TAN CHING JI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUANITO MAPALO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PROVINCIAL SHERIFF EX-OFFICIO OF COTABATO, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND CAMPUA UY TINA, DEFENDANTS, …

The answer to the pivotal legal issue in this appeal on a
question of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is supplied by Uy Tina
v. Avila,^[1] a
certiorari proceeding with the petitioner, the debtor, seeking to quash
a writ of execution in favor of one of the respondents, Tan Ching
Ji, plaintiff-appellee in
this case.  In the opinion of the Court
penned by Justice Makalintal, the unequivocal holding
is that the five-year period under Rule 39, Section 6 as to when a judgment may
be executed on motion^[2]
is to be counted not from the date “the judgment became final in the sense
that no appeal therefrom could be taken, but when it
became executory in the sense that it could already
be enforced.” There is thus sufficient legal basis for plaintiff’s
rescission suit, now before this Court on appeal, to set aside the auction sale
of Uy Tina’s properties, the debtor being the same
petitioner in the aforementioned certiorari proceeding, in favor of
defendant Philippine National Bank,^[3]
sole appellant, insofar as it would adversely affect four specific items
subject to prior attachment lien secured by plaintiff, included in the very
same order of execution issued five years after the finality of the judgment
but within such period counted from the time it could be executed and
enforced.  So the lower court held.  It is thus apparent that its decision cannot
be said to be vitiated by any error.  We
affirm, but subject to modification as will be hereinafter indicated.

As set forth in the appealed decision, plaintiff Tan Ching Ji filed a complaint for
the rescission of an auction sale of certain properties of Uy
Tina in favor of defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank.  It was shown in such complaint that in a
civil case^[4]
for the recovery of the sum of money, he obtained a first lien upon the
properties of defendant Uy Tina by means of writs of
attachment duly issued by the same court of first instance and that
subsequently he obtained a judgment in his favor in the sum of P23,000.00.  In another civil case filed against the same
debtor, defendant Philippine National Bank was awarded the sum of
P8,772.76.  It then sued out a writ of
execution and caused to be levied upon and sold at public auction the very same
properties already attached by plaintiff. 
The facts were substantially admitted by defendant but as affirmative
defense it was alleged that as a third party it was not bound by a writ of
attachment issued.  There was a pre-trial
and thereafter a compromise agreement on both of which occasions there was an
admission on the part of defendant Philippine National Bank that two parcels of
land in the municipality of Dulawan, province of Cotabato, a commercial lot in the same municipality as well
as a two-storey commercial and residential building, also in the same
municipality, had been the subject of attachment in favor of plaintiff in his
suit against the debtor, Uy Tina.^[5]
The decision in the suit between plaintiff and Uy
Tina rendered on February 4, 1954 awarded, as noted above, the sum of
P23,000.00 to plaintiff, but upon agreement of the parties defendant Uy Tina was given a period of six years within which to
pay, during which time he could hold and enjoy the fruits of such
properties.  The judgment debt, however,
remained unsatisfied and it was not until August 14, 1962 that there was an order for execution
based on such judgment.  In the
meanwhile, as far back as February 23,
1959, the very same property, subject of the attachment, had been
acquired by defendant Philippine National Bank in an execution sale resulting
from a judgment in its favor in a suit filed by it against the same debtor for
the amount of P8, 772,76.

On those facts, the lower court sustained plaintiff Tan Ching Ji, its decision of
February 5, 1963, specifically declaring “the first and prior attachment
lien in favor of the plaintiff, Tan Ching Ji, on the properties of the defendant Campua
Uy Tina in Civil Case No. 536 valid and subsisting,
and superior to the levy on execution and sale at public auction in favor of
the Philippine National Bank in Civil Case No. 467.  Consequently, the Court declares the levy on
execution, the auction sale, and the Certificate of Judicial Sale, Exhibit ‘H’,
rescinded and null and void and without any legal effect with respect only to
the properties of Campua Uy
Tina denominated in the said Exhibit ‘H’ as [first], [second], [third] and
[fourth parcels], * * * [which] shall be held and remain as they were before
the levy on execution and judicial sale on February 23, 1959, to await the
execution and satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 536, pursuant to Secs. 1 and 5 of Rule 59, Rules of Court.”^[6]

The principal legal question on which appellant Philippine
National Bank would seek a reversal of the aforesaid decision is the nullity of
an order of execution upon mere motion filed after five years from the date it
became final.  Its appeal is doomed to
failure.  Such a contention was
categorically rejected in Uy Tina v. Avila,^[7]
referred to at the opening of this opinion, with the very same debtor, Uy Tina, as petitioner and plaintiff-appellee
Tan Ching Ji as one of the
respondents.

The background facts of the above Uy
Tina certiorari proceeding are set forth in the opinion of Justice Makalintal thus: 
“In Civil Case No. 536 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Tan Ching Ji, plaintiff, vs. Campua Uy Tina, defendant, the parties executed a compromise
agreement, which was submitted to and approved by the Court in its decision
dated February 4, 1954.  Under that
agreement the defendant obligated himself to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P23,000.00 ‘without interest, within a period of six (6) years from date
hereof.’ It was also stipulated that certain properties which had been attached
as security would not be released until full payment and that the defendant
‘during the period of six (6) years, shall hold and fully enjoy the fruits of
said properties.’”^[8]
After which came the following recital: 
“On September 20, 1960,
after the six-year period had expired, plaintiff Tan Ching
Ji filed a motion for execution.  The motion was granted and the writ was
issued on August 14, 1962.  Defendant Campua Uy Tina moved to reconsider on September 13, 1962, announcing in his motion that
he was going to file an ordinary action to enjoin the enforcement of the
decision.  This he did on the following
September 18 (Civil Case No. 1843). On October
20, 1962 the court denied the motion for reconsideration in Civil
Case No. 536, and on January 3, 1963
another writ of execution was issued. 
Several other motions were subsequently filed by the defendant – to
quash the writ of execution or stay its enforcement – but they were all denied
by the Court in its order dated February
11, 1963.”^[9]

It was at that stage that Uy Tina filed
the petition for certiorari to have the writ of execution issued on August 14, 1962 and all subsequent
proceedings thereafter annulled and set aside. 
He invoked “Rule 39, Section 6, which provides that a judgment may
be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, and
that after the lapse of such time and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.  The contention is that since the decision
approving the compromise agreement was rendered on February 4, 1954, it could no longer be executed by mere
motion when respondent, plaintiff below, moved for that purpose on September 20, 1960, more than five
years having then elapsed.  Petitioner
would have respondent file an ordinary action in order to realize the amount to
which he is unquestionably entitled.”^[10]
In the answer of respondent Judge Avila, it was stated “that entry of
judgment in Civil Case No. 536 was made by the Clerk of Court only on February
5, 1960, because it was only then that the judgment had become final and executory, and consequently the writ of execution issued on
August 14, 1962 was well within the period of five years provided for in Rule
39, Section 6. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that said period should be
counted from the date the judgment became final, which was immediately upon its
rendition because it was a judgment on compromise.”^[11]

Then came the holding in the opinion of Justice Makalintal, speaking for the Court:  “The uncontradicted
statement of respondent Judge that judgment was entered only in 1960 should be
sufficient to dispose of this petition on the basis of the literal terms of
Rule 39, Section 6, as invoked by petitioner. 
But even irrespective of the date of entry of judgment, the decisive
issue here is not when the judgment became final in the sense that no appeal therefrom could be taken, but when it became executory in the sense that it could already be
enforced.  For it would be idle to speak
of execution or to try to obtain a writ for that purpose if the judgment was
not yet enforceable.  Rule 39, Section 6,
in providing that a judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry, clearly and logically contemplates the usual situation
wherein such judgment is susceptible of execution or enforcement the moment it
acquires the character of finality.”^[12]

There can be no disputing the validity of the conclusion reached
by us in the Uy Tina decision:  “Could defendant, petitioner here, be
compelled to comply with his obligation under the judgment and, upon failure to
do so, could his properties be levied upon, at any time within six (6) years
from the rendition of the judgment on February 4, 1954?  The answer is obvious.  He was given that period within which to
pay.  His obligation was one with a term
and the term was indubitably for his benefit, as shown by the fact that the
obligation carried no interest liability and that in the meantime he continued
in possession and enjoyment of the properties which were under attachment for
purposes of security.  Under Article 1193
of the Civil Code an obligation with a term is demandable only when the term
expires.  Had respondent demanded payment
from petitioner before the expiration of the term given to him, he could very
well have refused to pay on the ground that his obligation had not yet become
due.  A writ of execution would have been
as futile.  Since such writ could only
have been effectively issued after the lapse of six (6) years from February 4, 1954, respondent court
committed neither error nor abuse of discretion when he did issue it upon
motion on August 14, 1962
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 6.”^[13]

The question has thus been definitely set at rest.  The compelling force of the above decision
leaves appellant without any support for his stand.  The decision on appeal is not vitiated
therefore by the allegations in the three related assigned errors that the
order of execution in 1962 is without legal basis as the judgment in favor of
plaintiff had ceased to be enforceable by a mere motion under Section 6 of Rule
39.  Nor would it call for a reversal of
the appealed decision even if the first assigned error to the effect that the
lower court should have allowed an amendment of the answer of appellant to include
additional affirmative defenses, since even if it were thus, the authoritative
force exerted by Uy Tina v. Avila precludes a
reversal of the appealed decision.

In the appealed decision, however, the lower court declared
“the levy on execution, the auction sale, and the Certificate of Judicial
Sale, Exhibit ‘H’, rescinded and null and void and without any legal effect
with respect only to the properties of Campua Uy Tina denominated in the said Exhibit ‘H’ as [first],
[second], [third] and [fourth parcels], * * * [which] shall be held and remain
as they were before the levy on execution and judicial sale on February 23,
1959, to await the execution and satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No.
536, pursuant to Secs. 1 and 5 of Rule 59, Rules of
Court.”^[14]
It should not have gone that far.  It
suffices that such “levy on execution, the auction sale, and the
certificate of Judicial Sale, Exhibit ‘H’,” be deemed as subject to the
rights of the plaintiff Tan Ching Ji
by virtue of the prior and superior attachment lien, which he may now enforce
according to law.

WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of February 5, 1963 is affirmed, with the
modification above set forth.  With costs
against appellant Philippine National Bank.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., in the result.

Makasiar, J., no part.

^[1] L-20900,
May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 37.

^[2]
Sec. 6 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, reads in full:  “Execution by motion or by
independent action. – A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.”

^[3]
The other defendants in the lower court were the then Sheriff ex-officio of Cotabato, Juanito Mapalo, and the debtor, Campua Uy Tina, petitioner in the aforementioned certiorari
proceeding and a debtor, who owed money to both plaintiff and defendant
Philippine National Bank.

^[4]
Civil Case No. 536 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.

^[5]
The parcels of land were described thus: 
“Tax Declaration No. 9194 – A parcel of land situated in the
Barrio Lupapak, Municipality of Dulawan,
Province of Cotabato, Bounded on the North by Zainal Guiaman, on the East by Guiaman, on the South by Ikot,
and on the West by Ala River, containing an area of 60.0000 hectares, with a
total assessed value of P14,230.00; Tax Declaration No. 5629 – A parcel
of land situated in the Barrio of Reina-Regente,
Municipality of Dulawan, Province of Cotabato, Bounded on the North by Rio Grande de Mindanao,
on the East by same Rio Grande de Mindanao, on the South by Dr. Alejandro
Segovia, and on the West by Datu Piang,
containing an area of 70.0000 hectares, with an assessed value of P20,600.00; A
two-story commercial and residential building constructed on the land of the
owner, Campua Uy Tina,
situated at Dulawan, Cotabato,
with an assessed value of P15,500.00 under Tax Dec. No. 11704 in the name of
said owner; A commercial lot situated in Dulawan, Cotabato, bounded on the NE- Dulawan
Mun. Street, on the SE-Proposed Mun.
Street, on the SW-Lot No. Ab, and on the NW-Lot of Chio To, with an assessed value of P1,120.00 under Tax Dec.
No. 7106 in the name of Campua Uy
Tina.”

^[6]
Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 139-141.

^[7] L-20900,
May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 37.

^[8] Ibid.,
p. 37.

^[9] Ibid.,
p. 38.

^[10] Ibid.

^[11] Ibid.,
pp. 38-39.

^[12] Ibid.,
p. 39.

^[13] Ibid.,
pp. 39-40.

^[14] Ibid.,
p. 141.