G.R. Nos. L-49017 and L-49024. August 30, 1983
RIZALINA GUEVARRA, ELIZABETH MACLEAN AND ZENAIDA MACLEAN, ASSISTED BY THEIR MOTHER, RIZALINA GUEVARRA, JOSEFINA DE GUZMAN, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND RAFAEL DE GUZMAN, AND JOHNNY L…
VASQUEZ, J.:
Private respondents Cristina C. Recio
and Roque Recio filed a
complaint dated October 31, 1973 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioners Rizalina
Guevarra, Elizabeth Maclean
and Zenaida Maclean,
represented by their mother, Rizalina Guevarra, Josefina de Guzman (assisted by her husband
Rafael de Guzman) and Johnny Lara on two principal causes of action, the first,
for the annulment of a deed of sale of a parcel of land and the improvements
thereon located in Makati, Rizal;
and the second, to annul two deeds of sale of certificates of stocks, or for
the recovery of the value thereof. They further prayed for the recovery of
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
The herein petitioners filed their answer to the said complaint
traversing the material allegations thereof and interposing a counterclaim. Subsequently,
petitioner Rizalina Guevarra
filed a supplemental counterclaim against private respondents, and a
third-party complaint against the Security Bank and Trust Company praying that
she and her brother, Antonio de Guzman, be declared joint owners of 2/3 of the
proceeds of Banker’s Acceptance Certificate No. 3355
and the interest thereon, which is in the possession and custody of the
third-party defendant bank. Both the supplemental counterclaim and third-party
complaint were admitted by the respondent trial court.
After the filing of the aforementioned pleadings, private
respondent Cristina C. Recto, on May
16, 1975, filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the first
and second causes of action alleged in the complaint. Attached to the said
motion are affidavits of both private respondents.
On May 30, 1975,
the Recios filed another motion to order the Security
Bank and Trust Company to pay the aforementioned Banker’s Acceptance
Certificate No. 3355 to private respondent Cristina C. Recio.
The said motion was granted by the respondent trial court then presided by
Judge Nicanor S. Sison (now
deceased) in an order dated June 3, 1975, which directed the Security Bank and
Trust Company to pay the full amount of the said certificate to private
respondent Cristina C. Recio upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P170,000.00.
On May 30, 1975,
the petitioners filed a motion for the inhibition of Judge Sison
on the ground that he was supposed to reach the compulsory retirement age of 70
years on June 4, 1975. (Original Record, Vol. II, p. 419.) The record does not show
any resolution of said motion for inhibition. It appears, however, that even
after the said motion for inhibition was filed, Judge Sison
continued to act on the case.
On June 3, 1975,
the petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for partial summary
judgment. On June 4, 1975,
Judge Sison resolved the said motion by rendering a
“Judgment”, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“(a) Under the first
cause of action, annulling the deed of sale Annex ‘A’ as well as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-349450 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to issue a new title in lieu thereof to plaintiff Cristina
C. Recio’s name;
(b) Under the second cause of action, annulling
the deeds of sales Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’ thereof as well as the transfer made as
a consequence thereof to defendant Josefina C. de Guzman and Rizalina Guevarra and directing
the corresponding corporation to cancel the stock certificates in the aforesaid
defendants’ names and issue new ones in lieu thereof to plaintiff Cristina C. Recio’s name and to deliver to, and/or transfer to the name
of, plaintiffs all of their fruits, be they stock or cash dividends;
(c) Ordering restoration of plaintiffs to the
rightful ownership of the subject properties and their fruits as above prayed
for being impossible by virtue of any sale or disposition thereof by
defendants, ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
fair market value of the properties sold or disposed of at the time of such
sale or disposition, which in any case should not be lower than P350,000.00 for
the house and lot, and P1,000,000.00 for the shares of stock, together with the
reimbursement of the value of the fruits thereof, be they stock or cash
dividends;
(d) Sentencing defendants Josefina C. de Guzman, Rizalina Guevarra, Rafael de
Guzman and Johnny Lara, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00;
(e) Ordering the same defendants to pay to
plaintiffs jointly and severally attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00.”
Judge Sison issued two other orders in
the case dated June 4 and 5, 1975. (Original Record, Vol. II,
pp. 436, 468, 469.) He subsequently resolved on June 6, 1975 a motion to raffle the case to
another branch of the court filed by private respondent Roque
Recio on June
4, 1975, on the ground that Judge Sison
“will soon retire.” (Ibid., p. 442.)[1]
A copy of the partial summary judgment was served on the
petitioners on June 6, 1975.
On July 7, 1975 (the last day of the period of appeal, July 6,
1975 being a Sunday), petitioners filed an omnibus motion for a reconsideration
of the summary judgment, the order of June 3, 1975 and two orders both dated
June 5, 1975. An opposition to the said omnibus motion was filed by the private
respondents on September 2, 1975.
The omnibus motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial
court in an order dated December 29,
1975 issued by the then Judge (later Justice) Onofre
Villaluz. The petitioners received a copy of the
order of denial on January 5, 1976.
The following day, or on January 6, 1976, the petitioners filed
their notice of appeal, a cash appeal bond, and a motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal for a period of not less than thirty days from
said date. Private respondents filed their opposition to the said motion for
extension of time to file record on appeal on the ground that the petitioners’
omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed after July 7, 1975. They countered with their own motion for the
execution of the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Judge Villaluz set the motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal for hearing on January 13 and 16, 1976, at which hearing the
parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence.
On May 24, 1976, the trial court, then presided by Judge Nelly L.
Romero Valdellon, issued an order denying the motion
of petitioners for extension of time to file record on appeal, and granting the
motion of private respondents for the execution of the summary judgment for the
reason that the said omnibus motion for reconsideration was not filed on July
7, 1975. On May 31, 1976,
on motion of the private respondents, Judge Valdellon
appointed respondent Sheriff Rene Salvador and respondent Bailiff Eustaquio Parada as Special
Sheriffs to enforce the writ of execution.
On June 10, 1976,
the petitioners filed two separate petitions in the former Court of Appeals for
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
docketed in said Court as CA-G.R. Nos. SP-05555 and SP-05618.
In a decision promulgated on September
20, 1977, the former 8th Division of the Court of Appeals, dismissed both petitions.[2]
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on September 27, 1977, a division of
five denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated September 12, 1978.[3]
The instant petition was filed in the Supreme Court to review the
aforementioned decision of the Court of Appeals and the resolution denying a
reconsideration of the same. The petition was given due course after the
respondents filed their comment to the same. The parties were required to
submit simultaneous memoranda which was duly complied
with.
The petitioners have raised the following issues:
The respondent courts committed a grave abuse of discretion (1)
in holding that the omnibus motion for reconsideration was not filed on July 7,
1975; (2) in ruling that a motion for reconsideration is essential before a
petition for certiorari could be instituted; (3) in issuing the order of
June 3, 1975 ordering the Security Bank and Trust Company to pay the full
amount of P250,000.00 under Security Bank and Trust Company Banker’s Acceptance
Certificate No. 3355 to private respondent Cristina C. Recto on a mere motion
and without any hearing; and (4) in rendering a summary judgment despite the
fact that controversial issues of facts are raised and disputed by the parties
in their respective pleadings.
The questioned decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
resolved the petitions filed in said court only on what it called the two vital
issues of the case, namely: (a) Whether or not the omnibus motion for
reconsideration was filed on July 7, 1975; and (b) Whether the petitioners’
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned orders of the
trial court was fatal. There was no discussion at all on the question of
whether or not the partial summary judgment was validly rendered, nor on the validity of the questioned order of June 3, 1975 regarding the payment of
the proceeds of the Banker’s Acceptance Certificate. The concentration of the
dissertation made by the trial court, the Court of Appeals and in the several
motions and memoranda of the private respondents was on the alleged lateness of
the filing of the omnibus motion for reconsideration which caused the summary
judgment to have become final and executory.
It is conceded that if the omnibus motion for reconsideration
was, indeed, filed on July 7, 1975
as averred by the petitioners, it was filed on time, and it would then be
improper for the trial court to rule that the said summary judgment had already
become final and executory. As aforestated,
the trial court required the presentation of evidence on this question and, on
the basis of the evidence adduced, it ruled that the
omnibus motion for reconsideration was not filed on July 7, 1975. The Court of Appeals merely
confirmed the said findings by adopting the same ipsisimis
verbis.
After a careful examination of the record.
We are frankly amazed at how the lower courts have arrived at said conclusion. In
attempting to show that the omnibus motion for reconsideration was not filed on
July 7, 1975, private respondents relied almost exclusively on the testimony of
private respondent Roque Recio
who declared that no motion for reconsideration was filed up to the close of
office hours on July 7, 1975, as attested to by a certification issued by
Marcelo Buenaventura, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, which reads as follows:
“‘TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the entry book of this Office,
no motion for reconsideration of the decision or notice of appeal has been filed
by the defendants in Civil Case No. 18522 of this Court, entitled ‘Cristina Recio, et al. vs. Josefina de Guzman, et al.
Pasig,
Rizal, July
7, 1975.
NICANOR G. SALAYSAY
Clerk of Court
By:
(Sgd.) MARCELO BUENAVENTURA
Sp. Deputy Clerk of Court’ “
The above certification was held to prevail over direct and clear
evidence of record which shows the seasonable filing of the omnibus motion for
reconsideration on July 7, 1975,
consisting of the following:
1. The rubber stamp imprinted on the first page
of the omnibus motion for reconsideration, bearing the date “7/7/75”
initialed by Amparo Varinuevo,
an employee of the Receiving Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court;
2. The testimony of Amparo
Varinuevo that she actually received the said motion
during office hours in the afternoon of July
7, 1975;
3. The testimony of Maria Antonio, Receiving and
Filing Clerk in the Office of the Clerk of Court that she saw the motion
inserted in the Entry Book during the first hour of July 8, 1975;
4. The entry of the omnibus motion in the record
book for July 7, 1975;
5. The testimony of Special Deputy Clerk of
Court Buenaventura explaining the certification issued by him;
6. The testimony of Atty. Romulo
Galapon, counsel for the petitioners that he actually
filed the omnibus motion in the afternoon of July 7, 1975; and
7. The registry receipt attached to the omnibus
motion for the copy mailed to the counsel for private respondents, bearing the
date of July 7, 1975. (Original record, Vol. II, p. 488.)
The following are excerpts from the testimonies of witnesses Varinuevo, Antonio and Buenaventura
who were presented by the petitioners in the trial court:
Varinuevo, on
direct examination:
“ATTY. GALAPON:
Q Mrs. Varinuevo, you stated that you are an employee of the CFI
of Rizal?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were
you already an employee of the CFI of Rizal on July 7, 1976?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Did you report that
date?
A Yes,
your Honor.
Q What
time did you report?
A 8:00 A.M.,
your Honor.
Q What
time did you leave at noon?
A 12:00 noon,
your Honor.
Q What
time did you report back?
A 1:00 P.M., your Honor.
Q What
time did you leave?
A 4:30
P.M., your Honor.
ATTY. GALAPON:
Q Between
the hours of 3:30 and 4:30 P.M. on July 7, 1975, do you remember what you did?
A Yes, sir. My table is in the
mezzanine. But between that time, when I came down, I
found out that somebody was filing something and because the clerk in charge –
the receiving clerk was not there, I learned that she went home to attend a
funeral, I pitched in and I received the pleading.
Q What
is the name of this clerk in charge?
A Maria Antonio.
Q Showing
you a pleading dated July 7, 1975,
consisting of 11 pages and appearing therein is a stamp pad of the CFI of Rizal, Pasig,
Rizal, and there is an initial on the same, will you
please identify this initial if you know it?
A That is my initial.
Q There
is the figure 7/7/75. Whose handwriting is that, if you know?
A Mine.
ATTY. GALAPON:
That is all.” (pp.
6-10, TSN, January 13, 1976.)
On cross-examination:
“Q In
this particular case, did you go down to receive the Omnibus Motion Atty. Galapon was filing?
A I
went down without knowing if there were filers there. But if there are filers,
I am supposed to pitch in and I found out there were filers and I pitched in
and received.
Q Aside
from the Omnibus Motion you received that date, July 7, 1975, did you receive
any other paper?
A Yes,
sir, I received others.
Q In
this particular case, did you go down to where the regular receiving clerk was
stationed just to receive this Omnibus motion filed by Atty. Galapon?
A Yes, sir.
Q How
did you know the Omnibus Motion was being filed?
A I
received that because it so happened I came down and sat down at the chair of
the receiving clerk who was absent to attend a funeral. A fellow and some other
fellows came, one at a time, filing their pleadings and I did the work and
received them.” (pp. 15-17, Ibid.)
On redirect:
“ATTY. GALAPON:
Q Mrs.
Varinuevo, you stated that you received pleadings
including the Omnibus Motion for reconsideration. Did you enter these pleadings
you received in the civil entry book on July 7, 1975 before you left?
A No,
sir, I did not enter anything. Nene will be the one
to register the same. And the following day she recorded it.
Q By
Nene, you are referring to Mrs. Antonio, the regular
filing clerk?
A Yes, sir.” (p.
41, Ibid.)
Maria Antonio, in turn, declared as
follows:
“xxx xxx xxx
Q Do
you know where you were in the afternoon about 3:00 P.M. on July 7, 1975?
A At 3:30 P.M. I asked Mr. Buenaventura
that I will leave because I will attend a funeral.
Q What
time?
A 3:30
P.M.
Q Did
you report to the office the following day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What
is your duty in the office of the clerk of Court?
A To receive pleadings.
Q When
you arrived on July 8, 1975 the next day immediately upon arrival, do you
recall what you did?
A At
8:00 A.M. exactly I recorded the pleadings in my drawer and the ones inserted
in the record book.
Q Where
did you record them?
A Civil Record book.
Q Did
you bring the record book for July 8 or 7, 1975?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will
you show the Honorable Court what you made, according to you, upon arrival on
July 8, 1975?
A Here, sir. (Witness
showing page 46 and a date written in red July 7, 1975, Monday.)
Q Go
over all the entries that date and determine whether there is such Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration in civil case No. 18522.
A Here, sir. (Witness
pointing to page 54 showing the first line.) 18522-Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration.
Q This
entry was made for the date July 7, 1975?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. GALAPON:
That is all.” (pp. 44-48, Ibid.)
Explaining how he happened to issue the certification which had
been so ponderously relied upon by the private respondents, the Special Deputy
Clerk of Court Buenaventura, declared on direct examination:
“xxx xxx xxx
Q Showing
you a certification signed by Marcelo Buenaventura, now marked as Exhibit A for
plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for defendant, will you go over the same and tell this
Honorable Court what relation has this certification to the certification you
issued to Atty. Recio about 4:30 P.M. on July 7,
1975?
A This is exactly the certification I
issued on July 7, 1975.
Q You
stated in this certification that according to the entries in the book of your
office no motion for reconsideration was filed in case no. 18522. What do you
mean by according to the entry book. Did you look at
the entry book of the office?
A I
looked at the listing in the entry book and here I based my certification.
Q You
did not look at the papers that were placed between the leaves of the entry
book and the rush book?
A I
looked it over inside the entry book but not in the rush book.
Q You
based it in the entry book and it did not show a motion for reconsideration was
filed in case 18522?
A Yes.
Q. Did
you eventually come to know a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
defendants in this case on July 7, 1975?
A I
found out about that the following day.
Q You
are referring to July 8, 1975?
A The following day.
Q How
did you find out that there was in fact a motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendant in civil case no. 18522 on July 7, 1975?
A I
remember that somebody inquired for the same motion and . . . I don’t remember
the person exactly, and again I consulted the record and I saw a motion was
listed now.
Q What
time did you look for the motion for reconsideration which was filed by the
defendant on July 7, 1975?
A I
think it was between 9:00 & 10:00.
ATTY. GALAPON:
That is all.” (pp. 91-96, ibid.)
On cross-examination, Buenaventura declared:
“xxx xxx xxx
Q You
stated in answer to the question of Atty. Galapon,
that with respect to the Omnibus motion in question, you saw that only on July
8 or 9?
A July 8, the following day.
Q But
you did not see it on July 7?
A I
did not.
Q In spite of the fact that you had gone over
the entry book which was kept in the drawer of Mrs. Antonio?
A That is right.
Q You
did not search the leaves of the rush book on top of the table?
A The rush book was not on top of the
table of Mrs. Antonio.
Q Where
was it?
A I
don’t know.
Q Did
you look for it?
A I
did not look for the rush book but the entry book.
Q Was
it the request of Atty. Recto that you looked for the motion for
reconsideration in that book?
A Nobody
asked me to look in any particular book.
Q But
he asked whether a motion was filed in this particular case.
A That is true.
Q Did
you not feel it necessary to consult the rush book also?
A I
did not think it was necessary because . . .
Q You
did not feel it necessary in spite of the fact that you were going to issue a
certification?
A Yes.
Q And
you issued Exhibit A?
A Precisely,
the reason I stated in my certification, the statement is in accordance with
the entry book, I was not sure whether there were several papers which remained
not entered.
Q You
did not look for it in the rush book in spite of the fact that Atty. Recio was there since 3:00 P.M.?
A No.” (pp.
100-103, Ibid.)
The above testimonies of Amparo Varinuevo, Maria Antonio and Marcelo Buenaventura all
tended to show that the certification issued by Buenaventura to the effect that
no motion for reconsideration was filed as of July 7, 1975 were merely to
attest to the fact that no such motion was listed in the Entry Book of the
Office of the Clerk of Court on said date. The actual filing of the motion
before the close of office hours on July 7, 1975 had been categorically
testified to by Amparo Varinuevo
and Maria Antonio. They further explained the reason why, despite such filing,
no entry of the same was made in the Entry Book until the following day. Buenaventura
himself made it clear in his testimony that his certification was based alone
from what appeared in the Entry Book. The failure to enter the motion in
whatever book the same is to be registered does not necessarily mean that the
motion was not filed at all. What the rule requires is the filing of the motion
within the proper time; not the actual entry thereof which is merely a matter
of practice and a pure physical act on the part of the employee charged with
such duty. There is no rule requiring entry of such motion, much less to enter
the same on the same date it was filed.
We are accordingly of the view that the lower courts committed
palpable error in arriving at the conclusion that the petitioners failed to
file their omnibus motion for reconsideration on July 7, 1975. In the face of
the overwhelming evidence presented by the petitioners to sustain such fact,
the lower courts preferred to believe the testimony of private respondent Roque Recio whose bias is
undeniable, being a party-in-interest, and who could only declare negatively
that the omnibus motion was not filed until up to the close of office hours on July 7, 1975. The lower courts
discredited the testimonies of Varinuevo and Antonio,
as well as of Atty. Galapon, for alleged
inconsistencies as to the exact time of the filing of the omnibus motion and as
to whether the same was inserted in the Entry Book or in the Rush Book being
kept by Antonio. Capital was made of the circumstance that the hour of filing
was not indicated in the rubber stamp showing the date of filing, as required
by Section 1, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as if such circumstance would
negate the fact of filing. This glaring misappreciation
of the evidence may not be justified on the stereotype excuse that findings of
the lower courts may not be disturbed on appeal, as if such a doctrine is
absolute and inviolable to the extent of being a shield against the search of
truth and a weapon for the perpetration of injustice.
Another intriguing aspect of this case is the total disregard by
the lower courts of the issue regarding the propriety of the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court. This issue was raised by the petitioners in their
omnibus motion for reconsideration (Original Record, Vol. II, pp. 477, 481), as
well as in the opposition of the private respondents to the same. (Ibid., pp. 514, 521.) It was likewise raised in the
respondent Court of Appeals, as well as in the instant petition. Strangely, the
Court of Appeals passed on said issue sub silencio,
and limited its discussion to the question of whether or not the omnibus motion
for reconsideration was filed on July 7, 1975. The private respondents now
contend that the validity of the summary judgment may no longer be touched upon
in the instant proceedings, inasmuch as said judgment had already become final
and executory and may now be considered as “the
law of the case.” (Memorandum of respondents, Rollo, pp. 90-93.)
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a
summary judgment when, on motion of the plaintiff after the answer to the
complaint had been filed, it would appear, during the hearing of the motion for
such a judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits that, except as to the amount of damages,
“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the winning
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Section 3, Rule 34,
Rules of Court.) Conversely, the rendition of summary judgment is not justified
when the defending party tenders vital issues which call for the presentation
of evidence. (Villanueva vs. National Marketing Corporation, 28 SCRA
729.) As was observed in the Viajar vs. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684:
“Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt
as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties,
neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by
the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial.
An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary
judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a
summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party
supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with
notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion
supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other documents (Section 3, Rule
34). In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only
be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the
court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a
party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who moves
for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
unsubstantial as not to consitute a genuine issue for
trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the
movant.”
The case at bar may not, even by the most liberal or strained
interpretation, be considered as one not involving genuine issues which need
the presentation of evidence to determine which of two conflicting assertions
of fact is correct. A cursory examination of the pleadings will show that the
private respondents’ causes of action are to annul documents of sale which were
allegedly executed by private respondent Cristina C. Recio
on the ground of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and due influence and
intimidation. These allegations were all denied in the answer filed by the
petitioners. The issue thus raised may not be categorized as
not genuine so as to dispense with a formal trial and to authorize the
rendition of summary judgment.
The invalidity of the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court stems not only from the circumstance that such a kind of judgment is not
proper under the state of the pleadings filed in the case, but also from the
failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a
judgment. The motion does not contain a notice of hearing. After the private
respondents filed a motion to set the private respondents’ supplemental
counterclaim for hearing on May 22,
1975, Judge Sison scheduled the said motion
for hearing on May 28, 1975
“to coincide with the hearing of the motion for partial summary judgment
dated May 16, 1975 filed by
the plaintiffs set for hearing on the same date.” Attys. Ferry and Galapon, counsels for the herein petitioners, were served
with the said order of Judge Sison on May 25, 1975
and May 24, 1975, respectively, or only four and five days, respectively,
before the date of the hearing. This is contrary to the requirement under
Section 3 of Rule 34 that a motion for summary judgment “shall be served
at least ten days before the time specified for the hearing.” The minutes
of the hearing held on May 28, 1975 show that the counsel for the herein
petitioners prayed that they be given up to June 3, 1975 within which to file
appropriate pleadings, after which the motion for summary judgment shall be
deemed submitted for resolution. (Original Record, Vol. II,
p. 412.)
On June 3, 1975,
the petitioners filed their opposition to the motion for partial summary
judgment contending principally that such a kind of judgment may not be
rendered in the case inasmuch as their answer tenders genuine issues which need
a trial on the merits. (Ibid., pp. 438-441.) No
counter-affidavits were filed by the petitioners but in their aforementioned
opposition, they argued why a summary judgment is not proper in the case. On
June 4, 1975, the day following the filing of the opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, the court rendered its summary judgment in the case, which
granted not only the relief prayed for in the private respondents’ first and
second causes of action but also an award of damages which is not even prayed
for in any of the said causes of action.
As earlier observed, the burden of the
discussion in this case centered on the timeliness of the filing of the omnibus
motion for reconsideration of the said summary judgment. Viewing this
issue from another angle, it may rightly be said that such elaborate and
elongated argumentation on this question is hardly material to resolve the
issue at bar. Both parties appear to have assumed the correctness of the proposition
that the summary judgment in question was appealable;
hence, their dispute as to whether or not the period of appeal had lapsed or
not by the time the motion for the reconsideration of the decision was filed. We
consider this assumption to be erroneous.
It will be noted that the judgment in question is a “partial
summary judgment.” It was rendered only with respect to the private respondents’
first and second causes of action alleged in their complaint. It was not
intended to cover the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the
supplementary counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the private
respondents, nor the third-party complaint filed by the petitioners against the
Security Bank and Trust Company. A partial summary judgment “is not a
final or appealable judgment.” (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189, citing several cases.)
“It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall
be deemed established for the trial of the case.” (Francisco,
Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.) The nature of a partial summary
judgment is expressly provided for in Section 4 of Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court, which reads as follows:
“SEC. 4. Cases not fully
adjudicated on motion. – If on motion under this rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings
and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall
be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.”
The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court being
merely interlocutory and not a final judgment, it is puerile to discuss
whether the same became final and executory due to
the alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed period of of appeal. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal
from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment
that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the
material facts on which a substantial controversy exists. This is on the
assumption that the partial summary judgment was validly rendered which, as
shown above, is not true in the case at bar.
The above discussion renders it unnecessary to resolve the issue
of whether the two separate petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
filed by the petitioners in the former Court of Appeals should have been
dismissed for the reason that the petitioners did not file a motion for the
reconsideration of the judgment and orders therein sought to be annulled. Moreover,
the circumstances obtaining in this case, particularly the fact that the trial
court had already ordered the execution of the partial summary judgment and the
questioned orders of the trial court, necessitated the recourse to the urgent
remedy pursued by the petitioners. The situation easily falls under one of the
recognized exceptions to the rule that a motion for reconsideration should
first be availed of before filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus.
We also deem it unnecessary to discuss, in this instance, the
validity of the questioned order of June 3, 1975 which ordered the Security
Bank and Trust Company to pay the full amount of P250,000.00 of Banker’s
Acceptance Certificate No. 3355 to private respondent Cristina C. Recio upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P170,000.00. It appears that the motion of private respondent Cristina C. Recio praying for such relief was duly served on
petitioners five days before the date was set for hearing, in which the
petitioners’ appeared but failed to file any opposition. In any event, it
further appears that the giving of the proceeds of the said Banker’s Acceptance
Certificate No. 3355 was not an adjudication of the ownership thereof in favor
of private respondent Cristina C. Recio. Her
ownership of the said sum was provisional and conditioned upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P170,000.00 which is more than
the value of the 2/3 share of the said Banker’s Acceptance Certificate No. 3355
claimed by petitioners Rizalina Guevarra
and her brother, Antonio de Guzman. The bond expressly stipulates that it is
conditioned to answer for whatever damages that the Security Bank and Trust
Company or any of the petitioners may suffer “in the event that said
Cristina Recio is declared not entitled to the said
amount in the instant case or any other case.”
It may not be said, therefore, that the questioned order of June 3, 1975 was an
adjudication of the supplemental counterclaim filed by petitioner Rizalina Guevarra, nor of the
third-party complaint filed by her against the Security Bank and Trust Company.
As already mentioned above, the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial
court did not include such claims which still remain pending and unresolved. Petitioner
Rizalina Guevarra may
properly seek to set aside or modify the said order of June 3, 1975 in the trial court taking cognizance
of Civil Case No. 18522.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and
setting aside the decision of the former Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos.
SP-05555 and SP-05618; and annulling the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court in Civil Case No. 18522, and the orders dated May 24, 1976 and May 31, 1976 issued therein. The private respondents shall
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
There is nothing clear in the record as to the exact date when Judge Sison reached the compulsory retirement age. In petitioners’
motion for inhibition, they alleged that Judge Sison
was to retire on June 4, 1975.
(Ibid., p. 419.) In their omnibus motion
for reconsideration, petitioners stated that Judge Sison
was retiring on “June 5 or 7, 1975.” (Ibid.,
pp. 477-478.) The record does not reveal any actuation on the part of
Judge Sison after June 6, 1975.
[2]
Justice Samuel Reyes as Ponente, concurred in by Justices Emilio A. Gancayco
and Mama D. Busran.
[3]
Justice Samuel Reyes as Ponente, concurred in by Justices Emilio A. Gancayco
and Jose Jimenez. Justice Buenaventura de la Fuente
concurred in the result, with Justice Busran writing
a dissenting opinion.