JULIO GATLABAYAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APELLEES, VS. EMILIANO C. RAMIREZ, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

These are three (3) separate cases involving the same de­fendant
and identical legal issues.  The
plaintiff in each case is different from the plaintiff in the other cases,
although they seem to be members of the same family.  The cases were heard by the same Judge, who
rendered three (3) separate, but, practically identical decisions against the
defendant, who appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

There is no dispute as to the facts.  On January
17, 1958, three (3) deeds of absolute sale were executed in favor
of defen­dant EmiIiano C. Ramirez.  One was by Julio Gatlabayan
and his wife, involving a lot of 18,2725 hectares, situated in Barrio San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, for the sum of P14,618; the second was by Bonifacio Gatlabayan, involving a
lot of 22.5649 hectares, situated in Barrio Kay Dalag,
of the same municipality, for the sum of P18,051.92; and the third was by Maximo Gatlabayan and his wife,
involving a lot of 23.9860 hectares, located in the same barrio and
municipality, for the sum of P19,200. 
These lots had been acquired through Homestead Patents V-14193, V-14195
and V-14194, which, upon registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Rizal, were substituted by OCT Nos. 112, 140 and 115,
respectively, of said Office, in the respective name of the aforementioned
sellers, which certificates of title make reference to the Homestead Patents
upon which they are respectively based. 
In lieu of said original certificates of title, which were cancelled,
upon registration of the deeds of sale in favor of Ramirez, TCT Nos. 56809,
56806 and 56810 were issued in his name.

On December 14, 1962,
Julio Gatlabayan and his wife com­menced Civil Case
No. 7489 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
against Ramirez, for the redemption of the first lot, under the pro­visions of
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 
On January 2, 1963, Bonifacio Gatlabayan instituted
Civil Case No. 7504 of the same Court, against Ramirez, for the redemption of
the second lot, under the same legal provision. 
On January 9, 1963, Maximo Gatlabayan filed a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 7516 of said Court, for the redemption of
the third lot, relying upon said Section 119.

Ramirez filed substantially identical answers in the three (3)
cases, alleging that the period of redemption had already expired; that
plaintiffs had never expressed to him their intention to redeem; that
plaintiffs had not tendered or judicially consigned the redemp­tion price; and
that he had introduced improvements and performed “necessary acts for the
preservation of the land” in question. 
He, likewise, set up a counterclaim of P2,000 for attorney’s fees.

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered its
decision, in each one of said cases, overruling the defenses set up by Ramirez
and: (1) ordering him: (a) to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance in
favor of the respective plaintiff, upon payment of the sum stated in the deed
of sale executed by him; (b) to deliver to the plaintiff the possession of the
lot involved in the case; and (c) to pay the costs; (2) directing the Register
of Deeds of Rizal to cancel TCT Nos. 56809, 56806 and
56810, as well as to issue, in lieu thereof, other certificates of title in the
name of the respective plaintiffs, upon execution of the correspond­ing deed of
reconveyance; and (3) dismissing defendant’s
counterclaim, for lack of evidence in support thereof.

A reconsideration of said decisions having been denied, Ramirez
interposed the present appeal, directly to the Supreme Court, through a single
record on appeal.  He alleges that the
lower court erred: (1) “in considering the contract of sale to be January
17, 1958, instead of April 9, 1957, when the agreement was entered into between
the parties”; (2) “in refusing to recog­nize the disparity of the
value of the peso at the date of sale in 1957 and the value of the peso now
which will be the date of repurchase”; and (3) “in refusing to fix
the date when each of the plaintiffs may repurchase their respective homestead
lots to con­form to the time limit
fixed in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended” – although this
last issue was the first in defen­dant’s brief and the first question
adverted to above is the subject-matter of the last assignment of error in said
brief.

With respect to the date from which the statutory period of
redemption should be computed, Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
provides:

“Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.”

Defendant maintains that, in the cases under consideration, said
period of five (5) years should be reckoned, not from January 17, 1958 – the
date of deeds of sale in his favor – as the lower court did, but from April 9, 1957,
when plaintiffs herein signed agreements “to sell” to him the lots in
question, because said deeds of sale were executed in compliance with these
previous agreements “to sell.” 
This pretense is devoid of merit. 
As stated in the decisions appealed from:

” x x x
From the provisions of this deed^[1]
as well as the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, however, it is
clear that the conveyance of the land in question was actually made on
January 17, 1958, not before said date. 
In the first place, Exhibit 1, is by its own terms a mere pro­mise
to sell, not a sale or conveyance by itself.  Indeed, the parties expressly stated therein
that they could not execute any deed of absolute sale or conveyance ‘in
view of the legal prohibition‘ against the sale of the land before the
expiration of five years from the issuance of the homestead patent, or before
December 29, 1957.  In the second place,
it is also clear from the terms of Exhibit 1 that the parties including the
defendant, did not intend said deed to operate as a conveyance of the
land.  Thus, it was stipulated therein the
purchase (price) was not to be paid in full until the execution of the
absolute deed of sale after December 29, 1957; that the defendant would be
entitled to the peaceful, absolute and immediate possession of the property only
upon the execution of the deed of Absolute sale in his favor; that the plaintiff notwithstanding the execution of Exhibit 1 would still be
responsi­ble for the real estate taxes and other charges on the property until the deed of
absolute sale is exe­cuted after December 29, 1957; and that the plain­tiff
would continue paying of the mortgage on the land until said time.  Furthermore, the sale was registered under
Act No. 496 only on February 13, 1958.  In
short, even defendant did not consider himself owner of the land before the
execution of the deed of absolute sale on January 17, 1958.“2

We are fully in accord with this view, which we
adopt as ours.

The second assignment of
error is based upon Article 1250 of the Civil Code, which, Ramirez claims,
should have been ap­plied by the lower court. 
Said article reads:

“x x x In case an extraordinary inflation or
deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis
of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary.”

This assignment of error is untenable for: (1) the issue posed
therein was not raised in defendant’s answer; (2) there is no evidence whatsoever
as to the difference between our currency’s purchasing power in 1958 and that
of early in 1963, when these cases were filed; (3) plaintiffs cannot be made to
suffer for the difference between the purchasing power of our currency in 1958
and its present purchasing power, the delay having been due to defendant’s
unlawful refusal to allow the redemption in 1962 or 1963; (4) both parties were
identically subject to the risks concomitant with the fluctuations affecting
currency; and (5) said article 1250 applies when the contract provides that
payment be made in the “currency stipulated” whereas the contracts in the case at bar contain no
provision to this effect.

Defendant calls attention to the fact that, when plaintiffs filed
the complaints herein, on December 14, 1962, and January 2, and 9, 1963, they
had no more than up to January 17, 1963, or 34, 15 and 8 days, respectively, to
complete the period pres­cribed in said Section 119, and that, by not fixing in
the decisions appealed from the time within which they should exercise their
right of redemption, the statutory period has, in effect, been extended
indefinitely.

This point is well taken. 
Said decisions would, at least, leave the door open to the question
whether plaintiffs’ right thereunder could be
enforced at any time within ten (10) years, which is the period of prescription
of court decisions.  To forestall such
question, and in the interest of justice and fair play, a reasonable period
should be fixed for the exercise of plaintiffs’ right to redeem the lots in
question under the decision in these cases.

WHEREFORE, modified
in the sense that plaintiffs herein may exercise their right of redemption
within 60 days from notice of entry of this decision, that of the Court of
First Instance is hereby affirmed, in all other respects, without
pronouncement as to the costs in this instance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes,J.B.L., Makalintal,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando, and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Dizon, Zaldivar,
J., did not take part.

^[1]
Agreement to sell, Exhibit 1.

2
Underscoring ours.