RODOLFO ANTIPOLO, PETITIONER, VS. EUGENIA DELA RAMA, RESPONDENT.

Antipolo versus Dela Rama

The Case

This is the case of Antipolo versus Dela Rama. Eugenia Dela Rama sued Rodolfo Antipolo for ejectment, claiming that he was occupying a portion of her land in Quezon City by her mere tolerance and without paying rent. Antipolo answered that his house stood on a different lot, which he was buying on installments from Dela Rama's own brother. The case matters because the Supreme Court reminds every suitor that an ejectment complaint can only reach the property described in the plaintiff's title, and that the burden of proving the fact alleged rests on the party who alleges it. It is a compact lesson on cause of action, on the identity of the subject property, and on the burden of proof.

Procedural History

Dela Rama commenced the action in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Quezon City. The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered judgment for her, ordering Antipolo and all persons claiming rights under him to surrender and vacate the premises, described as portions of lot 153-A-21-A and lot 153-A-22 situated at the corner of Camia and Sampaguita Streets in the Ramirez Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City. It also ordered him to pay 3,000 pesos per month starting November 2001 until he vacated, plus 20,000 pesos in attorney's fees and the costs of suit.

Antipolo appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, in Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court in a decision dated March 25, 2003, adopting the dispositive portion of the appealed decision and denying the appeal. It found that Antipolo failed to show proof that he was occupying another lot, doubted the photocopied contract of purchase, and held that the receipts did not support his claim of installment payments.

Antipolo then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, assigning as errors the finding that Dela Rama's cause of action was established, the failure to determine the exact location of his house, the failure to hold that the 59 square meters were sold to him by Marcial Ramirez through Dela Rama's facilitation, and the failure to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of personality on Dela Rama's part.

Facts

Eugenia Dela Rama owned lot 153-A-21-A and lot 153-A-22, both located at the corner of Camia Street and Sampaguita Street in the Ramirez Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon City. She claimed that in 1990 she discovered that Rodolfo Antipolo was occupying a portion of her land, where he had erected his shanty. After she confronted him, they agreed that she would let him rent for 3,000 pesos a month, with the promise that he would vacate upon demand. She claimed that he stopped paying rent, and that he refused her verbal demand to leave on or before October 31, 2001. She then filed the ejectment suit.

Antipolo's defense was that his house stood not on her land but on lot 153-A-21-B, more particularly at 4-C Rosal Street in the same subdivision. He said he had bought that property, together with one Alfredo Lutosquien, from Marcial Ramirez, who was Dela Rama's brother. The contract of purchase was executed only between Ramirez and Lutosquien, but Antipolo paid his installments for his portion, with Dela Rama herself acting as her brother's collecting agent and issuing the receipts. He presented those receipts, his billing statements sent to his Rosal Street address, and his transactions showing that address as his true residence. He added that in 1987 Dela Rama told him to treat the receipts as receipts for rentals, and that he refused, insisting that she was not the lawful owner of the property.

The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court both ruled for Dela Rama, and Antipolo elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not Dela Rama's cause of action for ejectment was sufficiently established, given that her certificates of title covered lots different from the lot where Antipolo's house stood.
• Whether or not the lower courts erred in failing to determine the exact residence and location of Antipolo's house on the basis of the evidence of both parties.
• Whether or not the 59 square meters were sold to Antipolo by Marcial Ramirez through the facilitation of Dela Rama.
• Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action against Antipolo and for lack of personality on the part of Dela Rama to sue him.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

This is the provision the Court invokes to place the burden on Dela Rama, as plaintiff, to prove the fact she alleged, namely that Antipolo occupied her land by her tolerance.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the cause of action was not established. The complaint for ejectment could not extend to the lot where Antipolo's house stood, because Dela Rama's property was different from that property. Her certificates of title referred only to lot 153-A-21-A and lot 153-A-22, not to lot 153-A-21-B where Antipolo's house was unquestionably located. Her complaint placed her property at the corner of Camia and Sampaguita Streets, while Antipolo's answer placed his address at 4-C Rosal Street, a fact amply substantiated by billing statements from Meralco and Ayala Life directed to him at that address. That evidence competently proved that he occupied a property different from hers.

On the second issue, the Court held that Antipolo had a right to be in the property where his house was located, without any obligation to pay rents to Dela Rama. His claim of ownership of his own portion was borne out by strong evidence. Although the contract of purchase between Ramirez and Lutosquien was silent about his portion, his being co-buyer with Lutosquien was confirmed by the several receipts issued to him by the seller Ramirez. Those receipts, signed by Dela Rama herself as her brother's collection agent, explicitly showed that the payments were Antipolo's installments for the portion of lot 153-A-21 that he was buying. The lower courts therefore grossly erred in appreciating the record when they concluded that the receipts did not support his allegations of installment payments.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court held that Dela Rama, as plaintiff, failed to discharge her burden of proof, for it is a basic rule of evidence that she who alleges a fact has the burden to prove it. The Court quoted the rule:

Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.

Consequently, dismissal of the action was the logical outcome.

Doctrine

First, in an ejectment case, the plaintiff must prove that the property occupied by the defendant is the very property covered by the plaintiff's title or claim. A complaint that describes a lot different from the lot actually occupied cannot prosper, for the cause of action does not extend beyond the property alleged and proved.

Second, tolerance as a ground for ejectment must be proved by the plaintiff, because it is the fact she alleges. Under Section 1 of Rule 131, the burden of proof rests on the party who would fail without evidence on the facts in issue, and the plaintiff who alleges tolerance carries that burden.

Third, receipts signed by the plaintiff as collection agent for the seller, showing that the defendant paid installments on the portion he occupies, are competent evidence of the defendant's right to possess that portion, and they negate any obligation to pay rent to the plaintiff.

Disposition

The Supreme Court gave due course to and granted the petition for review, reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated March 25, 2003, and dismissed the case, with costs of suit against Dela Rama.

Remember This

An ejectment suit cannot reach a lot that the plaintiff's title does not cover, and the plaintiff who alleges tolerance bears the burden of proving it. Examiners use this case to test the identity of the subject property in ejectment and the application of the burden of proof under Section 1 of Rule 131.