilege of
Felix Barot to transfer his registered rights, thereby contravening Sec.
112 of Art. 496 under which the proceedings in the lower court were
initiated. Said section provides in part:

“. . . . . . Provided, however, that this section shall not be
construed to give the court authority to open the original decree of
registration, and that nothing shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, of his
heirs or assigns, without his or their written consent.”

Petitioners assert that Barot’s rights had been impaired. Yet they
have shown no authority to litigate for Barot, and defend his
privileges. And as the assignees of Barot, they can not complain
because, having started the proceedings in the lower court, they had
practically given “written consent” within the meaning of the
above-quoted statutory provision.

Anyway, and again, the error, if any, was corrigible by appeal
and could not amount to excess of jurisdiction.

Petition denied, with costs in favor of respondents. So
ordered.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo,
Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

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^[1] According to herein
petitioners he “sold” them; according to respondents he merely
“mortgaged.”

[2] It was mere redemption, according to respondents.

^[3] Which seems to be the
motive of this suit.

[4] Cf. Cuyugan v. Syquia 24 Phil. 567.

[5] Silvestre v. Torres 57 Phil. 885.

^[6] Profeta v.
Gutierrez David 71 Phil. 582; Govt. of U. S. v. Judge 49 Phil.
495.