THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO AGBOT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Charged with murder in the
Court of First Instance of Davao Oriental, Antonio Agbot was, after due trial, convicted of the crime charged,
and sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Leona Agbot Subat, in the
sum of P12,000.00.  Hence this mandatory
review of the death sentence.

The facts upon which
appellant was convicted, as quoted from the People’s brief are as follows:

At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 8, 1972, the
accused Antonio Agbot went to the house of his sister
Leona Agbot, married to Asisclo
Subat, in sitio Panganudan, barrio Lamiawan, Carraga, Davao Oriental, and
demanded from her the return of his twelve-year old daughter Milagrosa, who had been under the care and custody of Leona
Agbot Subat since she was
two years old.  Leona refused to
surrender the child to the accused because of her sacrifices and expenses in
the upbringing and education of Milagrosa.  The accused left angrily, saying —
“tighten your belt”, a phrase which, in the custom of the Mandayan tribe to which they belong, meant “something
bad will be forthcoming to you not long from now.” (tsn,
pp. 45-47, Mar. 26, 1973)

“At about 7:30 o’clock
in the evening of October 8, 1972,
while Asisclo Subat and
Francisco Baucan, step-son of the victim, were
relaxing at the porch of their house, and Leona Agbot
Subat was preparing supper in the kitchen, a gun
explosion was heard.  Asisclo
Subat and Francisco Baucan
tried to ascertain where the gun report came from.  Suddenly, Francisco called out — “Mama,
mama,” directing his call to his step-mother Leona Subat
who came rushing from the kitchen, wounded and bleeding on the right
breast.  In a few seconds, the latter
dropped on the floor and ex­pired.  (tsn, pp. 48-50, Mar.
26, 1973)

“At about 5:00 o’clock
in the following morning, October 9,
1972, Francisco Baucan, who was a
councilor of the place, went to barrio captain Pacifico
Sobiaco and reported the incident.  The latter sent a note to Patrolman Manuel Quiros who was assigned in a nearby police checkpoint and,
together, they proceeded to the house of the victim.  (tsn, pp. 5-6, Mar, 26, 1973) A joint investigation
was conducted by Sobiaco and Pat. Quiros.  They found the cadaver already dressed up and
ready for burial.  They also saw gunshot
wounds on the right breast of the deceased. 
(tsn, pp. 6-7, id.) Patrolman Quiros drew a sketch (Exh. D)
indicating the place where the victim was found dead and the location of the
wounds sustained by the deceased.  (tsn, pp. 117-118, June
21, 1973) No post-mortem examination was conducted on the cadaver
of Leona Subat.

“While thus conducting their investigation in the house of the
victim, the accused arrived thereat and admitted to Sobiaco
that he was the one who shot the victim using a “paltik”
shotgun.  (tsn,
pp. 11-12, 16-18, Mar. 26, 1973)
Whereupon, Sobiaco ordered two of his barrio
councilmen, Luis Ligasan and Adolfo Benaning, who were present to proceed to the house of the
accused and get the firearm.  After
getting the firearm, the same was shown to the accused who identified it as the
weapon he used in shooting the deceased. 
(tsn, pp. 8-13, Mar. 26, 1973) Thereafter, Barrio Captain Sobiaco turned over the shotgun and empty shell, as well as
the person of the accused to Patrolman Quiros (tsn, pp. 23-24, Mar.
26, 1973).

“On October 16, 1972,
appellant executed an extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of
Caraga (Exh. C) which was
subscribed and sworn to by him before Municipal Judge Manuel B. Castro.  (tsn, pp. 107-108,
June 21, 1973; pp. 34-35, Mar. 26, 1973)”

From the fact that no
post-mortem examination was made, nor was a ballistic examination conducted,
appellant would dispute the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction.  Thus, he would claim that no
competent proof was adduced that the wounds were caused by a gunshot, or that
assuming that they were, the home-made gun (paltik)
belonging to appellant was the gun that fired the shots.

That a gun explosion was
heard just seconds before the deceased was wounded while she was alone in the
kitchen is by itself an almost undisputable evidence that the wounds were
caused by that same gunshot.  No one was
seen near her who could have inflicted the wounds with a weapon that could find
its mark only if the victim was within physical reach of the assailant.  Only a gun could have caused the wounds which
can reach its target even from an appreciable distance.

The wounds themselves, as seen by the state witnesses,
particularly Barrio Captain Pacifico Sobiaco and Patrolman Manuel Quiros,
were readily described by them as gunshot wounds, one as big as one and
one-half inches in diameter and six (6) smaller ones obviously caused by
pellets of a bullet fired from appellant’s kind of a gun, a shotgun.  There can hardly be any ground for doubt as
to their competence in identifying the wounds as caused by a gun as distinguished
from one caused by a sharp-bladed weapon, much less a blunt instrument.  The existence of exits of the wounds, as
testified to by Patrolman Quiros^[1]
bolsters the conclusion or finding that the wounds sustained by the victim were
gun-inflicted.

In an effort to discredit
the testimony of Patrolman Quiros and Barrio Captain Sobiaco, appellant points to Patrolman Quiros
allegedly saying that he saw one (1) big penetrating wound while Barrio Captain
Sobiaco, as well as Asisclo
Subat, declared he saw six (6).  An examination of Patrolman Quiros‘ testimony will show that he did not say that he saw
only one (1) wound with no other wounds sustained by the deceased.  The small wounds caused evidently by tiny
pellets bursting out of a shotgun bullet may not have been noticed by Patrolman
Quiros, and so, he made mention only of the one (1)
big penetrating wound.

The lack of ballistic
examination can neither detract from the weight of the evidence presented
showing that appellant’s gun was the offending weapon.  It fits the nature of the wounds inflicted on
the deceased, being a shotgun whose bullet emits pellets, and the empty shell
which was found with the shotgun (paltik) taken from
appellant’s house.  Ballistic experts are
not needed to establish the relation between the wounds and appellant’s “paltik” shotgun in the face of the evidence that the
weapon is admittedly one that belonged to appellant, and the empty shell found
in his house even smelled gun powders which was proof of recent firing.  The shotgun (Exh.
A) and the empty shell (Exh. B) were indeed retrieved
from appellant’s house the morning following the night of the shooting made
possible by appellant’s own admission of authorship of the shooting, without
which these objects could not have been traced to, and recovered from, his
house.

Appellant’s denial of having made the foregoing admission and of having mentioned anything about the
shotgun to Barrio Captain Sobiaco is unworthy of
belief.  If he did not make the admission
when confronted by the barrio captain at the victim’s own house, how could the
two (2) barrio councilmen, Luis Ligasan and Adolfo Benaning, have been sent to recover appellant’s firearm at
the latter’s house?  A fact related to
what part the weapon had in the killing and the person who actively played the
role in using it, must have surfaced.  No
other fact suggests itself more than the appellant’s owning the shooting when
confronted by the barrio captain to whom report of the shooting had been
earlier made, and to whom the only suspect was mentioned, together with the
circumstance that drew suspicion to appellant — the threat of harm befalling
the deceased with the meaningful words “tighten your belt.”

The verity of appellant’s
admission of guilt having been firmly established, the contention that the
confiscation or seizure of the gun was illegal, there being no search warrant
and its use as evidence is not
permissible, clearly becomes devoid of factual or legal basis.  With his confession, his voluntarily
surrendering the weapon with which he committed the offense would be but a
natural consequence of his having admitted guilt.  The taking of the gun from his house was,
therefore, with consent and acquiescence that would not constitute a violation
of the constitutional guaranty against the admissibility of illegally seized
objects as evidence against an accused.^[2]

Appellant’s claim of his
confession having been extracted by force and maltreatment would, likewise, be
completely unbelievable.  Having readily
admitted his guilt when confronted by the investigators right in the house of
the victim, the very presence of his own departed sister laying in state
perhaps unnerving him in his vile desire to conceal the truth, how could he
still try to deny and turn back from his earlier admission made to a barrio
official when he later was formally investigated by the police?  No less than the Municipal Judge Manuel B.
Castro, testified to appellant having answered in the affirmative when asked if
he was willing to swear to the truth of his confession^[3].

The confession itself, by
the facts with which it is so replete, which appellant alone could have
supplied and the obvious attempt to mitigate his liability by alleging that he
did the act in a fit of
vengeance because the victim was the one who ordered the killing of his brother
Ansog Agbot, bears the
earmarks of voluntariness.^[4] The police investigators could not have just
conceived of this alleged fact from pure imagination to be placed in
appellant’s confession, considering the extreme improbability of a sister
ordering the killing of a brother.  For
the motive of the killing, what should have found its way to the confession is
the incident just before the shooting when appellant hurled a threat at his
sister, as narrated by the victim’s husband to the barrio captain, had
appellant not been allowed full freedom to tell his story.

With appellant’s confession fulfilling all elements of
admissibility, and supported as it is by independent evidence of corpus delicti, which is the fact of the crime having been
committed,^[5]
together with the finding in appellant’s house of the weapon that undisputably inflicted the fatal wounds sustained by the
deceased, it would be futile to argue against the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, as counsel has tried to do, and
commendably so, had it not been for his manifest misreading of the
evidence.  Thus, he would aver that corpus
delicti has not been proven^[6]
when the fact of death due to foul means has been so undeniably established by
the lifeless body bearing wounds that undisputably
caused the death to the victim.

The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery and with
the aggravating circumstances of dwelling^[7]
and relationship, the victim being the sister of appellant.^[8]

Evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated against appellant it appearing that no time sufficient
for calm reflection of the consequences of the crime committed intervened
between planning and execution.^[9] Neither sex could be taken against appellant
there being no proof that there was deliberate intention to offend or insult
the sex of the victim.^[10]

While lack of instruction may not be appreciated in favor of
appellant as argued by counsel, the offense of taking one’s life being
forbidden by natural law and therefore within the instinctive knowledge and
feeling of an human being not deprived of reason,^[11]
appellant being a member of the cultural minority may be considered in his
favor, pursuant to Sec. 106 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu and entitle him, regardless of the attending
circumstances, to life imprisonment instead of death.^[12]
It is no legal obstacle to accord to him this benefit of the law because he
failed to invoke same in the court a quo, for in an appeal of a
criminal case, same is thrown open for a complete review of all errors, by
commission or omission, as may be imputable to the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is affirmed, but the
death sentence is hereby reduced to life imprisonment, taking also into account
the length of time he had already been in the death row.  Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
t.s.n. p. 117, June 21, 1973.

^[2]
See Rule 126, Sec. 12, Rules of Court; People vs. Malasugui,
63 Phil. 221.

^[3]
t.s.n., p. 38, March 26, 1973.

^[4]
People v. Viduya, 97 SCRA 666; People vs.
Laureta, 95 SCRA 166; People vs. Opiniano, 22 SCRA 177; People vs. Cruz, 73 Phil.
651.

^[5]
People v. Kiram, 93 SCRA 696; People v.
Abrera, 17 SCRA 771; People vs. Taruc, 16 SCRA 834.

^[6]
p. 27, Appellant’s Brief.

^[7]
People vs. Ompad,
et al., G. R. No. L-23513, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 750.

^[8]
People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362.

^[9]
People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572.

^[10]
People vs. Mangsat, 65 Phil. 548.

^[11]
People vs. Mutyat, G.R. Nos. 11255-56, Sept. 30, 1959.

^[12]
People vs. Pawin, 85 Phil. 528; People vs.
Disimban, 88 Phil. 120.