TEODORICO B. SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET. AL., RESPONDENT.

Adriano
Calisin, et al. filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a
complaint for unfair labor practice against respondent alleging that
being in the employ of the latter as agricultural laborers they were
separated from the service on April 5, 1956 for the reason that they
have affiliated themselves with the Casaca Peasant Union contrary to
the warning given to them by a representative of respondent. Respondent
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
contending that since complaints were all employed in his hacienda
as agricultural laborers their complaints, if any, does not come within
the purview of Republic Act No. 875 and, consequently, it is beyond
the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Action on this motion having
been deferred until the case is tried on the merits, respondent filed
his answer wherein he claimed that the complainants were merely casual
laborers and not permanent tenants for they were merely paid per hour
and that he never interferred with their desire to join a labor union
for as a matter of fact, all his tenants in the hacienda were all members of the Casaca Peasant Union. He asked for damages and for the dismissal of the complaints.

Issues having been joined, hearing was held during which both parties presented their evidence. Thereafter, the court a quo
rendered decision holding that it has jurisdiction over the case even
if complainants, are agricultural laborers and, finding respondent
guilty of the charge, ordered him to reinstate complainants, except
those who withdrew, to their former positions, without loss of
seniority, with payment of their back wages from their dismissal up to
their reinstatement. Respondent interposed the present petition for
review.

It is undisputed that complainants were agricultural
laborers for at the time they filed their complaint they were working,
in the hacienda of respondent devoted to agricultural
purposes having an area of 500 hectares. Though it has around 72
tenants working in the hacienda under the leasehold systems the same is
not however mechanized. Only 10 hectares thereof were under the
administration of petitioner which were devoted to the cultivation of
coconuts, coffee, citrus, bananas and other agricultural products.

The
question to be determined is: considering that complainants are
agricultural laborers in the legal sense can their claim relative to an
unfair labor practice committed by petitioner be filed with the Court
of Industrial Relations? In other words, can the latter court take
cognizance of this claim under Republic Act No. 875 considering that
the complainants are agricultural laborers?

We are inclined
to uphold the negative view not only because an agricultural laborer
does not come within the purview of the word employee defined in
Section 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875; but also because any matter that
may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the
Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic
Act No. 2263), and any controversy that may arise between them as an
incident of their relationship comes under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Agrarian Relations created” by Republic Act No. 1267.
Thus, elaborating on the scope that the word “employee” should have as
defined din Section 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875, this Court made the
following comment:

“The same thing may be
said of the term. ’employee’ under said Wagner Act. It contains several
exemptions, such as any individual employed in the domestic service or
any person employed by his parent or spouse. Such exemptions axe absent
under the term ’employee’ used in our Industrial Peace Act; and yet
those exempted under the Wagner Act’s definitions of employer and
employee are obviously and clearly entitled to exception, or exemption
under our own Industrial Peace Act. For instance, there can be no
question that under our Industrial Peace Act, the Republic or any
political division or subdivision, like a province or municipality,
must and should also be excluded from the definition of employer.
Similarly, under the term ’employee’ of our law, agricultural laborers
or individuals employed in the domestic service, like private or
domestic drivers, housemaids, kitchen help, etc., should be excluded.
From this, we can logically conclude that our Legislature, in drafting
the law, particularly the portion defining employer and employee, did
not deem it necessary or advisable to make the obvious and necessary
exemptions or exceptions, but left it to the courts for interpretation
and application. For this reason, the cases decided by the United
States Federal courts, interpreting the Wagner Act as regards employer
and employee, are not applicable.” (Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos, 102 Phil., 1080; Italics supplied.)

With
regard to our conclusion that the present controversy comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations, suffice it
to state that the latter court was created for “the enforcement of all
laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all
agricultural lands under any system of cultivation” (Section 1,
Republic Act 1267, as amended by Republic Act 1409) , and was given
exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines “to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle all questions, matters, controversies,
or disputes involving all those relationships established by law which
determine the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land where one of the parties works the land” (Section 7, Ibid.)
Complainants, therefore, should have lodged their complaint with the
agrarian court for the redress of their grievance considering this
broad power given to it by law even if nothing is said therein relative
to unfair labor practice. The subsequent enactment of Republic Act No.
2263 which grants to agricultural workers the right to file an action
of this nature merely serves to confirm this jurisdiction of the
agrarian court. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that the
industrial court has improperly assumed jurisdiction over the present
case for it comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the agrarian
court.

Wherefore, the order subject of review is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, JJ., in the result.