CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA AND ANASTACIO GARCIA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA AND JUAN B. GUEVARA, RESPONDENTS.

This petition for certiorari to review a decision of respondent
Court of Appeals was given due course because it was therein vigorously
asserted that legal questions of gravity and of moment, there being allegations
of an unwarranted departure from and a patent misreading of applicable and
controlling decisions, called for determination by this Tribunal.  The brief for petitioners-spouses, however,
failed to substantiate such imputed failings of respondent Court.  The performance did not live up to the
promise.  On the basis of the facts as
duly found by respondent Court, which we are not at
liberty to disregard, and the governing legal provisions, there is no basis for
reversal.  We affirm.

The nature of the case presented before the lower court by
private respondent Angelina D. Guevara, assisted by her spouse, Juan B.
Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals thus:  “Plaintiff seeks
recovery of ‘one (1) lady’s diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts.
diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 cts. total
weight’ which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida,
Inc.”^[1] Then came a summary of now
respondent Guevara of her evidence: 
“Plaintiff’s evidence tends to show that around October 11, 1953
plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of
Mrs. Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant answered from
her comadre.  Plaintiff
explained that that ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952.  Defendant handed the ring to plaintiff and it
fitted her finger.  Two or three days
later, at the request of plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan
Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay
PD, defendant and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom, they showed the ring in question.  Mr. Rebullida
examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the
stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought
from him in 1947.  The ring was returned
to defendant who despite a written request therefor
failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. 
Hence, this case.  Later on when the sheriff tried to serve the
writ of seizure (replevin),
defendant refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost.”^[2]

How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the present petitioner
before us, along with her husband Anastacio Garcia, sought to meet plaintiff’s
claim was narrated thus:  “On the
other hand, defendant denied having made any admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the sheriff. 
Her evidence tends to show that the ring (Exhibit 1) was purchased by
her from Mrs. Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, who was boarding
in her house; that the ring she bought could be similar to, but not the same
ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida which was
stolen; that according to a pawn-shop owner the big diamond on Exhibit 1 was
before the trial never dismantled.  When
dismantled, defendant’s diamond was found to weigh 2.57 cts.”^[3]

Plaintiff lost in the lower court.  She elevated the matter to respondent Court
of Appeals with the judgment of the lower court being reversed.  It is this decision now under review.

These are the facts as found by respondent Court of Appeals:  “That the ring brought by the parties
for examination by Rafael Rebullida on December 14,
1953 was the same ring purchased by plaintiff from R. Rebullida,
Inc. on October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1952 has been abundantly
established by plaintiff’s evidence. 
Before plaintiff lost the ring, she had been wearing it for six years and became familiar with
it.  Thus, when she saw the missing ring
in the finger of defendant, she readily and definitely identified it.  Her identification was confirmed by Mr.
Rafael Rebullida, whose candid testimony is entitled
to great weight, with his 30 years experience behind him in the jewelry
business and being a disinterested witness since both parties are his
customers.  Indeed, defendant made no
comment when in her presence Rebullida after
examining the ring and stock card told plaintiff that that was her ring, nor did
she answer plaintiff’s letter of demand,* * * asserting ownership.  Further confirmation may be found in the
extra-judicial admissions, contained in defendant’s original and first amended
answers* * *. “^[4]

These further facts likewise appear therein:  “The foregoing proof is not
counterbalanced by the denial on the part of defendant or the presentation of
the ring, Exhibit I, which has a diamond-solitaire
weighing 2. 57 cts., or much heavier than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only.  It is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather dubious source of her
ring.  Aling Petring from whom the ring supposedly came turned out to be
a mysterious and ephemeral figure.  Miss Hinahon did not even know her true and full name, nor her forwarding address. 
She appeared from nowhere, boarded three months in the house of Miss Hinahon long
enough to sell her diamond ring,
disappearing from the scene a week thereafter. 
Indeed, the case was terminated
without any hearing on the third-party and fourth-party complaints, which would have shown up the falsity of
defendant’s theory.  Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda, third-party defendant, who tried to
corroborate defendant on the latter’s alleged attempt to exchange the ring
defendant bought through her, is [belied] by her judicial admission in her
Answer that appellee ‘suggested that she would make
alterations to the mounting and
structural design of the ring to hide the true identity and appearance of the
original one’ (Cunanan vs. Amparo,
45 O.G. 3796).  Finally, defendant is refuted
by her own extra-judicial admissions* * * although made by
defendant’s counsel.  For an attorney who
acts as counsel of record and is permitted to act as such, has the authority to
manage the cause, and this includes the authority to make admission for the
purpose of the litigation. * * * Her proferred
explanation that her counsel misunderstood her is puerile because the liability
to error as to the identity of the vendor and the exchange of the ring with
another ring of the same value, was rather remote.”^[5]

It is in the light of the above facts as well as the finding that
the discrepancy as to the weight between the diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and
the lost diamond was due to defendant having “substituted a
diamond-solitaire of plaintiff with a heavier stone” that the decision was
rendered, respondent Court reversing the lower court and ordering defendant,
now petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia, to return plaintiff’s ring or face value
of P1,000,00 and costs, as well as to pay plaintiff P1, 000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P1, 000.00 as exemplary damages. 
Hence this appeal.

To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse respondent Court.  It correctly applied the law to the facts as
found.

1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code.  It
reads thus:  “The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.  Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or
has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.  If the possessor
of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlaw­fully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price paid therefore. ”
Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the
diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo
S. de Garcia who was found in
possession of the same.  The only
exception the law allows is when
there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price. 
As authoritatively interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati,^[6]
the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by proof that there was good
faith in the acquisition by the possessor. 
There is a reiteration
of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco.^[7]
Thus:  “Suffice it to say in this
regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in
good faith by another, is based on his being dis­possessed
without his consent.  The common law
principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied
in a case which is covered by
an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.  Between a common law principle and a
statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.”^[8]

2. It is thus immediately apparent that
there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that her
possession in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent
Guevara’s claim.  As the above cases
demonstrate, even on that assumption the owner can recover the same once she
can show illegal deprivation.  Respondent
Court of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of
the ring in litigation is such respondent. 
That is a factual
determination to which we must pay heed. 
Instead of proving any alleged departure from legal norms by respondent
Court, petitioner would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code, which
provides:  “A possessor in the
concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.” She would
accord to it a greater legal significance than that to which under the
controlling doctrines it is entitled. 
The brief for respondents did clearly point out why petitioner’s
assertion is lacking in support not only from the cases but even from
commentators.  Thus:  “Actually, even under the first clause,
possession in good faith does not really amount to title, for the reason that
Art. 1132 of the Code provides for a period
of acquisitive prescription for movables through ‘uninterrupted possession for
four years in good faith’ (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, which provided a
period of three years), so that many Spanish writers, including Manresa, Sanchez Roman, Scaevola,
De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the Spanish Code.  (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the
title of the possessor in good faith is not that of owner­ship, but is merely a presumptive title
sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. p. 258; IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Español, 6th Ed., p. 380). 
And it is for the very reason that the title established by the first
clause of Art. 559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis
for acquisitive prescription, that the clause immediately following provides
that ‘one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same’.  As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.
A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec.
1947:  ‘Article 559 in fact assumes that
the possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the
possessor has come to acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse
possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal deprivation
could avail the former owner of the chattel. 
He would no longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.'”^[9]

The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to
prove the identity of the diamond ring. 
Clearly the question raised is one of fact.  What the Court of Appeals found is
conclusive.  Again, petitioner could not
demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the Court of Appeals acted in an
arbitrary manner.  As made mention of in
the brief for respondents two disinterested witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Reynaldo Cementina
of the Pasay City Police Department, both of whom
could not be accused of being biased in favor of respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the ring.

The third assigned error of petitioners would find fault with
respondent Court relying “on the weakness of the title or evidence” of petitioner
Consuelo S. de Garcia.  It is true, in the decision
under review, mention was made
of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment when in her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring and the stock card,
told respondent Angelina D. Guevara that that was her ring, nor did petitioner
answer a letter of the latter asserting ownership.  It was
likewise stated in such decision that there were extra-judicial
admissions in the original and first amended answers of petitioner.  In the appraisal of her testimony, respondent
Court likewise spoke of her giving a rather dubious source of her ring, the
person from whom she allegedly bought it turning out “to be a mysterious
and ephemeral figure.” As a matter of fact, as set forth a few pages back, respondent Court did enumerate
the flaws in the version given by petitioner. 
From the weakness of the testimony offered which, as thus made clear,
petitioner, did not even seek to refute, she would raise the legal question
that respondent Court relied on the “weakness of [her] title or
evidence” rather than on the proof justifying respondent Angelina D.
Guevara’s claim of ownership.  Petitioner
here would ignore the finding of fact of respondent Court that such ownership
on her part “has been abundantly established” by her evidence.  Again here, in essence, the question raised
is one of fact, and there is no justification for us to reverse respondent
Court.

The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of error is
that the matter of the substitution of the diamond on the ring was a question
raised for the first time on appeal as it was never put in issue by the pleadings
nor the subject of reception of evidence by both parties and not touched upon
in the decision of the lower court.  Why
no such question could be raised in the pleadings of respondent Angelina D.
Guevara was clarified by the fact that the substitution came after it was
brought for examination to Mr. Rebullida.  After the knowledge of such substitution was
gained, however, the issue was raised at the trial according to the said
respondent resulting in that portion of the decision where the lower court reached
a negative conclusion.  As a result, in
the motion for reconsideration, one of the points raised as to such decision
being contrary to the evidence is the finding that there was no substitution.  It is not necessary to state that respondent
Court, exercising its appellate power reversed the lower court.  What was held by it is controlling.  What is clear is that there is no factual
basis for the legal arguments on which the fourth assigned error is predicated.

What is said takes care of the fifth assigned error that
respondent Court was mistaken in its finding that there was such a
substitution.  Again petitioner would
have us pass on
a question of credibility which is left to respondent Court of Appeals.  The sixth assigned error would complain
against the reversal of the lower court judgment as well as petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia being made to pay respondent Angelina D. Guevara
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 
The reversal is called for in the light of the appraisal of the evidence
of record as meticulously
weighed by respondent Court.  As to the
attorney’s fees and exemplary damages, this is what respondent Court said in
the decision under review: 
“Likewise, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s
fees in the sum of P1, 000, it being just and equitable under the
circumstances, and another P1, 000 as exemplary damages for the public good to
discourage litigants from resorting to fraudulent devices to frustrate the ends
of justice, as defendant herein
tried to substitute the ring, Exhibit 1, for plaintiff’s ring.”^[10]
Considering the circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth assigned
error on the matter by petitioner fails to demonstrate that respondent Court’s
actuation is blemished by legal defects.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6,
1962 is hereby affirmed. 
With costs.

Concepcion,  C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concur in the result,
art. 85 of the Code of Commerce not being applicable.

^[1]
Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioners, pp. I to II.

^[2]
Ibid, p. II.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. II-III.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. IV-V.

^[5]
Ibid, pp. V-VI.

^[6]
98 Phil. 788 (1956).

^[7]
L-18536, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 486.

^[8]
Ibid, p. 493.

^[9]
Refutation of the First Assignment of Error, Brief for Respondents-Appellees, pp. 8-10.

^[10]
Decision, Appendix A, Brief for the Petitioners, p. VII.